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Abstract 
Though the civil-military relations field has seen a lot of theoretical work in recent years, the field 
still lacks consistent overarching theories. This dissertation argues that the field requires a new and 
better theoretical framework. Scholars do not agree about how to define key concepts or how these 
concepts affect one another. They therefore have a tendency to talk past one another when 
debating and developing theories of civil-military relations.  
 This dissertation develops a new and more sophisticated theoretical framework for elite 
civil-military relations. The field’s current theoretical framework was developed by Samuel 
Huntington in The Soldier and the State. This dissertation uses his framework as a starting point for a 
larger conceptual analysis, where political and military sociology, international relations, political 
theory, and military science are used to define the key concepts of civil-military relations.  
There are two heterogeneous types of civil-military relations that should be studied 
separately: societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. Political science 
approaches to civil-military relations, such as this dissertation, typically focus on the latter type. Elite 
civil-military relations consist of two separate fields of study: civilian control and military 
effectiveness. Elite civil-military relations function as a system that essentially depends on civilian 
overall preferences, the mutual trust between soldiers and civilians, the institutional set-up of the 
state, and the actual skills of civilian and military elites.  
 The dissertation challenges several of the field’s established truths. It shows that one cannot 
claim that one civilian control policy is superior a priori. Instead, the choice of policy depends on the 
situational circumstances. It also shows that military professionalism plays a less significant role than 
commonly thought. It clarifies that civilian control depends on both the internal norms of the officer 
corps and the external control institutions of the state. Finally, it demonstrates that Samuel 
Huntington’s work, though clearly impressive for its time, lacks the sophistication needed of a 
modern social science theory and theoretical framework. It therefore argues that the civil-military 
relations field should move beyond The Soldier and the State.  
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- 1 - 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation is about civil-military relations theory. It examines how much we know about the 
way soldiers and civilians interact in advanced, Western democracies and – perhaps more 
importantly – what we do not know, and why we do not know it.1 After a wave of new theoretical 
work on civil-military relations, the development of new theory has come to a halt. From the mid-
1990s and for the next decade, the field saw a blossoming of studies that tried to develop a new 
theoretical view of the fundamental problems associated with civil-military relations. There was a 
willingness to use new methods to develop more consistent theories that questioned some of the 
established assumptions made by the field’s founders.2 These new theories criticized past scholars, 
who had established the field in the 1950s and -60s. However, as will be described more thoroughly 
later in this dissertation, though the new theories gave new attention and vigor to the field and 
presented alternatives to past theories, the field remains caught up in some of the same debates 
that have characterized it since its beginning. Though we now have more detailed perspectives on 
how soldiers and civilians interact, one could claim that we are hardly closer to a definitive theory.  
 This dissertation explores why this is so, and what to do about it. How do we develop better 
theories of civil-military relations? What are the barriers for developing better overall theories of 
civil-military relations? The fundamental issue is that the civil-military relations field lacks a coherent 
theoretical framework – that is, a coherent system of definitions and causal relations concerned with 
all inquiry within a scientific field. Most civil-military relations theories focus on studying different 
sub-processes and are derived from careful empirical analyses of historical cases. Yet, none of these 
present these many dimensions in one coherent framework. The one exception was Samuel 
Huntington’s The Soldier and the State, which became the field’s fundamental theoretical 
framework. However, his framework does not adequately define the field’s key concepts. 
Developing a theoretical framework was just one of the many things that Huntington set out to 
accomplish in that work. It also contained a treatise on Western military history, a theory of military 
sociology, and a theory of civilian control of the military. Alas, the theoretical framework got buried 
beneath these many purposes. The categories that Huntington defined were not explained 
                                                          
1
 I follow the precedence within the literature and focus on the relationship between the officer corps and 
various dimensions of civilian society. I use different synonyms for officer (such as “military man”, “soldier”, 
“general” and “warrior”) to refer to the officer corps for the sake of style. I use the terms properly when the 
distinction between officers and lower ranks is relevant.  
2
 Feaver, Peter D. (1999): Civil-Military Relations, in Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 2, pp. 213 & 230-33.  
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adequately and he never mapped out the various fault lines within the field. Consequently, when 
future scholars operated within his framework, they found it difficult to use his categories to 
describe the phenomena they were studying.  
Having established that the lack of clear concepts and causal maps is the main barrier for 
new theories, this dissertation then develops an alternative theoretical framework. This is a task akin 
to the one Kenneth Waltz faced, when he wrote Man, the State and War. Dissatisfied with the basic 
international relations categories – especially the ones used to study the possibility of a durable 
peace - Waltz asked himself how one should think about war and peace.3 Understanding how to 
think was a prerequisite for understanding what to think. He shied away from making yet another 
empirical analysis of different dependent and independent variables. Instead, he ventured into the 
realm of conceptual analysis, from which he developed a theoretical framework for international 
relations. The cause of war and peace, he ventured, had to be identified on at least one of three 
conceptual planes: they were either found within human nature (the first image), the nature of 
society (the second image), or the relationship between states (the third image), with the latter 
factor being the most likely cause. 4  Waltz’ taxonomy seemed simple. However, before its 
publication, international relations scholars did not always talk about the same phenomena. Once 
Waltz’ framework was presented, its clarity seemed obvious and it soon became influential within 
the study of international affairs. Today, when presented with a new theory of international 
relations, scholars will typically begin by asking if it provides a first, second, or third image 
explanation for war and peace. 
This dissertation attempts to accomplish the same feat, albeit within the much smaller civil-
military relations field. I make a conceptual analysis of civil-military relations, thus hoping to provide 
a clearer language through which to talk about the relationship between war and politics. The 
conclusions presented in this dissertation may seem obvious. However, like Waltz’ three images, I 
would venture that stating them explicitly provides a starting point for theoretical research currently 
missing within the field. It is my hope that summarizing our entire stock of knowledge and showing 
how different theorists relate to one another can create a foundation for more focused, and 
revealing research.  
The first step in doing so is to define civil-military relations as such. The term “civil-military 
relations” is rarely defined and often misunderstood. There is no set consensus about what “civil-
military relations” actually means. Strictly speaking, as Vladimir Rukavishnikov and Michael Pugh 
correctly note, civil-military relations simply refer to “the relationship between civilians (‘people 
                                                          
3
 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959): Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University 
Press, pp. 2 & 12.  
4
 Waltz (1959). 
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without arms’), the society at large, and the military (‘the people with arms)”.5 Civil-military relations 
encompass every aspect of social life, where people who are defined as soldiers or warriors have 
something to do with people who are defined as civilians. Scholars, however, use the term to mean 
different things. Some use it to mean the relationship between elite actors. Others use it to mean 
the cooperation between civilian and military institutions aimed at implementing solutions to 
military problems – what is commonly known as civil-military cooperation (or CIMIC). Some use it to 
mean the relationship between the military and civil society groups.  
In this dissertation, I will distinguish between societal civil-military relations and elite civil-
military relations. Societal civil-military relations describe how the military plays a functional role in 
enabling society to survive. Societal civil-military relations therefore cover at the role of military 
power in society in general and how it interacts with grand scale societal transformations over time. 
It also includes the relationship between the military and members of civil society. Elite civil-military 
relations, by contrast, describe the interaction between soldiers and civilians within the state – 
relations between the members of the executive and legislative branch and the most senior 
members of the officer corps. The state is the primary directive component in society.6 The 
processes that go on within the state differ significantly from the processes that characterize society 
at large. It therefore makes sense to distinguish between them. The two are intermingled and 
influence one another. However, they operate according to separate logics. “Civil-military relations” 
is an umbrella term that encompasses both societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military 
relations.  
The distinction between societal civil-military and elite civil-military relations also highlights 
a disciplinary difference between sociology and political science.7 Military sociologists study the 
nature of military identity and the patterns of social interaction within the armed forces. Soldiers 
commonly define themselves, and their activities, by contrasting them with civilian life. In other 
words, civil-military relations are a fundamental part of military identity. Sociologists are therefore 
primarily interested in societal civil-military relations.  
 By contrast, political science approaches to civil-military relations focuses on elite civil-
military relations. Political scientists study the role of power in society. The main power mechanism 
in contemporary society is the state. When political scientists talk about civil-military relations, they 
                                                          
5
 Rukavishnikov Vladimir O. & Michael Pugh (2003): Civil-Military Relations, in Caforio, Guiseppe (2003): 
Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, New York: Kluwer Academic, p. 131.  
6
 I follow Anthony Giddens by defining the state as “a political organization whose rule is territorially ordered 
and which is able to mobilize the means of violence to sustain that rule” (Giddens, Anthony (1987): A 
Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Volume 2: The Nation-State and Violence, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, p. 20). The state should be distinguished from society, which is a system of social 
relationships based on a shared culture. The state is thus an institution within society.  
7
 Feaver (1999), pp. 212-13.  
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often implicitly mean elite civil-military relations. To be sure, societal civil-military relations and elite 
civil-military relations are intertwined and political scientists have to understand societal civil-
military relations to understand elite civil-military relations. The power relations within the state can 
only be understood by looking at how power is generated outside of the state and by grasping the 
requirements the state have to fulfill in order to survive. For instance, part of the military’s power 
stems from its general acceptance and popularity within civil society. Understanding how this power 
is generated is therefore a precondition for understanding elite civil-military relations. Political 
scientists cannot examine elite civil-military relations in isolation, but should include societal civil-
military relations in their models. However, for a political scientist, these processes are only 
interesting because they influence the state’s ability to generate resources. Societal civil-military 
relations are of secondary importance.8 
This dissertation is essentially a political science study. It focuses on elite civil-military 
relations and aims to produce a theoretical framework that emphasizes the main questions that 
theorists should ask themselves. It highlights the main variables and causal relations that shape elite 
civil-military relations. However, the study does not examine elite civil-military relations in isolation. 
In order to explore the mechanisms that shape elite civil-military relations, it also examines societal 
civil-military relations in depth to see how these relations affect the elite level. This involves 
including sociological and anthropological analytical models that uncover how war interacts with 
large-scale societal trends to shape the nature of society. The model of societal civil-military 
relations claims to uncover all the main societal civil-military processes that have a political impact 
on the elite level. In other words, the study does not provide a comprehensive model of societal 
civil-military relations. Instead, it produces a model of societal civil-military relations with a political 
impact. The resulting theoretical framework is therefore a comprehensive model of the of elite civil-
military relations (in advanced, Western nation-state democracies) that includes a model of societal 
civil-military relations with a political impact. It is a comprehensive political science framework, but 
not a comprehensive framework for sociologists, anthropologists or other social scientists that study 
civil-military relations. 
 
 
This is a brief overview of the theoretical framework of civil-military relations. The central question 
within the study of elite civil-military relations is which policy the civilian government should use to 
                                                          
8
 Civil-military relations are sometimes taken to mean the same as civilian control of the military. In this 
dissertation, I argue that this is not the case. Civilian control is an important dimension of civil-military 
relations and can be studied as an independent topic. However, there is more to civil-military relations than 
just the question of the civilian leadership being capable of controlling the military.  
9 
 
control its armed forces. Political leaders face a choice between either direct or institutional policies. 
There are essentially three types of direct civilian control policies available to policymakers: they can 
allow the military autonomy over tactical and operational details (objective control); they can 
meddle in these details (assertive control); or they can interfere in the very organizational structure 
of the military and make it more like a civilian agency (subjective control). Subjective control is rare 
in modern democracies. Instead, policymakers typically decide between objective and assertive 
control. Institutional policies involve establishing external control institutions that allow the civilians 
to detect and punish military shirking. Neither of these options is optimal a priori. Instead, the choice 
of policy depends on the health and consistency of elite civil-military system. 
A society’s elite civil-military relations constitute a complex system of factors.9 Five key 
variables are central to how the system functions: the priorities of the civilian government, the 
civilian trust of the military, the military trust of the civilians, the external institutions that define 
their mutual interaction, and the actual skills of the military and civilian elites. These variables are 
mutually related and thus constitute a system. The purpose of the system is to maximize the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the state. However, its ability to achieve these goals depends both on 
the elite civil-military system per se and on a plethora of exogenous factors that determine the 
health and strength of the system: the general legitimacy of the government, state, and constitution; 
the civilian strategic culture; the values defining military culture; administrative reforms; popular 
militarism; the skills and personalities of individual leaders; the general level of threat; and the 
character of the conflicts in which the state engages. The choice of policy should be tailored to the 
state of the fundamentals of the elite civil-military system.  
The relationship between soldiers and civilians is, in essence, a classic example of an 
information asymmetry caused by delegation. The civilians delegate the implementation of military 
policy to the armed forces. However, because the officer corps knows more about the details of 
military policy, it then becomes difficult for the government to ensure that the military is 
implementing their intended policies. These problems are exacerbated by certain specific features of 
defense policy. Defense policy is characterized by a high degree of secrecy, which makes it difficult 
for certain civilian institutions, for instance the media, to detect any potential problems. 
Furthermore, the military has a comparatively high degree of informal power, which it can use to 
resist any changes that do not suit its preferences. Thus, the system is shaped by both formal and 
informal power relations. The civilian leadership typically wields extensive formal power, mandated 
by the constitution. However, the military often holds various forms of informal power, which allows 
                                                          
9
 This claim is implicitly present in much of the existing literature, but I am – to my knowledge – the first to 
formulate this argument explicitly and place it within a comprehensive framework.  
10 
 
it to influence government policies, either directly or indirectly. This power is typically used in a 
convoluted and unreported manner, which makes it difficult to trace.  
Elite civil-military relations studies typically look at one of two analytically distinct topics. 
Civilian control is the civilian leadership’s ability to control the armed forces. Military effectiveness is 
defined as the capacity to generate military force from a state’s basic resources in wealth, 
technology, population size, and human capital. Neither civilian control nor military effectiveness is 
accomplished through one particular civilian control policy. Instead, they each depend on the 
circumstances.  
Civilians control the military through a combination of external and internal mechanisms. 
External mechanisms refer to the use of institutions to monitor and punish military actors. 
Institutions essentially influence the payoffs of behaving in one or another manner. Institutions can 
delimit the incentive to act against the will of the government by making it easier for the 
government to detect and punish such behavior. Internal mechanisms are defined as the creation of 
a military culture of loyalty. The soldier is more easily controlled if he feels loyal to the democratic 
institutions of the state. 10  
Military effectiveness depends on the balance between need for a division of labor between 
soldiers and civilians and the need for strategic coherence. Soldiers are professional experts in 
warfare, while civilian politicians are experts in politics. This division of expertise informs the division 
of labor between soldiers and civilians. However, the civilian leadership has to ensure that there is 
strategic coherence – that is, that the military bureaucracy gathers information and implements 
decision in a way that reflects overall national strategy. This can only be done by meddling in 
decisions within the armed forces’ purview.  
The dilemmas of elite civil-military relations originate in the fundamental problems of 
societal civil-military relations. One of the defining features of modern, democratic society is the 
general need for accountability. Accountability means that political leaders are believed to be 
responsible to the people they govern and that they are thought to govern in the interest of all 
members of society.11 The state must give the impression that it pursues the interests of the 
population in order to ensure the loyalty, taxes, and manpower needed to secure its survival. This 
relationship between state and population is largely unique to modern, democratic societies. In both 
                                                          
10
 In this dissertation, I define “culture” as “the stock of knowledge from which [actors] supply themselves with 
interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the world” (Habermas, Jürgen (1987): 
The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2: The Critique of Functionalist Reason, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
p. 138). “Norms” are specific cultural entities that prescribe normative action. “Institutions” are formal 
organizations. One of the purposes of institutions is typically to socialize individuals into a specific culture. 
11
 This definition is largely inspired by, yet not similar to, the one provided by Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 
Francis (2011): The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Geroux, p. 321).  
11 
 
pre-modern societies and contemporary undemocratic societies, the need for accountability, albeit 
present, is less pronounced. This feature of modern society explains the need for civilian control. 
Modern society is built up around a notion of accountability, which makes the government the agent 
of the people and the civil service the agent of the government. The government has to control the 
military because it is part of the accountability principle, from which it derives its legitimacy.12  
All societies have to find a balance between a societal and a functional imperative. The state 
has to stay legitimate, while ensuring that it wields military force effectively. Accountability 
influences the societal imperative. The societal imperative is the degree to which domestic features 
of society may obstruct the state from pursuing an optimal political course. If the ideas, the 
institutions, or special interests within a society diminish its ability to counter military threats, we 
ascribe these problems to the societal imperative. Simply put, is the understanding of military 
threats in accordance with the actual threats facing the state? Ideological currents within society can 
either under- or overestimate the need for military force. The degree to which elite decisions are 
influenced by societal currents is also significant. In modern societies, the accountability principle 
generally means that elite thinking may be influenced by currents within the populace at large.  
The functional imperative is the material requirements that a society has to fulfill in order to 
survive. Simply put, the state needs to accumulate power to ensure that enemy societies do not cut 
off its access to material resources. This grows out of the general competition between states in the 
international realm and military force is one of the power accumulation tools available to the state. 
Depending on the level and nature of the threats facing it, the state may need to be able to employ 
military force effectively. Most modern states – at least the United States – are in a situation, where 
military force is only of secondary importance.  
  
 
This dissertation provides a new starting point for political science-based research in civil-military 
relations. The field’s existing theoretical framework, which was developed and presented in The 
Soldier and the State, lacks the accuracy needed for a mature social scientific field. Many of the 
concepts within this work are not defined accurately. Furthermore, its causal logic is vague, or even 
contradictory at times. Huntington’s work has played an important role in defining the civil-military 
relations field. However, the lack of an adequate theoretical framework has become a stumbling 
block for the theoretical development of the field. Too many theoretical studies are critiques of 
Huntington’s categories. By providing a comprehensive study that mines Huntington’s work for 
                                                          
12
 To use the definition developed by Jean-Marie Coicaud, “[l]egitimacy is the recognition of the right to 
govern” (Coicaud, Jean-Marie (2002): Legitimacy and Politics. A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and 
Political Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 10).  
12 
 
valuable terms and corrects ambiguities within his framework, I hope this thesis provides a 
foundation for more accurate theoretical work. This dissertation thus introduces the policy choice 
facing the civilians into a wider theoretical framework and presents a causally consistent model of 
elite civil-military relations; a better understanding of the dynamics of civilian control and military 
effectiveness; a more accurate description of the military expertise; and an improved model of 
societal civil-military relations. A theory derived correctly from this theoretical framework will, I 
believe, be more sensitive to the problems and debates within contemporary civil-military relations.  
This is the first comprehensive study of civil-military relations theory in its entirety.13 Others 
have explored the history of the field or tried to give an overview of one or a few of its essential fault 
lines. However, no-one has provided a framework that encapsulates the field’s core fissures and 
debates. Unlike other meta-studies, this dissertation combines the study of the debate with an 
investigation of the fundamental nature of civil-military relations. Indeed, it argues that we have 
never clarified the very nature of civil-military relations. This has affected not only our theories, but 
also the existing meta-analyses. Simply put, one cannot explore how others debate an issue, if one 
does not have a clear grasp of the nature of the issue itself. In lieu of a clear understanding of the 
nature of civil-military relations, meta-theorists have focused on the key debates of the moment and 
erroneously promoted them as being the essential debate within the field. For instance, most meta-
analyses claim that the theoretical core split runs between Huntingtonians, who argue that military 
professionalism leads to good civil-military relations, and Janowitzians, who, though they cherish 
professionalism, argue that perfect professionalism is impossible.14 However, this view does not 
capture the fundamental debate within the field. Huntington and Janowitz wrote on different 
analytical levels and essentially explored different topics. Huntington was a political scientist who 
mainly investigated how civil-military relations influenced political government. Janowitz was a 
sociologist who focused primarily on military identity. Huntington’s argument contained an 
argument about military identity, which Janowitz challenged. Yet the latter did not confront the 
entirety of Huntington’s argument. Indeed, the civil-military relations field consists of several topics 
that rarely communicate with one another. Each of these topics is structured around a debate 
between different theories. The debate between Huntingtonians and Janowitzians is perhaps the 
                                                          
13
 Feaver (1999) presents an excellent overview of the history and some of the fault lines of the field. However, 
he does not give a comprehensive description of its debates and causal dynamics.  
14
 See for instance, Feaver (1996), pp. 157-67; Burk, James (2002): Theories of Democratic Civil-Military 
Relations, in Armed Forces and Society, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 7-29; Nielsen, Suzanne C. (2005): Civil-Military 
Relations and Military Effectiveness, in Public Administration and Management, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 61-84; Cohn, 
Lindsey (2003): Civil-Military Relations in the U.S., in Callaghan, Jean M. & Franz Kernic (2003): Armed Forces 
and International Security. Global Trends and Issues, Münster: LIT Verlag, pp. 65-72. Notable exceptions 
include Johnson, Douglas and Steven Metz (1995): Civil-Military Relations in the United States. The State of the 
Debate, in Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 195-213.  
13 
 
most obvious example of these many debates. The standard meta-theoretical analyses therefore fail 
to capture the nub of the debate within the field. By providing a coherent theoretical framework, 
this dissertation seeks to ensure that fundamental misunderstandings can be avoided. By defining 
what we are talking about, it essentially allows us to ask the right questions.  
 Why civil-military relations, and why theory? Is it really worth our while to look at how 
different scholars study how soldiers and civilians interact? The relationship between those who 
carry arms, and the rest of us, touches something fundamental in society. The separation between 
warriors and civilians has puzzled thinkers since the beginning of political philosophy. Even in our 
modern and complex society, understanding how civilians and the military can develop a good 
relationship to one another is vital. The end of the Cold War led to a more peaceful and prosperous 
world, but it did not lead to a world without war. The past two decades have been awash with 
armed conflicts. The international system has changed, societies have changed, the character of war 
has changed, and consequently, the rules for civil-military relations are in a state of change. Political 
scandals and tensions – the ambiguous evidence that led to the Iraq war, the debates about 
inclusion in the American armed forces, the alleged insubordination or indiscretion of officers in the 
public debate - followed in the slipstream of the new wars. Being able to judge who is right and who 
is wrong, and to which extend these civil-military conflicts are politically problematic, is of the 
utmost importance.  
 Why is it necessary to have good theories about civil-military relations? The civil-military 
relations field is largely empirical and non-theoretical.15 Developing coherent theories furthers our 
knowledge and helps both scientific scholarship and practical policymaking. Theories summarize our 
knowledge into a more useful and coherent concentration of causal statements. They enable us to 
access the big picture of a specific phenomenon quickly without having to know all the small details. 
When we condense our knowledge into causal statements, we naturally evaluate the strength of 
each factor. Thus, theory helps us predict future events and better understand how practitioners 
should go about handling real-life policy-problems. When we face new situations – as we did from 
1989 onward - having a more holistic theoretical guide helps us to understand how these 
phenomena have functioned, or are likely to function.16 The international system is constantly in flux 
and it is likely that we will soon face new threats and problems. A better general understanding of 
how these problems create civil-military challenges is essential if we are to grasp how to react to 
them. Though one should be hesitant to echo John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s assertion that 
“the creation and refinement of theory is the most important activity in [the scientific] enterprise”, it 
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seems safe to say that good theories are the backbone of any healthy scientific field, and necessary 
for sound decision-making.17 
The Cold War theories of civil-military relations were of little help in the new, post-1989 
security environment. For instance, the Cold War theories focused mainly on the concept of 
professionalism. They implicitly assumed that making the military more professional would diminish 
civil-military tensions. This focus on professionalism was less relevant when discussing many of the 
new civil-military problems. For example, the military’s resistance to the legalization of homosexual 
soldiers could not be explained as a matter of only professionalism. Other mechanisms had to play a 
role. The Cold War theories were middle-range theories that tended to focus on the conditions at 
the time of writing. They did not seek to generalize beyond the Cold War to describe how civil-
military relations work, as such; or how new conditions might create quite different challenges. The 
wave of new theories from the mid-1990s should be seen as a reaction to the limitations of the 
classical theories. However, in retrospect, the new theories did not replace the Cold War masters. 
Instead, the field became more fragmented and revolved around a patchwork of old and new 
theories. By investigating how we can develop better theories of civil-military relations, this 
dissertation hopes to plant the seed that will one day turn facilitate better guides for civil-military 
relations. Without them, the debate about the appropriate amalgamations of civilian and military 
behavior will continue to be relatively random and without useful points of reference.  
 
 
The structure of the dissertation’s argument is molded around the distinction between societal civil-
military relations and elite civil-military relations. It consists of three parts, each of which focuses on 
one of the three components of the overall argument. The first part – contained in chapter 2 - is a 
meta-theoretical analysis of the existing theories of civil-military relations. The civil-military relations 
field is characterized by many different theories, each of which explores a different sub-dimension of 
civil-military relations. Only a few authors address what civil-military relations are per se. Indeed, 
only Samuel Huntington has made a comprehensive theory of the entire topic.18 Consequently, the 
theoretical framework underpinning Huntington’s theory is also the only one of its kind and later 
scholars tend to operate within this framework. Several authors have uncovered significant 
theoretical inconsistencies in his theoretical framework. Huntington’s theory has been shown to be 
empirically inadequate and it has generated unfulfilled predictions. These weaknesses originate in 
his theoretical framework.  
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Having identified the meta-theoretical conundrum that haunts the field, this dissertation 
then seeks to find a theoretical answer in the second and third parts. It aims to develop a theoretical 
framework for civil-military relations. It does so by emulating Huntington’s general methodology. He 
combined insights from political and military sociology with military history and military science to 
arrive at a theoretical framework. Yet where Huntington rather rushed along, exploring his many 
other purposes, I have paused at every theoretical intersection to describe the various conundrums 
and fissures in a landscape of ideas that is still terra incognita. Flagging what we have yet to explore 
may be just as important as the act of charting the known. 
The second part – which consists of chapters 3 and 4 – examines societal civil-military 
relations. All societies balance between a functional and a societal imperative. Chapter 3 explores 
how states generate power to fend off rivals - what Huntington called the functional imperative. It 
argues that military power is just one of the power generation tools available to the modern state. In 
chapter 4, I explore how features within domestic society may obstruct the state’s ability to adapt to 
outside threats – what Huntington called the societal imperative. This involves exploring both how 
society has changed to include a wider set of groups within the decision-making process and how 
ideas can inhibit the state’s ability to adapt to threats.  
The third part, which comprises of chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, focuses on elite civil-military 
relations – this dissertation’s main topic. Chapter 5 focuses on the military. It argues that the 
modern officer is defined as being an expert in warfare. It explores how the role of the officer 
changed from being defined by specific physical characteristics to becoming mainly defined by 
access to abstract systems of technical military knowledge. Chapter 6 and 7 consider civilian control. 
Chapter 6 gives an overview of the mechanisms that define civilian control, which are divided into 
external and internal mechanisms. I show that external control alone cannot fully explain how 
civilians control the military. Our knowledge of internal control, by contrast, is fragmented and we 
lack a coherent conceptual language for understanding how these norms and cultures are created. 
To remedy this, the causal factors shaping military culture are presented in chapter 7, which 
concludes that internal control mechanisms alone cannot explain how civilians control the military. 
The overall conclusion of chapter 6 and 7 is that civilian control is achieved through a combination of 
external and internal mechanisms. Chapter 8 explores the role of military effectiveness, which is 
created by combining a division of labor between soldiers and civilians with centralized political 
control of the decision-making process. Finally, chapter 9 collects all the threads woven in the 
previous four chapters and describes how elite civil-military relations function as a system.  
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I would emphasize three caveats before I venture on. Firstly, this dissertation focuses on civil-
military relations in advanced, Western democracies. Civil-military relations is an enormous topic 
that covers all imaginable political units, from the smallest primordial tribe over the vast empires of 
antiquities to today’s failed states and advanced liberal democracies. Developing a total framework 
for all these different political units is beyond the scope of a single dissertation. Most civil-military 
relations theory has been developed by focusing on liberal democracies, in particular on the United 
States during and after the Cold War. It makes most sense for this dissertation to stay within this 
pattern. I will bring in experiences from other societies, epochs, and political units whenever I need 
to address phenomena that have not occurred in the United States, or need to show the historical 
background of a specific condition. However, the dissertation’s core focus is on the civil-military 
interaction in relation to the political governance of advanced, Western democracies.  
Secondly, the present study focuses on civil-military relations in modern nation-states. It 
examines the historical trajectory that allowed the development of this type of political unit and 
highlights the preconditions and social processes that still today have to be satisfied in order for the 
nation-state to exist. One could argue that this focus on the nation-state is out-dated and that it fails 
to capture the basic reality of modern political life. Some scholars claim that the nation-state era is 
over, and that we are moving towards a period of post-sovereign governance, where sub- and supra-
units organize social and political life. Others emphasize that many societies are organized around 
political units that do not fit into the nation-state model. I do not examine civil-military relations in 
the post-sovereign era or in other political units in this dissertation. The purpose of the present 
study is to provide an ideal-type of elite civil-military relations – that is, a model of contemporary 
civil-military relations that are isolated from the specificities of each individual case. Such an ideal-
type requires that one explores civil-military relations in the most pervasive contemporary political 
unit. For better or for worse, the nation-state has proven itself to be perhaps the most competitive 
type of political form. Most contemporary societies are organized as variances of the nation-state. 
To be sure, other studies can widen our understanding of contemporary civil-military relations by 
examining how these relations play out in the post-sovereign era or in non-nation-states. They 
would benefit from having the present study as a mainstream model that can be used in 
comparative analyses. They would be able to capture the richness of the political units they explore 
by criticizing the nation-state model provided in this dissertation. 
Thirdly, this dissertation will use an abstract notion of war. Clausewitz argued that the 
nature of war is constant, but that the character of war is changing. He used more cryptic terms to 
describe this feature of war, when he argued that “[w]ar is more than a true chameleon that slightly 
17 
 
adapts its characteristics to the given case.”19 By this he meant that all wars contain universal 
features, which allow us to distinguish war from other types of human activity. However, no two 
conflicts will ever be the same and their differences are not just a matter of appearance. Different 
wars are fought under different premises. There is a vast difference between the counterinsurgency 
wars fought in the past decade and the massive, near-absolute wars, like the massive 
Materialschlacht of the First World War, where states strike at each other with their entire material 
and industrial potential. I will not investigate how different types of war change civil-military 
relations. Including this variable would add one layer of complexity too many and probably make a 
fairly complicated dissertation well-nigh unreadable. I will follow Martin Shaw in seeing war as “the 
systematic and extensive use of violence as a means of policy by an organized social group claiming 
(but not necessarily exercising) legitimate control over a given territory, against another such group 
(or groups).”20 War changes from time to time, but largely varies with the severity of the threat 
involved.  
Fourthly, this dissertation focuses on descriptive, rather than normative, theory. The 
purpose of the present work is facilitate the creation of models that allow us to predict how civil-
military relations play out in advanced, Western democracies. I am mainly interested in 
understanding the processes that drive civil-military relations. The ethics of civil-military relations – 
to which extent patterns of civil-military relations are conducive for the good life - are of only 
secondary importance. To be sure, there is no such thing as entirely value-free descriptive science.  
Descriptive studies implicitly assume that some states of affairs are more desirable than others. The 
present study, for instance, assumes that liberal democracy is a normatively defendable political 
model and that liberal democracies have a right to wage war to protect themselves against enemy 
aggression.21 It implicitly assumes that understanding how this is best done without infringing on the 
domestic political structures of the state is a justifiable and reasonable endeavor. 
Fifthly, this study does not engage in theory testing and it only uses empirical data for 
illustrative purposes. Instead, it focuses on exploring the theoretical coherence of the conceptual 
language of civil-military relations. The purpose of this study is to develop a theoretical framework – 
but not a theory - of civil-military relations. Developing a theoretical framework is a substantial task 
– turning the theoretical framework into a theory as well would be a task that went beyond what 
one can expect to do in a single dissertation. The choice to only do a theoretical framework shapes 
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my choice of empirical data. Theories and theoretical frameworks require different types of data. I 
will examine the distinction between theories and theoretical frameworks further in chapter 2, 
where I also provide exact definitions of the two terms. Basically, a theoretical framework is a 
coherent set of definitions and causal relations concerned with all inquiry within a scientific field. 
Theoretical frameworks specify the questions with which scholars within a specific scientific field 
concern themselves. They define the most important variables and give an overview of how these 
variables affect one another. Theories, by contrast, provide answers to those questions. They aim to 
explain and predict a class of phenomena. Doing so entails showing that variable B is more important 
than variables A and C, even though the latter may also influence the phenomenon in question. They 
develop hypotheses and test whether these hypotheses are empirically true. This requires that cases 
are chosen in a rigorous manner to ensure that they allow the scholar to weigh the value of variable 
B against variables A and C. In comparison, theoretical frameworks do not have to unpack the 
strength of variables A, B, and C. Instead, they only have to show that these variables all have crucial 
causal effect on the phenomenon in question. Doing so does not require the same systematic 
approach to the choice of cases. The empirical data only needs to show that a causal relationship 
exists and that it is important – not that it is the most important one. In this dissertation, I only use 
empirical cases to illustrate the value of certain factors and that certain causal relations exist. 
Finally, I will be criticizing Samuel Huntington’s work throughout this dissertation. It may 
sound as if I am trying to denigrate his academic reputation or make light of his scholarly 
accomplishments.  Nothing could be further from my intentions. Huntington’s achievements are 
impressive by any standards. He defined an entirely new field of study, which forced him to explore 
many different topics. He could probably do nothing but rush through these many tasks. 
Furthermore, he was also hampered by the incompleteness of the sociological models of his time. 
Many conclusions have been made within the fields of political and military sociology in the past 
fifty-odd years. Standing on the shoulders of the recent political and sociological thinkers, who have 
explored the relationship between society and warfare in the last decades, allows me to arrive at 
more precise and consistent definitions - to move forward, where Huntington had to hold back. The 
more complex and coherent recent theories of military and political sociology permit me describe 
the basic mechanisms of civil-military interaction in more detail. Doing so, I argue, will allow us to 
move the civil-military relations field beyond The Soldier and the State.  
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Part I: Theories of civil-military relations  
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- 2 - 
The past and present of civil-military relations theory 
 
This dissertation explores how we can develop better theories of civil-military relations. The first 
step is, of course, to look at our present theories. This chapter explores the fundamental theoretical 
debates within the civil-military relations field. To what extent, it asks, do the existing theories 
explore the nature of civil-military relations?  
The existing theories do not capture the core nature of civil-military relations. The field is 
structured around a theoretical framework developed by Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the 
State. Huntington’s work moved the field from largely idiographic, historically minded scholarship 
towards more general, nomothetic social science theories. He developed a theoretical framework 
for the field by marrying insights from political sociology with military science and history and used 
this framework to generate a theory of civil-military relations. Later studies have shown that 
Huntington’s theory was unable to predict the outcome of civil-military interaction. They have also 
uncovered fundamental inaccuracies in various sub-dimensions of his theoretical framework. 
However, no theorist has provided overarching alternatives to Huntington’s theory or theoretical 
framework. Instead, scholars focus on exploring these sub-dimensions in greater detail. The field is 
therefore dominated by an inaccurate overarching theory and an inadequate theoretical framework. 
The main obstacle blocking the development of a better overarching theory is the lack of an accurate 
theoretical framework.  
The argument of the chapter consists of three sections. The first section explores the nature 
of theory. The second section looks at how the civil-military relations field came into being, while the 
third section examines civil-military relations theory after Huntington.  
 
What is a theory? 
Debates about the nature of theory do not take up much space in the social sciences. Many social 
scientists simply use the word theory for any general statement about a relationship between two 
entities. For the purpose of this thesis, however, a firmer grasp of what it means for something to be 
a theory is needed. Ernest Nagel defined theory as 
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“a set of statements, organized in a characteristic way, and designed to serve as partial 
premisses [sic] for explaining as well as predicting an indeterminately large (and usually 
varied) class of … phenomena.”22 
 
Theories should be distinguished from laws and theoretical frameworks. Laws are defined as 
“relationships between things or features of things that are commonly said to be themselves 
observable”.23 For instance, the fact that water evaporates when heated above a certain threshold 
temperature is a law.24 A certain law-like relationship can be observed between a cause (placing an 
open container over a flame) and an effect (the water in the container boiling and evaporating).  
By contrast, theories explain laws. They provide a causal story that explains why we see that 
specific pattern and predicts how the same object would react in a different, often hitherto not 
observed, context. To use our example from before, the theory of thermodynamics employs our 
general ideas of the molecular consistency of water to explain the evaporation processes.25 It allows 
us to predict how water would react in circumstances that have not been observed. Based on these 
explanations, one can pinpoint the exact causal relationship that compels water to boil, and make 
predictions about how the same fluid would react to different experiments. Theories develop causal 
stories by marrying empirically observable laws with a system of definitions and causal relations that 
specify the nature of the object of study. To develop a theory of how and when water boils, one 
must ask the basic question, what is water? This necessarily involves more than just simple 
observations of the object of study. Each theory thus has a speculative element that goes beyond 
mere observation. Developing a theory involves knitting together different concepts through careful 
considerations of the nature of the concepts. It is by coming to terms with the very essence of the 
thing that the scholar develops a theory that can explain why an empirical incident occurs and how it 
will occur under different preconditions.26 For instance, the theory of thermodynamics depends on a 
set of definitions of water, molecules, and heat. These definitions must be internally consistent in 
order to explain one another. All the concepts have to be defined and the causal relationship 
between each concept has to be unpacked.  
A coherent system of definitions and causal relations concerned with all inquiry within a 
specific scientific field – the very thing that separates theories from mere laws - is referred to as a 
theoretical framework. These frameworks depend on a criterion of internal coherence. A theoretical 
framework examines and defines the nature of the object of study. Based on its fundamental 
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definition of the basic unit of study, it is then capable of defining all concepts within the specific 
field. For instance, the notion of atoms and molecules serve as the starting point for the theoretical 
framework behind the theory of thermodynamics. From the basic idea that molecules are made up 
of atoms, scientists are able to understanding the process that occurs when water is heated. This 
simple observation allows us to understand and define notions like pressure, fluid, and steam that 
are central to understanding the heating process.  
Theoretical frameworks are not just lists of definitions. They also sketch the main causal 
relations driving a phenomenon. However, these causal stories are not as exact as the ones provided 
by theories. Whereas theories identify the most important causal relations amongst a large set of 
relations, a theoretical framework simply describes the main lines of causality present without 
passing judgment about their importance. It is agnostic about the matter, so to speak.  
Theoretical frameworks are mainly judged by the internal coherence of their definitions and 
causality. Laws are mainly evaluated by the correspondence between a statement (for instance, that 
water boils at 100 degrees Celsius) and empirical observations. Theories are assessed by their ability 
to square observable laws with a coherent causal story. They have to satisfy both a correspondence 
and a coherence criterion. Theoretical frameworks, by contrast, are mainly judged by their ability to 
create a coherent causal story.  To be sure, they cannot be entirely disconnected from empirical 
observations of the object in question. For instance, the notions of atoms and molecules were 
crafted through careful interaction between a speculative effort and careful experiments. But the 
empirical requirement asked of a theoretical framework is less substantial than the requirement 
asked that are asked of laws and theories. A theoretical framework only needs to show that certain 
processes occur. It does not have to determine which process is the most important one.  
 The move from law to theory involves asking questions about the nature of the object of 
study. To develop a theory of how and when water boils, one must ask the basic question, what is 
water? This necessarily involves more than just simple observations of the object of study. Each 
theory thus has a speculative element that goes beyond mere observation. Developing a theory 
involves knitting together different concepts through careful considerations of the nature of the 
concepts. Experimentation ensures that each concept somehow reflects a reality beyond mere 
theory. However, it is by coming to terms with the very essence of the thing that the scholar 
develops a theory that can explain why an empirical incident occurs and how it will occur under 
different preconditions.27 For instance, Newton’s theory of gravity consists of careful observations of 
the revolution of planets and falling objects on Earth. However, it was only through abstract 
mathematical speculation that Newton could arrive at a revolutionary theory that could explain why 
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objects behave in a certain manner, and that would predict how they would behave under different 
conditions. Of course, Newton’s theory left a lot of questions un-answered. No theory explains 
everything. However, for certain aspects of physical reality, it provided explanations and predictive 
power. 
 The speculative dimension of theoretical frameworks is developed through carefully refined 
logical tools that capture the essence of phenomena. One of the most prominent innovations within 
theory development is the concept of a system. Systems are notoriously hard to define. As Robert 
Jervis points out, most academics think of systems in the same way Justice Potter Stewart defined 
pornography in Jacobellis vs Ohio: “I know it when I see it.”28 Indeed, most theorists need not define 
this concept, but focus on employing it intuitively. However, for our purposes, a more accurate 
definition is in order. Jervis provides such a definition:  
 
“We are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so 
that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the 
system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different 
from those of the parts.”29 
 
Behind that notion is the basic insight that every object can be broken into components, but that the 
object itself is more than the sum of its parts.30 For instance, the solar system is made up of a star, 
planets, and various minor celestial objects. The system is more than just the collection of planets – 
their effect on one another creates something bigger than themselves. Gravity keeps these bodies 
together in the sense that a sudden change in the trajectory of one planet (for example Jupiter) may 
affect the course of the remaining planets.31 Similarly, the human body can be said to consist of the 
mutual relationship between various organs and body parts. Together, they form an entity that is 
different than themselves. Remove one organ (for instance the heart) and the entire system breaks 
down.  
 Both laws and theories make claims that are generalizable beyond the specific 
context of an observation. For instance, the law that water boils when heated would be true at any 
given time under the same conditions. Laws and theories that can be generalized beyond the specific 
observed occurrence are normally said to be nomothetic. Conversely, statements that specifically 
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refer to one-time occurrences are idiographic. For instance, “Napoleon I was the emperor of France” 
is an ideographic statement, because there was only one Napoleon I. The claim cannot be 
generalized beyond the specific context. The social sciences are an odd mix of nomothetic and 
idiographic elements.32 They often strive for general theories, but are constantly limited by the 
impossibility of subsuming a vast and complex reality under the rubrics of one specific theory.  
The early history of general sociology illustrates how theories are developed, and the role 
they play in the furthering of our understanding of the world around us. Of course, the development 
of social science began before social scientists became aware of themselves as something other than 
political philosophers. As Gabriel Almond emphasized, social science reasoning was always implicitly 
present in political philosophy.33 However, in the late 18th and early 19th century, thinkers became 
aware of the possibility of developing a scientific approach to society. Henri Saint-Simon and August 
Comte began to advocate that social phenomena were investigated with methods resembling those 
found in the natural sciences.34 As Jon Elster has recently argued, Alexis de Tocqueville’s work was so 
dedicated to identifying causal mechanisms that he could be seen as the most sophisticated social 
scientist of his generation.35 By the end of the 19th century, the social sciences, most notably 
sociology, had branched off from philosophy. This transformation was largely driven by the 
development of modern, industrial society. As Anthony Giddens has argued, the purpose of 
sociology (and arguably social science as such) was to understand why and how a modern society of 
constant change replaced traditional society.36 
The development of the social sciences was not complete by the middle of the 20th century. 
The early social scientists focused on methodology and on uncovering idiographic trends. That is, 
they focused on studying specific trends in their own right without connecting them to a larger, 
universal social science theory about societies.37 Consider an eminent scholar like Max Weber: 
Weber correctly identified key trends in the society of his time. He explored the notion of 
rationalization and provided meticulous definitions of concepts like the state, bureaucracy, and 
politics that became canonical within the social sciences. He did not, however, define how societies 
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work in various settings.38 Weber’s line of thinking began with the individual and explored how 
society functions by understanding how the individual thought about social life. To speak in systems 
terms, he focused on the components that make up society, rather than on society as such.  
Talcott Parsons’ writings marked a shift towards a more nomothetic line of reasoning.39 
Parsons tried to develop a general definition of society by understanding it as a system.40 The result 
was a labyrinthic – almost incomprehensible – system of definitions and causal relations. According 
to Uta Gerhardt, “students at Harvard in the 1950s who were required to know two foreign 
languages as an entrance requirement for sociology are said to have inquired whether ‘Parsonese’ 
could be one of the two.”41 However, Parsons’ work drove the expansion of social theory further. He 
pulled together different lines of reasoning, showing how seemingly contradictory positions, like 
those held by Weber and Durkheim, could be combined with insights from anthropology and 
ethnology under one theoretical umbrella. An overly simplistic summary of his basic argument might 
run something like this: all societies consist of individuals, cultures, and institutions. Society is made 
up of individuals who need food, shelter and security. It is surrounded by a material environment, 
which it has to interact with in order to produce the material necessities required for its survival. 
This poses a functional pressure from the outside that society must handle.42 Conversely, however, 
as a system, society also depends on the internal relationship between its components.43 As society 
is nothing but the concerted action of individuals - in principle it can only exist as long as the 
individuals feel like being involved. Crudely put, the basic tension in society is between the need for 
economic efficiency, and a sense of community based on normative agreements. Parsons then went 
on to show how institutions and cultural systems help alleviate this basic tension.44 
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By weaving the different intellectual strings together to form a single conceptual fabric, 
Parsons hoped to develop a single theoretical framework for the social sciences that could make 
scholarly discussions clearer.45 Parsons did not accomplish this goal. Although his model of society 
represents an enormous scientific advancement, it has certain crucial blind spots that made it 
vulnerable to attacks. To this day, there is no overarching social theory. There were two reactions to 
this failure. One group of scholars, most notably C. Wright Mills, argued that the search for a general 
theory obfuscated the true purpose of sociology, which was to uncover structures of power and 
abuse in society.46 Other scholars continued Parsons’ project beyond the realm of mainstream 
sociology. There is a large line of literature that still tries to use the notion of systems to tease out an 
even more accurate description of the fundamental processes of society.47 This literature, however, 
is largely isolated from most of the social sciences - and perhaps rightly so, given its complexity and 
lack of empirical applicability.  
Though he did not arrive at a definitive description of society, Parsons’ work had an 
important influence on the social sciences. As William Buxton argues, early political science was, in 
fact, Parsons-inspired political sociology.48 By importing Parsons’ theoretical vocabulary to their own 
sub-disciplines, social scientists suddenly had a ready-made framework that they could use to 
develop coherent theories. For instance, a study of the political system no longer had to develop 
concepts for adjacent areas of study. Instead, the scientist could implicitly turn to Parsons for a 
general idea of the causal mechanics of modern society. In the 1950s and -60s, the nascent discipline 
of political science took a quantum leap in terms of theoretical coherence, in part inspired by 
Parsons’ work.49 Many of the field’s early classic ideas used his model of society as a theoretical 
framework for developing their own theories.50 For instance, Gabriel Almond - a great pioneer in the 
study of political culture – openly identified himself with “the Weber-Parsons tradition in social 
theory”. Among other things, Almond argued that systems analysis was a superior analytical tool, 
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and he used a Parsonian understanding of culture in developing his theories.51 Likewise, Parsons’ 
notion of the social system was of immense importance for Seymour Lipset’s ground-breaking work 
on values and politics.52 His famous notion that legitimacy was essentially a matter of belief clearly 
had roots in Weber’s and Parsons’ thought.53 Other great scholars inspired by Parsons include Karl 
Deutsch, Stein Rokkan, David Easton, Giovanni Sartori and – as will be shown below – Samuel 
Huntington.54 To be sure, many political scientists became dissatisfied with the general and generic 
character of Parsons’ concepts.55 However, the refined concepts that they developed in reaction to 
Parsons already contained a common meaning in the social science community that ensured a 
certain amount of homogeneity within the discipline. 
To sum up, theories allow us to summarize and systematize knowledge and apply it in new 
and innovative settings. They consist of a theoretical framework that defines the crucial concepts 
within a field and the causal relations between them and of laws that map out regularities between 
objects. From its origins in political philosophy, social science has generally moved in a more 
nomothetic direction and has developed increasingly sophisticated theories.  
 
 
The birth of the scientific study of civil-military relations 
The civil-military relations field has developed from an idiographic to a nomothetic field of study. To 
be sure, civil-military relations theory does not lend itself to precise causal arguments that can be 
proved with total certainty. The factors involved are too numerous and the cases too few to allow 
scholars to pinpoint universally valid laws. In his introductory course at Northwestern University, 
Charles Moskos - perhaps the leading military sociologist of his generation - would paraphrase 
Winston Churchill’s famous quip about democracy to describe his own seminal theory. “It is the 
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worst system possible”, he would remark with a grin, “except for all the others.”56 What he meant, 
of course, is that theories within military sociology and civil-military relations are not perfect. It is 
impossible to make general laws about civil-military relations.  
The contemporary study of civil-military relations arose in the United States after 1945.57 It 
was shaped by two historical trends: the changing international security environment after the 
Second World War, and the development of modern social science in the 20th century. The 
contemporary civil-military relations field was born out of the American anxiety about military affairs 
after 1945. In the late 19th and early 20th century, America was shielded from foreign threats by two 
oceans. Consequently, in the decades following the First World War, it could contently follow a 
policy of neutrality and isolation. However, with the European empires crumbling under the weight 
of two world wars, the United States had to fill the power vacuum and become a major military 
power on the world scene. This meant that George Washington’s well-meaning advice “to have with 
[foreign nations] as little political connection as possible[,] (…) to steer clear of permanent alliances 
with any portion of the foreign world” could no longer be followed.58 This gave civil-military relations 
a certain urgency. Policymakers, and the public, sought to understand if this development would 
impede American democracy. Would a strong military be “inauspicious to liberty” as Washington 
had predicted?59 The United States had long prided itself by its isolation from the affairs of the 
continent. Its special strand of liberalism was born out of the individual’s quest for wealth and 
security within a capitalist society, with minimal state control. Could this ideology survive the 
increased spending necessary to retain a large military? Could democratic institutions survive the 
pressure from an institution that was in many respects the upholder of the law?  
In previous societies and eras, such questions would have been tackled by philosophers and 
public intellectuals. In the middle of the twentieth century, social scientists, rather than 
philosophers, took up the gauntlet of understanding the relationship between military affairs and 
political order. As Ira Katznelson has argued, post-war social science was largely driven by normative 
concerns for the future of political life. The horrors of wars and genocide had not been prevented by 
discussions of ethics and morality. Instead, these scholars thought that social scientific studies of the 
conditions of political life could serve as a rough guide to the new and unexpected events that 
modernity seemed to have in store for humanity.60 The post-war study of war and international 
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relations can be seen as a way of understanding the implications of the new situation for American 
democracy.61 Arguably, the literature on civil-military relations was part of this wave. 
The early social scientific study of civil-military relations was built on an existing body of 
work. The study of the relationship between war and politics goes far back, beyond the limits of 
recorded history. As some commentators note, the Homeric epics can be read as metaphorical 
discussions of the relationship between war and political order.62 For Plato – the first philosopher 
whose treatises on politics we have access to in full – the relationship between war and politics was 
of the outmost importance. He saw war as a necessary evil that disturbs the virtue and tranquility of 
the just state. For instance, in The Laws, the last of his major works, he went to great lengths to 
argue against the standard Greek position (represented by the Cretan Cleinias in the dialogue) that 
society and the state exists for the sake of war.63 These discussions recurred throughout the 
subsequent history of ideas, where political philosophers tried to capture how political life and war 
are related to one another.  
We can see the first faint glimmers of a scientific study of civil-military relations in the work 
of the early proto-social scientists of the late 19th and early 20th century. De Tocqueville, for instance, 
dedicated several sections of the second volume of Democracy in America to keen observations on 
the role of military affairs for the new democracy.64 Towards the turn of the 19th century, early 
political sociologists, primarily in Germany, explored how society and military organization were 
mutually constitutive in the 19th century.65 The early literature was largely idiographic, drawing much 
of its strength from military history. The scholars did not attempt to create a theory that would 
explain civil-military relations in all cases. Instead, they focused on looking at how civil-military 
relations functioned in the specific tumultuous setting in which they found themselves.  
Even though the first American civil-military relations scholars identified themselves as social 
scientists, they largely followed this idiographic tradition. Harold Lasswell’s The Garrison State, a 
1941 article in the American Journal of Sociology, was the most important work of this period.66 An 
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outstanding scholar, most famous for his seminal definition of politics as “who gets what, when and 
how”, Lasswell developed several key concept that were instrumental in informing the nascent 
discipline of political science. Writing before the American entrance to the Second World War, 
Lasswell explored how an increased emphasis on military affairs would affect the status of 
democracy in the United States. He projected contemporary trends into the future to see how 
society would turn out.67 He argued that warring societies are held together by a culture of fear. War 
was becoming an increasingly technological endeavor, based on industrial production, and the entire 
production apparatus of society – and thereby the civilian population – was becoming part of the 
war machine. He predicted that civilians would make up the bulk of the victims of future wars. Fear 
would be even more widespread, resulting in the increasing homogeneity of social sentiment and 
the loss of the right to dissent. The “garrison state” –a semi-dictatorial society where “the specialists 
on violence are the most powerful group” – would be the result.68 This society would be held 
together by a mix of fear and propaganda orchestrated by the military-political elite, thus marking 
an end to American liberalism.  
 Lasswell’s approach exemplifies the idiographic, non-theoretical mode of analysis 
characteristic of his era. He did not situate himself within a larger theoretical model of society. 
Instead, he defined key concepts, and the causal relations driving society, anew. The Garrison State 
was awash with undefined concepts and claims that were not backed up with supporting theory. For 
instance, his framework for understanding social change seems to be developed ad hoc and 
disconnected from the literature on social cohesion within political sociology. In overall terms, 
Lasswell’s theoretical framework resulted in a theory, whose predictions diverged from actual 
events.69 
 Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State marked a nomothetic turn in civil-military 
relations theory.70 Huntington - a precocious academic and Army veteran from the Northeast, who 
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graduated with a BA from Yale age 18 and a PhD from Harvard age 23 -was one of those towering, 
eclectic figures one found in the early years of American social science. Moving between the 
academy and the Beltway – his career included a spell as advisor to Zbigniew Brzezinski during the 
Carter years – he was driven by his interest in the salient policy issues of the day. He moved from 
discipline to discipline, writing about whatever topic caught his eye, often defining a new field of 
study along the way. His oeuvre would contain defining, yet often controversial works within 
virtually all subfields of political science. The Soldier and the State, a reworked version of his doctoral 
dissertation, was one such defining work.71 Having witnessed the changes that followed the Second 
World War, he was dissatisfied with Lasswell’s theory, and with the state of civil-military relations 
theory in general: 
 
“The study of civil-military relations has suffered from too little theorizing. The only 
theory of civil-military relations in the United States [Lasswell’s The Garrison State, JRC] 
is a confused and unsystematic set of assumptions and beliefs derived from the 
underlying premises of American liberalism.”72 
 
Huntington rightly recognized that Lasswell lacked a theoretical framework for evaluating the social 
changes that follow military activism. In lieu of a framework, Lasswell implicitly used the 
predominant ideology in society – liberalism – as his baseline for analyzing the normative desirability 
of that change. Consequently, he was incapable of understanding the finer distinctions between 
different types of change. For him, all changes that were not in accordance with liberalism posed a 
threat to democracy as such.73 
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Huntington contributed to civil-military relations by developing a theoretical framework, 
from which he derived a theory of civil-military relations. This theory led him to make policy 
recommendations for the United States government. Huntington aimed to avoid Lasswell’s mistakes 
by developing the much needed theoretical framework for civil-military relations.74 As he wrote in 
the preface of The Soldier and the State,   
 
“this book does not attempt an historical description of civil-military relations in general 
nor of any particular aspect of civil-military relations in particular. It is, rather, an effort 
to develop a way of looking at and thinking about civil-military relations, in short, a 
theoretical framework.”75 
 
The overall puzzle was to figure out if democracy could survive the new emphasis on military affairs. 
Huntington realized that answering this question required a theoretical framework that was founded 
in political and social theory. Only by having theoretically coherent concepts and a thorough 
understanding of causality could the study of civil-military relations seriously explore the many 
changes that military engagement would mean for modern society.  
In spite of his overt goal of developing a theoretical framework, the result remains rather 
obtuse. The theoretical framework of civil-military relations is not exactly obvious from the pages of 
The Soldier and the State. In fact, as we shall see later on, my argument is that Huntington’s 
theoretical framework was incomplete. The following is therefore an interpretation of his hidden 
framework. One has to tease it out of the scattered remarks in that work, attempting to add clarity 
where he left only ambiguity. 
Simply put, compared to Lasswell’s work, Huntington’s theoretical framework provides a 
more nuanced understanding of five key aspects of civil-military relations. Firstly, he developed an 
overview of the civilian control policies available to civilian politicians.76 He argued that civilian 
leaders essentially have two ways of controlling the military. One option is to politicize the military 
organization by making promotion dependent on political contacts with the dominant party in 
society – what Huntington labeled “subjective control”. This type of control involves “civilianizing the 
military, making them the mirror of the state”.77 The second option, “objective control”, involves 
allowing the military a certain amount of autonomy. By permitting military control over tactical and 
operational details and making promotion dependent on merit, it will necessarily be more conducive 
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to civilian control.78 It is important to notice that Huntington did not consider the possibility that 
civilians could meddle in tactical and operational details, yet leave the military organization 
untainted – what civil-military relations theorists call “assertive control”. Subjective control, the 
policy that Huntington criticized, is rarely considered an option in modern, advanced democracies. In 
that sense, Huntington did not analyze the key policy dilemma facing modern elite civil-military 
relations. We shall return to this point in chapter 6.  
Subjective and objective control are difficult to understand without the remaining parts of 
his theoretical framework. The second component of the framework was a general model for social 
change. Huntington basically focused on elite civil-military relations, arguing that the interaction 
between military and civilian elites is the main factor leading to political outcomes.79 However, 
although he only gave societal civil-military relations scant attention, he recognized that one cannot 
explore the interaction between civil and military actors within the state without having a grasp of 
the conditions for societal survival and the demands that society places upon the state. Thus, elite 
civil-military relations are not simply the result of a power game between civilian and military actors: 
elite actors have, at the very least, to ensure that society can survive militarily, if they want to 
remain in power. Societal civil-military relations are therefore crucial for explaining elite civil-military 
relations. Huntington borrowed a model for social change from Talcott Parsons’ political sociology 
and tailored it to handle how military threats influence society. In his later work – most notably in 
Political Order in Changing Societies, arguably his magnum opus - Huntington would develop a 
theory of modernization that criticized Parsons’ views.80 However, Parsons’ general model of society 
provided a good starting point for Huntington’s model of societal civil-military relations. In essence, 
he combined Parsons and Clausewitz to form a theoretical framework for how societal civil-military 
relations function. He followed Parsons in seeing societies as systems of institutions, interests, and 
cultures. These factors are dynamically related, meaning that they generally adapt to change.81 
Societies are caught between a societal imperative arising from the institutions, interests, and 
ideologies that define society and a functional imperative of military competition from the outside. 
Societies that face a military threat have to adapt by building up conventional military forces that 
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can meet that threat. This can only happen if the ideologies within society and the political 
institutions allow this change.  
Thirdly, Huntington’s main thrust against Lasswell was an argument about the nature of 
military culture. Lasswell presumed that military elites would use the tools at their disposal to 
maximize their share of power: when the military became more important, the top brass would 
necessarily use their enhanced power to institute a garrison state. Huntington had a more benign 
understanding of military culture. He argued that the officer corps, by virtue of its professional 
creed, is inherently loyal to the civilian government: 
 
“The officer[’s] (…) behavior in relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill 
can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the 
state. While the primary responsibility of the physician is to his patient, and the lawyer 
to his client, the principal responsibility of the military officer is to the state.”82 
 
Against Lasswell, Huntington argued that the officer will not use his military expertise to 
assume political power. Loyalty to the civilian government, he argued, is an inherent part of the 
professional’s psychology. Furthermore, professionalism will also generate much needed military 
effectiveness. The professional culture is destroyed when civilian politicians meddle in military 
promotions to ensure that the generals share the values of the government. Objective control 
therefore leads to military loyalty and effectiveness. Only when the military is left alone will it 
develop a professional culture and stay out of politics.83 
Having established that civilian meddling is detrimental to military professionalism, 
Huntington then became interested in the factors that shape the civilian leaders’ military policy. 
When would civilian leaders meddle in military affairs, and when would they adopt a less interfering 
objective control policy? He identified two key factors that determine the government’s civilian 
control policy. The first of these factors is the constitutional arrangement. Some constitutional 
structures, such as the British constitutional arrangement, collect the civilian supremacy over the 
military in the government. This enables the government to remove political squabbling from the 
elite civil-military relations and thus facilitates professionalism. Conversely, other arrangements, 
such as the American constitution, divide civilian power between multiple parties. This makes civil-
military policy a slave of potentially conflicting ideologies, which may eventually erode military 
professionalism.84 The only way to facilitate military professionalism in such societies is to ensure 
that all members of the ruling elite are committed to a military-friendly ideology.  
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Finally, unlike Lasswell, Huntington argued that ideological changes in society do not 
necessarily lead to a breakdown of democracy. Huntington acknowledged that there was a tension 
between contemporary civilian ideology and military culture. Like Lasswell, he saw liberalism as the 
dominant ideology in American society and recognized its inherently anti-military dogma. 85 
However, he did not see this ideology as tantamount to the democratic culture that defines the 
American political system. Instead, he suggested that conservatism poses a viable democratic 
alternative. By conservatism, Huntington meant a Burkean ideology of preservation, which 
emphasizes the goodness of the present and the risk inherent in change.86 This type of conservatism 
does not strive for an abstract ideal society. Instead, it contains an appreciation of the immanent, 
which leads it to fear sudden change.87 It stresses the factors that pose risks to the preservation of 
society – power, war, and the inherent evil of man. Because of its fear of change and its embrace of 
the possibility, Huntington stressed, “conservatism is basically similar to the military ethic.”88 He 
implicitly argued that conservatism, when employed in a democratic society, would strive to 
preserve the democratic institutions of that society, making it a democratic ideology. As he put it in 
an article written specifically about conservatism,  
 
“Today (…) the greatest need is not so much the creation of more liberal institutions as 
the successful defense of those which already exist. This defense requires American 
liberals to lay aside their liberal ideology and to accept the values of conservatism for 
the duration of the threat. Only by surrendering their liberal ideas for the present can 
liberals successfully defend their liberal institutions for the future.”89 
 
In spite of his stated intention to develop a theoretical framework, Huntington did not limit 
himself to this task. Instead, he expanded his theoretical framework into a theory of civil-military 
relations and made predictions about how American Cold War civil-military relations would develop. 
Furthermore, he also provided a substantial historical and sociological treatise on the military 
profession in America, including smaller comparative studies of the military profession in other 
developed countries. This treatise was necessary to prove his statement that the American officer 
corps was a profession. However, though probably necessary to establish civil-military relations as a 
social scientific field, this scholarly multitasking meant that the theoretical framework got lost 
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among the 500-odd pages of The Soldier and the State. Instead, the book turned out to be more a 
theory than a theoretical framework.  
 Huntington put the concept of professionalism at the core of his theory of civil-military 
relations (see figure 2.1. below). A professional officer corps, he argued, will necessarily be loyal and 
effective and professionalism will thus minimize the tensions between officers and politicians, while 
maximizing the state’s ability to handle conventional military threats.90 Objective control facilitates 
military professionalism. The main barrier lies in the civilian world. Professionalism cannot develop, 
if liberal forces in society hold the government back from objective control. A liberal political 
establishment will be hostile to military affairs and, unless restricted by the constitution, politicize 
the military organization, thus undermining its professional culture. Huntington’s theory duly leads 
to two policy options. Firstly, political leaders can stay aloof and allow military autonomy, which 
would lead to military professionalism and, thus, to maximal military effectiveness and civilian 
control. Secondly, the civilian leadership can choose to politicize the armed forces at the price of 
diminished military effectiveness. If faced with a substantial threat, a society that insists on 
continuing this political course will be militarily overwhelmed.  
This theory led Huntington to fairly extensive recommendations regarding the United States’ 
Cold War policy. He advised that a conservative culture, permissive of military independence, should 
develop in American society.91 He argued that a constitutional change was unrealistic. The state 
essentially faced two options: become conservative and allow military professionalism, or stay 
liberal and face the Soviet Union with an ineffective military. The latter option, he argued, would 
necessarily lead to the demise of the United States. The only viable option was the development of a 
conservative political culture. Only a conservative society would allow the military the autonomy 
necessary to become a truly professional. If American society continued to be characterized by 
liberalism, the United States would be unable to exert the military force necessary to push back the 
threat from the Soviet Union. Instead,  
 
“The requisite for military security is a shift in basic American values from liberalism to 
conservatism. Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative will permit 
American military leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon 
them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure.”92 
 
America would either become conservative or succumb in the military race against the USSR. 
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Figure 2.1. Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations 
 
 
To sum up, the relationship between soldiers and civilians has been studied since the earliest 
political philosophers. However, it is only recently that civil-military relations have become the 
object of study for social scientists. Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State marked a 
nomothetic turn in the field’s history. Huntington combined political sociology with military science 
and history to develop a coherent theoretical framework. This allowed him to produce a rigorous 
theory that sees military professionalism as the key to good civil-military relations. His theory led 
him to predict that the United States would either become more conservative, or would be unable 
to compete militarily with the USSR.  
 
Civil-military relations after Huntington 
The decades after the publication of The Soldier and the State witnessed a wave of new theoretical 
work on civil-military relations. Several authors picked up the new emphasis placed on civil-military 
relations by Huntington. Several of them were critical of Huntington’s theory, which many found to 
be too simplistic. The criticism was driven both by an empirical dissatisfaction with Huntington’s 
ability to predict actual events and a theoretical criticism of his definition of various concepts. Many 
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authors found that his notions and causal relations made little sense. His work became the focal 
point to which many academics and commentators reacted.93 
The bulk of the early criticism focused on his concept of professionalism. Morris Janowitz 
spearheaded the sociological study of military identity. Though he essentially agreed with 
Huntington that professionalism is the key to understanding contemporary military identity, he 
found that the picture painted by Huntington brushed over key problems: military professionalism is 
not only more complex than Huntington portrayed it, but the profession was undergoing severe 
changes. The traditional boundaries between soldiers and civilians were becoming blurred, as 
military officers took on tasks akin to those handled by civilian managers. The military virtues that 
Huntington argued were creating harmonious civil-military relations were eroding.94 Consequently, 
Janowitz argued, civil-military relations would be riven by ambiguities and conflicts, when old roles 
broke down and new ones were defined.95 
Samuel Finer echoed some of the same points of criticism against Huntington. Not only were 
contemporary militaries not characterized by a complete, unambiguous professionalism, but the 
notion that professionalism automatically leads to loyalty is logically incoherent. He pointed out that 
there is little logical relationship between the feeling of being a member of a profession and loyalty 
to the civilian government. Instead, he showed that professional norms within the military can lead 
to a military coup. Looking specifically at examples of coups and military disobedience, he showed 
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that many of these were performed by soldiers who were seemingly acting in accordance with the 
norms of professionalism.96 
After a decade-long hiatus in the 1980s, civil-military relations began to attract new 
attention after the end of the Cold War. From the mid-1990s and for a further decade, the field saw 
a surge of new theoretically minded work, much of which was produced by Huntington’s former 
students.97 Like his earlier critics, the new theorists highlighted both empirical and theoretical 
problems with his work. The most important point of criticism focused on the prediction power of 
Huntington’s theory. Peter Feaver, a former student of Huntington’s, points out that his simple 
prediction of the Cold War development in civil-military relations – that the United States would 
either become more conservative or cease to exist as the Cold War continued – had been 
contradicted by actual events. The United States did not become significantly more conservative, nor 
did it lose the Cold War. Instead, based on analyses of extensive polling data, Feaver concludes that 
the “divergence in civilian and military preferences, which Huntington identified as troubling in 
1957, endured throughout the Cold War”.98 Ideally, theories should be able to predict actual events. 
The fact that Huntington’s theory was fundamentally unable to do so was a terrible blow and it 
showed that the field’s dominant theory has little predictive power.  
Feaver combines this empirical criticism with a theoretical critique of Huntington’s concept 
of ideology. Huntington understood ideology as a discrete variable. Democratic polities essentially 
only have two ideological options: liberalism or conservatism. However, we normally do not think of 
ideology or political culture as a discrete variable. Instead, most cultures can brush over 
contradictions to produce various compromising forms. Huntington’s schema of political cultures 
seems too simplistic. As Feaver correctly notes,  
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“nowhere in Soldier and the State did Huntington suggest that Americans could simply 
become ‘liberal hawks’, or liberals in everything but military policy – people who voted 
for an expansion of individual liberty and an expansion of the defense budget.”99 
 
If liberalism can become hawkish, then a heightened military threat will not necessarily 
make society more conservative. Liberal hawks can make room for individual and social rights, while 
allowing the military the autonomy necessary to tackle military threats. This would explain how the 
United States was able to survive the Cold War in spite of its continued liberalism. However, 
Huntington’s schematic understanding of ideologies as discrete entities – that a society was either 
liberal or conservative - prevented him from exploring this option.100 
Focusing on the way that policy-makers make strategic decisions, Eliot Cohen criticizes the 
way Huntington – his former supervisor at Harvard - understood the strategic process. Huntington 
was surprisingly silent about matters of strategy. He seemed to argue that the relationship between 
civilian and military leaders should be a harmonious division of labor, with the civilians setting the 
overall political goals and the military devising the means necessary to achieve these goals. 
Surveying the strategic processes in the wartime administrations of four successful wartime leaders, 
Cohen shows that harmony is rarely the father of achievement. Instead, these war-leaders 
constantly meddled in the strategic and tactical details and drove their generals to the brink of 
exhaustion. Consequently, Cohen argues, we should not see civil-military relations at the elite level 
as a division of labor. Instead, it is more of an Unequal Dialogue – a constant and often messy 
discussion between soldiers and civilians, where the civilian leader retains the final authority to 
decide the political course.101 
 Although they are impressive theoretical criticisms, none of the post-Huntingtonian 
theoretical work has resulted in a new overarching theory of civil-military relations. These authors 
show that Huntington was unable to predict empirical occurrences and that certain sub-dimensions 
of his framework are incoherent, but none have developed overarching theories of civil-military 
relations or challenged his theoretical framework in toto. These authors focused on developing only 
one dimension of civil-military relations. They used more refined methodologies to explore these 
dimensions empirically and typically showed that they worked differently from the portrayal of them 
in The Soldier and the State. They consequently developed better theories of one dimension of civil-
military relations, yet left the rest of Huntington’s theoretical framework alone.  
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For instance, Morris Janowitz and his followers primarily focused on criticizing Huntington’s 
account of professionalism. Interviews with military professionals showed that modern soldiers did 
not conform to Huntington’s simple model. However, the Janowitzians did not provide a framework 
for social change that illuminates how transformations of different grand scale factors can change 
civil-military relations. Instead, they were content to point to observations that contradicted 
Huntington’s notion of military identity. Without a general framework that explains social change, 
the observations and predictions made by Janowitz and his followers are merely projections of 
present trends into the future. These scholars did much to show the deeper complexities involved in 
the study of civil-military relations, yet they did not present an overarching theory that can compete 
with Huntington’s. They wrote on a different analytical level.  
It is often claimed that Huntingtonians and Janowitzians constitute the two fundamental 
approaches that define civil-military relations. This is not correct. Huntingtonians see the military 
profession as relatively constant, while Janowitzians argue that the military profession is changing 
and becoming steadily more similar to civilian identity. However, this debate focuses only on military 
identity, not on civil-military relations. Janowitz was a theorist of military identity, who only touched 
upon civil-military relations when they affected the formation of military culture. He did not produce 
a theory that explained how different factors affect civil-military relations.  
 Samuel Finer probably provided the closest thing to a complete alternative to Huntington’s 
theory. Having rejected Huntington’s professionalism-centric approach, for empirical and theoretical 
reasons, Finer argued that military encroachment on civilian domains followed simply from the 
values held within the military, and the legitimacy of the civilian state. Simply put, the military would 
only grab power if it felt motivated to do so. If that was the case, it could only be successful if the 
state lacked the legitimacy to resist the military’s intrusion.102 Based on these insights, Finer 
developed a typology of various forms of civil-military tensions, ranging from violence and a military 
putsch in societies where the state has only little legitimacy, to indirect influence in societies, where 
the state is highly legitimate.103 
Finer’s theoretical framework never became accepted as a viable alternative to Huntington 
for several reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, his overall claim was simply too broad and 
insubstantial. Simply saying that civil-military tensions arose from the motivation of the military and 
the degree of legitimate power of the civilian government was not enough to guide Cold War 
policymakers. His theory lacked a description of how these motivations and civilian power were 
created. Which factors would make the military less motivated to intervene? How could the civilian 
government generate legitimate power? Secondly, his end-result was more of a typology, which 
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could be used to “rubricate” civil-military relations in a large number of cases, rather than a 
systematic theory that explained how civil-military relations worked in specific cases. His work 
lacked the rigorous connection to political sociology that was the advantage of Huntington’s model. 
Though Finer did define many crucial concepts in his model, he was not entirely clear when it came 
to describing their causal relations. In some sense, Finer lacked a strong theoretical framework. 
Finally, Finer did not give special attention to American civil-military relations. Civil-military relations 
in the United States had become the field’s paradigmatic case, on which every civil-military relations 
theory focus. By emphasizing other examples, it was not entirely clear how Finer stood vis-à-vis the 
dominant American approaches. In the end, though highly influential within coup studies, Finer 
never became part of the civil-military relations canon.  
Peter Feaver shows that Huntington’s theory was unable to predict United States’ Cold War 
civil-military relations, and that his conception of ideology was imprecise. Using rational choice 
theory, Feaver presents an alternative theory of civilian control that focuses on how elite civil-
military relations are shaped by the institutional environment of the state and past strategic 
behavior. In other words, his theory emphasizes that elite civil-military relations are mainly caused 
by factors intrinsic to the elite civil-military system. Though he recognizes the importance of 
variables outside this system, for instance the polarity of the international system, he does not 
explain how they work. He tests this theory empirically, using American Cold War and post-Cold War 
civil-military interaction as his cases.104 However, he does not present a theory that allows one to 
analyze societal civil-military relations or how these relations affect elite civil-military relations. His 
framework only focuses on elite relations. It therefore ignores how other factors in society may 
affect these relations. As we shall see in chapter 3, one has to unpack the concept of power and 
redefine the role of military force for societal survival to explain how the United States managed to 
prevail in the Cold War without giving up liberalism. By only analyzing elite relations, Feaver shies 
away from looking at these other key dimensions of civil-military relations. Furthermore, as we shall 
see later on, civilian control is just one of the two dimensions of elite civil-military relations. By 
focusing specifically on this dimension, Feaver loses sight of some of the elite civil-military problems 
that are unrelated to the question of control. Though it is an impressive analysis of civilian control on 
the elite level, Feaver’s approach does not present an alternative overarching theory of civil-military 
relations.  
Eliot Cohen focuses on how military effectiveness is related to elite civil-military relations. 
He pinpoints a significant weakness in Huntington’s framework by showing that effective civil-
military relations are born out of discord rather than harmony. However, his Unequal Dialogue 
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approach does not present an alternative overarching theory of civil-military relations. It essentially 
contains two limitations. Firstly, it assumes that the military accepts the principle of civilian control. 
Cohen looks at empirical cases where all actors accepted the overall principle of civilian control. His 
studies do not explore why the military can be controlled by the civilians – instead, he looks at how 
the civilians use their power to maximize military effectiveness.105 Civilian control is one of the key 
dimensions of civil-military relations. No overarching theory can be developed without addressing 
the question of civilian control.  
Furthermore, Cohen’s exploration of the dynamics driving military effectiveness needs 
further elaboration. Cohen focuses on showing that civil-military relations on the elite level are more 
complex than one might think. He shows, meticulously, that effective civil-military relations cannot 
be reduced to a division of labor. However, he does not fully explore the full complexity of the 
relationship between civilian involvement and the division of labor. He does not look at cases where 
civilian meddling was counterproductive, or where a division of labor would have been a more 
fruitful approach. Because of these limitations, Cohen’s theory is not a final theory of military 
effectiveness, and therefore not an overarching theory of civil-military relations.  
 Michael Desch – another former Huntington supervisee - presents a theory of civil-military 
relations that focuses on how the domestic and international threats facing a government shape 
elite civil-military relations. His basic argument is that civilian control is affected by the existence of 
external and internal threats. Surveying some 20-odd cases from the 20th century, Desch shows that 
civilian control is weakened by the existence of internal threats, while external threats may – under 
the right circumstances – strengthen the civilian governments hold on power: civilian control is 
strongest, when the government is stable, yet faces an external threat.106 
 Though clearly a systematic and generally impeccable study of the causal relations between 
threats and civilian control, Desch’s work does not constitute a rival theory of civil-military relations. 
Like Feaver, Desch focuses solely on civilian control, while leaving other aspects of the field 
unexplored. In his introduction, Desch acknowledges that civilian control is but one of the topics of 
civil-military relations.107 Furthermore, even within the narrower study of civilian control, showing 
that external and internal threats affect patterns of control falls well short of a conclusive theory. 
Threat patterns may be a crucial factor in shaping civilian control, yet one could argue that they are 
hardly the only influential factor. Internal threats also depend on other issues, including the general 
legitimacy of the state. Additionally, Desch’s theory says very little about how civilian control 
functions within these more general patterns. For instance, how can domestic factors enhance 
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civilian control within a society that faces no external and internal threats? Desch explores an 
important dimension of civil-military relations, yet he does not cover civil-military relations as such.  
Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory tries to develop an overall theory of civil-military 
relations, yet does so by following an idiographic rather than nomothetic route. Schiff argues that it 
is the ability of the military, the political elite, and the citizenry to arrive at a cultural agreement that 
determines the health of civil-military relations. This cultural agreement is measured by the ability to 
agree on four key variables: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making 
process, military recruitment methods, and military style.108 In other words, if actors share cultural 
values, significant conflict between them will not occur.  
Concordance theory contains a number of problems that makes it closer to a law than a theory. 
Firstly, it does not provide a definition of culture, the theory’s key variable.109 Secondly, culture is 
treated as a black box that cannot be compared in general terms, or used to make general claims of 
causality.110 Instead, the “study of civil-military relations (…) requires an empirical and ethnographic 
understanding of politics, history, and culture.”111 Thirdly, Schiff does not explain why these four 
indicators show the crucial cultural agreement that determines the state of civil-military relations. 
Fourth, and related to this, Schiff argues that concordance theory has predictive, but no explanatory, 
value:  
 
“the causal statement that concordance prevents domestic military intervention does not 
explain why it is that some nations can or have achieved concordance. … The major reasons 
for the theory’s causal limitation results from the cultural aspect of the methodology”.112 
 
In other words, concordance theory can only identify when a society will have harmonious civil-
military relations. It cannot explain why this happens, or how it might change in the future. Schiff’s 
fundamental problem is that she does not operate with a consistent theoretical framework. In that 
sense, concordance theory is not so much a theory as the empirical observation of a law.113 
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 In general, then, post-Huntingtonian theorists have criticized the empirical correctness and 
theoretical coherence of Huntington’s theory. They have convincingly shown that his theory failed to 
predict actual events, and that several of the dimensions of his theoretical framework were overly 
simplistic. However, no theorist has presented an alternative overall theory or a more accurate 
theoretical framework.  
 
Conclusion 
Civil-military relations developed as a social scientific field of study in the middle of the 20th century. 
Thinkers had studied the relationship between war and politics for millennia, yet it was only in post-
war America that scholars begun to formulate rigorous social science theories. Samuel Huntington’s 
The Soldier and the State marked a turn towards a more nomothetic approach. Unlike previous 
scholars, Huntington presented a coherent theoretical framework, developed by combining political 
sociology with military sociology and military science. Though he focused on elite civil-military 
relations, he rightly understood that these relations cannot be understood without grasps how they 
are affected by societal civil-military relations. This led him to a theory that emphasized the 
professionalism of the officer corps as the key factor in civil-military relations. He predicted that the 
United States would either become more conservative or unable to keep up militarily with the Soviet 
Union.  
Over the more than half a century since its original publication, civil-military relations 
scholars have shown that Huntington’s theory and theoretical framework suffer from significant 
empirical and theoretical weaknesses. Empirically, it has been shown that Huntington was unable to 
predict how American Cold War civil-military relations would conclude. Theoretically, scholars have 
uncovered significant problems in his description of various sub-dimensions of civil-military 
relations. Some of the newer theories have provided richer explanations of sub-dimensions of 
Huntington’s framework, yet none of them have presented an alternative overall theory or a new 
theoretical framework. Thus, Huntington’s theory and theoretical framework still define the field 
well into the second decade of the 21st century. The remainder of this dissertation focuses on 
developing a better theoretical framework for the political science study of elite civil-military 
relations. It can benefit from recent advances in civil-military relations, and political and military 
sociology to arrive at a more coherent understanding of the role of military power in social change. 
The framework defines the core concepts of civil-military relations, and outlines the most important 
causal links shaping elite civil-military relations. The new theoretical framework will be presented in 
the coming chapters.  
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Part II: Societal civil-military relations  
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- 3 - 
The functional imperative 
 
Civil-military relations consist of two dimensions: societal civil-military relations and elite civil-
military relations. A theory of elite civil-military relations only makes sense when it is combined with 
a theory of societal civil-military relations and vice versa. A comprehensive theory must necessarily 
engage with both societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. The present 
dissertation is about the study of civil-military relations within political science and its main focus is 
consequently on elite civil-military relations. However, these relations cannot be studied in isolation. 
They are affected by processes that occur in society at large. A theoretical framework of elite civil-
military relations must necessarily outline the societal civil-military relations processes that affect 
the elite level.  
The following two parts each look at one of these fields of study. The present part (which 
consists of chapters 3 and 4) explores societal civil-military relations. This is not meant to be a 
comprehensive study of societal civil-military relations. Instead, the chapters outline the societal 
processes that influence elite civil-military relations. Societal civil-military relations are shaped by 
two fundamental imperatives: the societal and the functional imperative. Chapter 4 explores the 
societal imperative – that is, how the state interacts with civil society to generate the resources 
necessary to build up an effective military. The present chapter looks at the functional imperative – 
that is, how the state handles outside military threats.  
In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington argued that the United States would be 
destroyed by the functional imperative if it did not grow more conducive to the needs of its military. 
This, he claimed, could only be achieved by abandoning liberalism and adopting a more conservative 
posture. However, as we saw in chapter 2, history produced a different outcome. The United States 
stayed liberal, yet still managed to prevail in the Cold War. This failure to predict the outcome of the 
Cold War highlights a hole in his theory. In this chapter, I argue that this inconsistency was caused by 
an incomplete definition of the functional imperative: Huntington did not fully explore how 
conventional military force supports the modern state.  
The functional imperative comprises the material requirements that a society must fulfill in 
order to survive. Huntington understood this mainly as the threat posed by conventional warfare. 
The key task in the Cold War, he argued, was to ensure that America had a ferocious fighting force 
that could fend off a conventional Soviet invasion. I argue that conventional military force plays a 
different role for modern societies. For most states in the modern era, military security is not 
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achieved solely by increasing their conventional military force. Instead, their main deterrent is their 
stock of nuclear weapons. Conventional force is but one of many tools available for the state. 
Diplomacy, economic strength, and technological innovation also play a significant role. When we 
look how the United States prevailed in the Cold War, we notice that its conventional military forces 
only played a marginal role. The United States was never forced to mobilize its entire society to 
maximize its short-term conventional military force. Consequently, it was never forced to make the 
choice between a pro-military conservatism and an anti-military liberalism.  
My argument progresses in three steps. In the first section, I explore the nature of the 
functional imperative in highly abstract terms. I look at the state’s power accumulation strategies in 
the second section. Finally, I use the power accumulation framework to analyze how the United 
States won the Cold War in the last section.  
 
The functional imperative and the state 
The functional imperative is one of the two main forces, which, Huntington argued, shape societal 
civil-military relations. “The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces”, he wrote 
in the introduction of The Soldier and the State, “a functional imperative stemming from the threats 
to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and 
institutions dominant within the society. … The interaction of these two forces is the nub of the 
problem of civil-military relations.”114 Huntington did not explain the functional imperative beyond 
these cursory remarks. However, it played a crucial role in the theoretical framework that came out 
of his work. When he applied his framework to analyze American Cold War civil-military relations he 
clearly understood the functional imperative as a conventional military threat. Professional soldiers 
were necessary for handling the functional imperative.115 An unprofessional military would not have 
the skills necessary for fighting the wars that were required to keep America secure. Therefore, 
society had to adapt to the need for a professional military and adopt a posture that tolerated 
conventional warfare. This entailed giving up liberalism and replacing it with a more conservative 
attitude.116 “The tension between the demands of military security and the values of American 
liberalism”, he wrote in the concluding chapter of The Soldier and the State, “can, in the long run, be 
relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism.”117 
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The concept of the functional imperative has deep sociological roots that were not explicitly 
explored by Huntington. The term was borrowed from functionalist sociology – a theoretical wave 
that dominated American sociology in the first two decades after the Second World War. To state 
what may seem obvious, societies consist of people with biological needs that have to be met. The 
state depends on the cooperation of the populace, which it can only get by ensuring that people are 
fed, clothed, and have access to other basic necessities.118 National security is thus the matter of 
ensuring that the state has enough resources to meet these demands.119 The functional imperative 
describes all the phenomena – domestic as well as international – that may destroy a population and 
which may erode the state’s legitimacy. In other words, the functional imperative comprises the 
material requirements that a society must fulfill in order to survive. To be sure, the threats that a 
state faces may be man-made or have natural causes. War, however, is one of the most important 
threats that modern societies face. Hostilities with other societies is one of the four exterior factors - 
the others being environmental problems, climate change, and loss of trading partners - that Jared 
Diamond identifies as causing societal collapse.120 
In Guns, Germs, and Steel,  Diamond uses the story of the Moriori - a small unwarlike tribe 
“with simple technology and weapons, and without strong leadership or organization” who 
inhabited the Chathams, 800 kilometers off the coast of New Zealand - to illustrate how the inability 
to handle war may cause the obliteration of a society.121 When their existence was discovered by 
New Zealand’s bellicose and ferocious Maori in 1835, the result was near-annihilation: 
 
“500 Maori armed with guns, clubs, and axes arrived, followed [weeks later] by … 400 
more Maori. Groups of Maori began to walk through Moriori settlements announcing 
that the Moriori were now their slaves, and killing those who objected. An organized 
resistance by the Moriori could have defeated the Maori, who were outnumbered two 
to one. However, the Moriori had a tradition of resolving disputes peacefully. … Before 
the Moriori could deliver [a peace offer], the Maori attacked en masse. Over the course 
of the next few days, they killed hundreds of Moriori, cooked and ate many of their 
bodies, and enslaved all the others, killing most of them too over the next few years as it 
suited their whim.”122 
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The story of the Moriori’s fatal demise illustrates what may be at stake in warfare, in extremis. To be 
sure, modern societies rarely end with the total eradication of an entire population. The defeated 
state is usually dismantled and the occupying state takes over the administrative control of the 
territory, either directly or by proxy. The victorious state typically tries to engage in a new social 
contract with the population to gather the taxes and support that is necessary to make a society 
stronger. 
The history of human civilization can be cast as the development of steadily more 
sophisticated institutions, designed to handle the functional imperative.123 Some scholars suggest 
that violence was prevalent among pre-civilizational societies. 124  This is contested by other 
researchers, who question the archeological evidence and argue that warfare was an evolutionary 
inferior strategy for scattered groups who were not necessarily in direct competition with one 
another.125 This debate is mainly of interest for archeologists and anthropologists. If it were not a 
steady feature of social and political life already, military competition between groups became so 
when tribes and bands were replaced by more complex political units. These units were more adept 
at handling the functional imperative. Whereas a tribe could be vulnerable to environmental 
changes, sudden natural disasters, or surprise attacks from other tribes, organized states could build 
granaries and other storages to handle the cycles of nature, and develop armies and fortifications to 
diminish military threats.126  
 The state secures the population by ensuring that they cooperate to produce the necessities 
of life. Pre-state societies were of course also dependent on cooperation. These societies were built 
around activities that were organized face-to-face, such as hunting, gathering, simple farming, and 
warfare. However, in more complex societies, the greater range of needs require advanced 
institutions that coordinate, without necessarily needing to convince everyone about every detail. 
Thus, decision power largely was removed from the immediate, everyday experience of ordinary 
people. The need for complete popular understanding would require massive resources, and that 
would put a brake on the complexity of coordinated communal action. Simply put, getting everyone 
in a group to understand a problem and to agree about the most pertinent course of action can be a 
cumbersome and inefficient way of organizing social life. In state-based societies, decision power 
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therefore became delegated to rulers and their bureaucracies.127 As Charles Tilly has shown, the 
early states were little more than protection rackets akin to modern day organized crime: a group of 
loosely coordinated men, who used their superior organization and military skills to strike terror in a 
population within a given territory to pay tribute. However, this largely self-interested behavior 
increasingly solved coordination problems within society and gave rise to steadily more complex 
societal forms. Thus, the state’s largely self-interested behavior had positive, unanticipated 
consequences.128  
The state’s control of a territory depends on its ability to use power to fend off rival states. 
Power is one actor’s ability to influence the actions of other actors. Kenneth Waltz argues that 
power is a capability held by states, which may not be used, but the presence of which can be traced 
by looking at the behavior of other states. In his words, “an agent is powerful to the extent that he 
affects others more than they affect him”129 Potential force and violence make up the core of power, 
yet power is something more than just acts of force.130 Power can also be the tacit acceptance that 
others have a greater potential for violence. Power is relative. The absolute size of a state’s army 
and arsenal does not matter per se. Instead, it matters if the state has a greater arsenal than its 
neighbors and if this is enough to force them to do its bidding. 
The international realm is anarchic and thus states can only rely on themselves for their 
security. One of the great insights in international relations is that states face a security dilemma: a 
state’s accumulation of power may create insecurity for other states. If a state acquires additional 
weaponry to secure itself against an assault by its neighbor, it implicitly enhances its own ability to 
make offensive attacks against other states.131 The best way to understand this is to see the 
international system as a political counterpart to the economic system. Whereas firms compete in 
the marketplace for profit, states compete for power in the international realm.132 
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The international system contains what international relations scholars refer to as 
“structural modifiers” that minimize the competition between states.133 The two most important 
structural modifiers are geography and the offense-defense balance. Firstly, the use of force – and 
thus power itself - has a price. To enact force over long distances or across geographical barriers, 
such as seas or mountains, require additional manpower, supply lines, and fortifications. These have 
to be protected from enemy assaults and the wrath of the elements, and often require costly 
transport over deserts, oceans, and mountains. Similarly, conquered territory only becomes 
beneficial when it is under control, which requires police institutions and state legitimacy. All in all, 
this ensures that states generally refrain from major ventures into enemy territories.134 
Secondly, the difference between the cost of offensive weapons and the cost of defensive 
weapons – the so-called offense-defense balance - also affects the stability of the system. Winning 
an offensive campaign becomes significantly more costly when defensive weapons are cheaper to 
deploy than offensive ones. A great example of this is the First World War, where the use of 
trenches, the introduction of the Maxim gun, and the immobility of communications technology 
gave defenders a significant advantage. In spite of the belief among pre-war generals that offensive 
action would be rewarded, these conditions reduced what should have been a display of daring 
offensive action to a grueling four-year trench nightmare.135 The security dilemma is thus diminished 
if policymakers and military leaders acknowledge the advantage of defensive capabilities. States do 
not have to fear a sudden surprise attack, because even relatively modest defensive capabilities will 
be sufficient to discourage an assault.136 
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To sum up, the functional imperative is the material requirements that a society has to fulfill 
in order to survive. States strive to become secure from enemy aggression by acquiring power 
resources that enable them to control other actors. The competition for power constitutes the 
international system, the structure of which rewards power accumulating behavior and punishes 
waste of resources.  
 
Power accumulation strategies 
Grand strategy is the purposeful employment of a state’s power resources to ensure its security.137 
The state’s core activity is to make sure that it has enough power to secure itself against an enemy 
attack. Much like a firm, the state uses its current stock of power to pursue opportunities that will 
generate even more power. Theorists generally emphasize four potential strategies for acquiring 
power: military build-up, economic growth, war, and diplomacy. Broadly speaking, the first two are 
created domestically, while the latter two are directed towards other societies.138 One gets a clear 
idea of how the functional imperative arises and how the state counteracts it by looking at how each 
these power generation mechanisms work.  
 
Internal Measures: Military Capabilities and Economic Growth 
At the core of power is force, and the ultimate determinant of power is the state’s stock of military 
capabilities. However, the production of military capabilities is not simply a matter of investing in 
weaponry. The state has a finite amount of resources and it must choose between investing directly 
in general military capabilities, which give a short-term boost in power, or in more long-term 
prospects, such as military innovation or economic growth.139 
The most basic way to build up military capabilities is to increase the means of force directly 
through purchase of equipment or recruitment. Generally speaking, capability purchases expand the 
power of the state linearly. A state with 10 armored divisions can boost its capabilities by 10 percent 
if it invests in yet another division. This increases the state’s ability to handle a short-term threat. 
However, states can also make investments that do not increase their stock of power in the short 
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term, but which yield a significant increase in power in the long term. Understanding these choices 
involves assessing the importance of technology and the market economy in modern society.140 
 One of the main characteristics of modern war is the important role played by technology. 
To be sure, technology has always been a game-changer in warfare. For instance, in his seminal A 
History of Warfare, John Keegan emphasized how the invention of the chariot in the second 
millennium BC skewed the balance of power radically towards societies that mastered this 
technology. It allowed warriors to increase their speed of movement tenfold, thus creating a highly 
mobile killing machine when bands of chariots, carrying bowmen, fought together in battle. The 
ancient empires – the Egyptians, the Indians, and the Mesopotamians - were soon overrun by 
hitherto obscure tribes who mastered the art of chariot warfare. In ungoverned corners of the globe, 
such as China, charioteers were able to use their competitive advantage to concentrate enough 
power to set up new states. However, despite these impressive feats, military victories were rarely 
driven by technology. Military technological innovation was uncommon and often the result of a 
sophistication process that spanned over millennia.141 
Modern society, by contrast, is characterized by an extreme degree of innovation that allows 
new technologies to appear within the span of a few years. Investment in new military technologies 
can therefore be a way of developing more capabilities in the long run by sacrificing short-term 
gains. The nuclear bomb, for instance, increased military firepower by a factor of thousands, yet the 
expense of Manhattan Project and related production projects only account for slightly more than 
one percent of American defense outlays in the same period.142 The total cost of the 70,000 nuclear 
warheads that the United States developed and produced between 1945 and 1990 amounted to less 
than three percent of total defense outlays.143 In other words, technological investments entail 
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foregoing a short-term increase in capabilities, when resources are used for the development 
process instead. However, in the long term this may be a sensible investment if the increase in 
capability effectiveness outweighs the loss of resources. 
Technological innovation is not the only way of acquiring more formidable weapons. First-
movers rarely get to keep their innovations for themselves. Rival powers can often rapidly emulate 
the new technology. Because powers that are “catching up” do not have to invest as much on 
research and development, they tend to acquire the same increase in military strength at a much 
lower cost. For example, this was largely the pattern in military innovation during the Cold War. The 
United States generally came up with new technologies, which were quickly usurped by the Soviet 
Union.144 It caused a furor when Moscow conducted its first successful nuclear test in August 1949, 
little more than four years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. American strategists had expected that the 
USSR would go nuclear eventually, but no one had imagined it would catch up so soon. Being 
second-movers gave the Soviets several advantages that helped them develop the bomb cheaply. 
Stalin only realized the strategic importance of the bomb after having witnessed the attacks on 
Japan. Furthermore, the Soviets could rely on open source information and, more importantly, on 
secret intelligence, most notably from Klaus Fuchs, a physicist who spied for the USSR from inside 
the Manhattan Project.145 
So far, I have focused solely on the ways in which the state is capable of building capabilities 
directly. Yet, one of the key characteristics of modern society is the existence of a capitalist market 
economy. To understand how the economy works as a power generation devise, one has to bring in 
lessons and concepts from economic theory.146 The modern economy functions as a system on par 
with the international system. Whereas the unit in the international realm is the state, the unit in 
the economy is the firm or the corporation. It faces competition over consumer capital (which is 
finite at any given time) and it ceases to exist once it is unable to provide its laborers with the wages 
they require. This forces the firm to constantly seek the most effective solutions. Firms are forced to 
develop new technologies if they are to retain their competitive edge. The economic system 
therefore creates and enhances technological innovation. Together with expansion of labor and 
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capital, economists argue that it is the level of technological innovation that determines the rate of 
economic growth.147 
One of the key tenets of classical economic theory is that international trade increases the 
effectiveness of the economic system. The law of comparative advantage – introduced by David 
Ricardo - famously argues that if two states can trade freely, each can do what they do best and sell 
their excess production to the other, thus making both states better off. This is the case even if one 
of the states has an advantage in all industries. Most economists therefore emphasize that free 
trade enhances the growth potential in the market significantly.148 However, it is largely impossible 
to estimate the exact net effect of international trade for economic growth.149 International trade 
has an important political dimension, which limits it significantly in spite of the mutual benefits 
involved. The state has a significant influence over international trade. Trade requires a legal 
framework that helps the parties trust each other. However, when trade goes beyond borders, this 
framework requires state cooperation through international institutions. The state can also put 
restrictions on international trade by setting up trade barriers.150 All in all, the key question concerns 
the state’s interest in international trade. Evidence suggests that concerns about the relative balance 
of power do not necessarily impede on trade.151 
The capitalist economy can generate military capabilities for the state in three ways. Firstly, 
innovation in military technology can occur in the market economy instead of within the state. A 
market economy has certain structural advantages over a purely state-based system. Competition 
on the free market forces companies to innovate to keep prices low or quality high. This pushes 
innovation forward at a comparatively higher pace.152 In the long run, the anonymous pressure of 
the market rewards companies that develop effective solutions. This often provides local managers 
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with the autonomy needed to generate innovation. For instance, observers of the Soviet weapons 
industry noted that the system was highly formalized, and tended to stifle innovation by not 
allowing research teams the organizational freedom necessary to develop long-term technological 
solutions.153 
Secondly, private investments lead to economic growth, which is then directed back to the 
state through the tax system. A larger GDP provides the state with more resources that can be 
invested in military capabilities, or used to create alliances.154 For example, as we shall see below, 
the outcome of the Cold War was largely determined by the greater effectiveness of the American 
economy. The American capitalist system generated a higher economic growth than its Soviet 
counterpart. In the long term, this allowed America to buy and develop more military capabilities, 
and to invest in new military technologies.155 
Finally, relatively secure financial markets give the state access to credit at lower interest 
rates. The ability to borrow capital for investments in military capabilities can give states a significant 
strategic advantage. The ability to loan at a relatively low interest rate gives states the opportunity 
to make massive investments in the short term that may provide the tipping point in an actual 
conflict. This gives the state a flexibility that allows them to increase their short term investments in 
weaponry and political alliances.156 For instance, the Confederacy generated significant amounts of 
capital during the American Civil War by issuing bonds that were guaranteed in future yields of 
cotton. Ironically, cotton – and thereby also cotton bonds - was in high demand as markets worried 
about the supply from the South due to the very same war as the bonds were helping to pay for. The 
South thus generated significant short-term resources for the war by taking advantage of the 
financial system.157 In that sense, access to financial markets, whether domestic or foreign, can be a 
significant advantage.  
The development of capitalism has fundamentally changed the way international relations 
work. In the premodern period, war was generally decided by the courage, strength and skill of the 
fighting force and the tactical and strategic nous of commanders.158 An invasion by highly specialized 
and motivated warrior tribes from the surrounding ungoverned territories was a real threat for most 
ancient societies. The Roman Empire, for instance, was a largely agricultural society, where the 
potential for innovation was relatively low. Historians estimate that their average long-term real 
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economic growth was approximately 0.1 percent per annum.159 Constant foreign campaigns were 
necessary to replenish the coffers of the empire and the pockets of the standing army. For instance, 
when Carthage faced fiscal ruin after its defeat in the First Punic War, new military adventures were 
the easiest way to bring balance to the empire’s finances. Hamilcar Barca, the father of the famous 
Hannibal, led a campaign in Spain, where he gained control of the rich mines of the Sierra Morena.160 
As one historian summarizes the vicious circle of constant warfare, “the tranquility of nations was 
impossible without armies, armies without soldiers' wages, or wages without tribute”.161 The Roman 
state was constantly forced to engage in warfare, yet the Roman state held very few advantages 
over the barbarian tribes beyond its borders. As Edward Luttwak point out, the Roman army was not 
characterized by markedly superior technology or tactics nor was the Roman legionnaire famous for 
his courage.162 
The nexus of technology and the market economy changed that. The increase in wealth 
within capitalist economies meant that modern states can develop power by investing less in 
military force and more in private industry. Advanced societies are capable of generating more 
resources, which in turn can enhance military capabilities. The development of capitalism meant 
that the state became increasingly dependent on another institution – the firm – for the production 
of power. Market and state solve problems of coordination in tandem.163 Contemporary society is 
characterized by a steady growth of its economic output due to the innovation-creating potential of 
the market economy. The power resources available to society steadily increase, making its state 
capable of deterring enemy attacks. Ceteris paribus, over the long haul, the state cannot withhold its 
position vis-à-vis other states if it has a lower GDP growth. The market economy allowed the state to 
reap the fruits of innovation and gain a long term advantage over non-capitalist states. The power of 
the state made freelancing bands relatively less potent. Whereas savage tribes had once derived 
their power from the courage, strength, and excellence that comes from being accustomed to war, 
contemporary society derives its power from the innovation which can only arise in a society that is 
at relative peace. The martial values - courage, strength, and excellence - that characterized the pre-
modern warrior lost some of its importance for the outcome of war.  
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This evolution has a long history, but it came into decisive fruition with the Industrial 
Revolution. The changing balance between savagery and civilization was not lost on the early 
political economists. As Adam Smith observed in The Wealth of Nations: 
 
“In modern war the great expense of firearms gives an evident advantage to the nation 
which can best afford that expense; and consequently to an opulent and civilized over a 
poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times the opulent and civilized found it difficult to 
defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor 
and barbarous nations find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and 
civilized.”164 
  
It is important to keep in mind that the relationship between the state and the economy is a two-
way street. Just as the state needs the economy to develop its power, so does the economy require 
the state to manage what economists call public goods. In simple terms, public goods are those 
which everyone benefits from, but where it is difficult to ensure that everyone pays for their usage, 
making it impossible for a private firm to profiteer from producing the good.165 Public goods are 
therefore commonly produced by the state. The existence of these goods, and their necessity for the 
continuation of capitalism has been known since the first political economists. When Adam Smith 
described the basic conditions of the new capitalist system in The Wealth of Nations, he recognized 
that the production of public goods were “duty of the sovereign or commonwealth”.166 He stressed 
that the conditions for private property, defense and a judicial system, and the production of public 
goods that enhanced the welfare of all citizens, such as infrastructure, should be handled by the 
state.167 
Economists still debate where the optimal balance between the market and the state lies. In 
fact, most socio-economic debate is concerned with how many other functions are public goods that 
should be handled by the state. This dissertation is not about political economy per se and finding 
the right balance between these two systems is well beyond our scope. The key conclusion is that 
the co-existence of the state and the market are necessary conditions for modern political life. The 
state protects capitalism, while capitalism provides the state with the resources needed to offer self-
protection. While mutually dependent, capitalism and the state simultaneously exist in continuous 
conflict with each other. Each of the systems requires resources to exist and they therefore try to 
acquire these at the expense of one another. The optimal government interference in the market 
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depends on the amount of public goods required. However, identifying these public goods is a 
complex empirical process, which public debate is only partially effective in promoting.168 Capitalism 
and the state will therefore continuously try to crowd out certain of the other’s aims. 
  
International Measures: Diplomacy and War 
The security of states does not only depend on their ability to summon inner strength. Their external 
actions can also help them stock up on power. States can either use persuasion or brute force to 
accumulate power in the international realm. Diplomacy is a state’s use of persuasion in the 
international realm. Although states sometimes try to forge alliances with non-state actors – 
insurgent or opposition groups, NGOs and the like - their primary cooperative partners are other 
states. Interstate cooperation occurs through the establishment of institutions. Institutions function 
like inter-state contracts where states promise to abide to certain rules. States engage in this type of 
cooperation because it helps them achieve common goals.169 
Institutions come in many forms. Some international institutions are little more than ad hoc 
statements of intent between a few states. Others, such as the UN, are highly formalized and involve 
the creation of an independent bureaucracy and formal decision-making procedures. In a security 
perspective, alliances are the most important type of institutions. An alliance “is a commitment for 
mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some specified set of circumstances.”170 
They typically have a narrow military focus and include a limited number of states.  
International cooperation is difficult as the competition for power makes states wary about 
conceding any advantage to their rivals. The notion of common goals is therefore not unproblematic. 
Because states are concerned about their stock of power vis-à-vis potential invaders, states base 
their decisions to cooperate on calculations of both the absolute and relative gains of the 
cooperation. When two states – state A and state B - collaborate with one another they are 
motivated by the prospect of both states increasing their security in absolute terms. However, state 
A also worries that state B will benefit more from the cooperation, thus making B stronger than A. 
State B will, of course, have the same concerns. This makes cooperation difficult as both state A and 
B try to maximize their individual gains from the alliance at the other’s expense. Under some 
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circumstances, cooperation is possible.171 Generally speaking, states collude as long as they have a 
shared interest. States look out for their own security first when faced with a devastating threat. 
They will therefore shirk from their commitment to the security of other states if that engagement 
risks putting their own security at jeopardy.172 For instance, citing legal technicalities, Italy famously 
decided not to join Germany and Austria-Hungary – with whom it had had a defensive military pact 
since 1882 – at the eve of the First World War. Instead it joined the Triple Entente against its former 
allies the following year. Rome estimated that the Entente would most likely win the war and secure 
Italy significant land-gains from Austria-Hungary. Had Italy fought on the losing side of the war, the 
internal cohesion of the young Italian state could have been at risk. As it turned out, the expected 
victory came at a steep price and not even land gains could prevent the Italian state from being 
thrown into disarray.173 
War, the mirror-opposite of diplomacy, is “the systematic and extensive use of violence as a 
means of policy by an organized social group claiming (but not necessarily exercising) legitimate 
control over a given territory, against another such group (or groups).”174 War is an activity that can 
be used to acquire an advantage in military capabilities, economic wealth or diplomatic cooperation. 
It is therefore typically the tool used by states that are losing ground in one of the three other 
dimensions of power. 
 Wars are fought for many different reasons, yet when we understand them in terms of 
power accumulation, the aim of war is to use short-term advantages to avoid long-term 
disadvantages.175 In other words, war may become a superior power accumulation strategy when 
the relative balance of power between one or more states shifts, making one state relatively weaker 
than the other in the long term. As Jack Levy puts it, there may be  
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“an apprehension that this decline will be accompanied by a weakening of one's 
bargaining position and a corresponding decline in the political, economic, cultural, and 
other benefits that one receives from the status quo; and further, that one might be 
faced with a future choice between a dangerous war and the sacrifice of vital national 
interests. The temptation is to fight a war under relatively favorable circumstances now 
in order to block or retard the further rise of an adversary and to avoid both the 
worsening of the status quo over time and the risk of war under less favorable 
circumstances later.”176 
 
States can thus use wars to increase their stock of power if their relative power advantage is larger 
in the present than it will be in the future. One of the crucial features of war is its unpredictability, so 
the state’s decision to fight also depends on its access to information, and its acceptance of risk.177  
The purpose of power accumulation warfare is to increase the state’s relative stock of 
military, economic, or diplomatic power resources. War can enhance the power of a state by 
conquering the military capabilities of other states. Of course, conquering military capabilities are 
generally difficult as the weapon in question can usually be used against the aggressor. Conquest is 
therefore more commonly oriented towards sources of wealth – such as means of production, 
skilled labor, or scarce or particularly valuable resources – instead. Though often forgotten, the first 
states probably began as plundering bands of warriors who discovered that it was easier to exert a 
regular annual tribute instead of raiding a territory. The early state could increase its absolute stock 
of power by conquering resources and peoples from other states.178 This, however, only worked as 
long as the cost of war was lower than the gain.  
As the state grew more potent, its force potential steadily increased over the past centuries, 
making war increasingly expensive. As Peter Liberman has shown, modern industrial states can still 
conquer enemy economic and military resources and use them to their own advantage.179 For 
instance, the taxes, resources, and manpower that Nazi Germany mobilized from occupied Western 
Europe vastly exceeding the funds it spent on quelling local resistance.180 However, the costs of the 
entire operation commonly surpass the absolute gain available for conquest. Conquest is no longer 
an avenue for absolute wealth, but it may increase the state’s stock of power, relative to that of 
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other states. If a state can destroy the military capabilities of another state at a relatively low loss, a 
state will typically be better off, even though both states suffered a military set-back.  
This development culminated with the invention of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in 
the second half of the 20th century. These weapons essentially increased the costs of war to almost 
absolute terms. An attack would surely provoke a counterattack, thus destroying vast sections of 
both the aggressive and the defensive society. However, because there was still a relative advantage 
to be won, war could not be discounted as a rational strategy, even in the nuclear age.181 For 
example, Herman Kahn - a nuclear strategist on whom Stanley Kubrick based the title character of 
Dr. Strangelove - argued that even nuclear weapons could be used strategically to achieve political 
ends. The key thing was to secure that America would be lose fewer people and resources than the 
Soviet Union in a nuclear exchange.182 His work was therefore ripe with calculations of fatalities, 
weighing the loss of millions against the loss of tens of millions, discussing the acceptable level of 
genetic mutation caused by radioactivity, and even drawing up plans that would distribute 
contaminated food to elderly people who would not have time to die from radiation-related 
illnesses before they died of “natural” causes.183 Even nuclear war is essentially political, as the 
relative power stock of the state can be increased, if another state’s stock of power is decreased by a 
larger percentage. Hypothetically speaking, a situation may arise where the state becomes more 
secure by decreasing the power stock of other states, thus potentially making nuclear aggression a 
superior strategy.  
War can also be used to create fertile grounds for cooperation with other parties, or to 
destroy or disrupt enemy alliances. For example, the United States decided to fight the Vietnam War 
– “the single greatest error the United States made in fighting the Cold War”, according to John 
Lewis Gaddis – because it believed that a communist take-over in Saigon would show that 
Washington lacked the commitment to keep its grand alliance together.184 Although Vietnam was 
geopolitically insignificant, the symbolism of losing yet another partner state was viewed as a serious 
threat to the American system of alliances.185 The theory behind this strategy may have been based 
on misperception, yet the war was still an example of a state fighting a war mainly out of alliance 
concerns.  
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A framework for state interests 
The state’s power accumulation strategies can be summarized by categorizing them based on the 
length of the perspective and whether they are directed internally or externally, as it is done in table 
3.1. To survive, the state must, first and foremost, avoid a destructive attack against its own 
territory. This is done by ensuring that any act of force against the state can either be physically 
rebuffed, or that massive retaliation will severely damage the attacker in a way that surpasses the 
relative damage caused by the attack. The state therefore has to ensure that its force stockpiles are 
large enough. Military build-up and actual war are the mechanisms whereby a state ensures that it 
does not face short-term destruction.  
 
Table 3.1: The power accumulation strategies of the modern state 
 Short-term Long-term 
Internal Military build-up Innovation or growth 
External War Diplomacy 
 
If the state has more or less secured itself against an immediate assault, its secondary interest is to 
avoid the threat of a similar attack in the future. The state is therefore not only interested in building 
capabilities that can be used immediately – it also uses long-term strategies to ensure that it also has 
enough power in the future. This involves diverging resources into its domestic economy, investing 
in innovation in weapons technology, and evolving diplomatic relations with other states. As we saw 
above, economic growth and diplomacy are related to one another as the trading system requires 
diplomatic cooperation between states. This two-tiered framework is highly theoretical. However, it 
helps us to understand the processes that led to the end of the Cold War. 
 
How the United States prevailed in the Cold War 
So far, we have only looked at the functional imperative in the abstract. Yet Huntington connected 
his description of the functional imperative with an empirical prediction: America would either 
become more conservative, or it would succumb to the functional imperative. With the benefit of 
hindsight, we can evaluate Huntington’s assertion. By looking at how the United States fared in the 
Cold War, we can determine if Huntington’s prediction was correct and, if not, if he understood the 
nature of the functional imperative.  
 Huntington argued that a society’s ability to handle the functional imperative is determined 
by its constitution and its domestic ideology. If one of these two variables allows a professional 
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military, then the military will be capable of handling the functional imperative. He argued that the 
American constitution was unlikely to change and that, therefore, the only way the United States 
could survive the threat of war was to choose an ideology that was more conducive to supporting 
military effectiveness – that is, by making conservatism the dominant ideology in society.186 
Peter Feaver has, as mentioned in chapter 2, tested the empirical accuracy of Huntington’s 
predictions in his seminal work on civil-military relations. Surveying different indicators of the 
general attitudes in the populace, Feaver shows that Americans did not become significantly more 
conservative throughout the period. As we also described in chapter 2, Feaver finds part of the 
explanation in the way Huntington understood ideology and political culture.187 I look specifically at 
this problem in chapter 4, where I show that Huntington’s conception of ideology had significant 
weaknesses.  
 The problem with Huntington’s framework, however, goes beyond the question of ideology 
in politics. His model simply did not capture the nature of the functional imperative. Conventional 
military force – the type of force administered by Huntington’s professional soldiers – is actually one 
of the lesser factors ensuring the security of the modern state. The immediate security of the 
modern great powers is ensured mainly by their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Their long-term 
security also depends on other factors, such as economic performance and diplomatic relations – 
variables which Huntington did not explore in depth. Furthermore, states that are leaders in the 
international system have different priorities from states that challenge the status quo.  
This becomes clear when we examine how the United States won the Cold War. America’s 
geography, access to advanced technology, economic system, and its massive head-start in 
economic and military resources at the onset of the Cold War played a crucial role. Washington’s 
ability to safeguard its homeland against an imminent military attack, guaranteed mainly by its 
nuclear stockpile and its favorable geographical location, allowed it the elbow room necessary to let 
its capitalist economy build up a power gap. The Soviet Union could not match this disparity in the 
long run and eventually collapsed. Two limitations of Huntington’s framework stand out when one 
compares it with the outcome of the Cold War. Firstly, he overestimated the conventional military 
threat posed by the USSR. Secondly, he did not grasp how the functional imperative works when a 
full-scale conventional military attack is not looming. The first of these weaknesses was empirical – 
the latter was theoretical.  
 We can analyze the American Cold War strategy, using the power accumulation framework 
presented above. The United States’ interests can be grouped in a primary and a secondary cluster. 
Firstly, the American state’s primary interest was to avoid being violently overturned through a 
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military attack. This entailed that the United States had to build up military resources that could 
repel an attack or at least ensure that an attack would be so costly that it would be deemed futile by 
enemy states. It is crucial, for our purposes, that the United States did not secure itself against 
military devastation primarily by building up conventional military force. It was its nuclear arsenal, 
rather than its conventional forces, that ensured the United States against an all-out attack. 
At the end of the Second World War, the United States was the most powerful state in the 
international system. The combination of geographical isolation, significant military forces, including 
a potent navy and a significant nuclear arsenal, ensured that a Soviet attack would be either 
rebuffed or at least met with a counter-attack so powerful that a conquest of the American 
homeland would be impossible.188 In the early period of the Cold War, the Soviet and American 
nuclear stockpiles were relatively small and the means of transportation fairly unsophisticated. A 
superpower war would be fought with at least some conventional forces. The Pacific and Atlantic 
Oceans functioned as effective barriers that made an attack on the United States costly and difficult. 
As nuclear stockpiles grew in size and potency, and ballistic missile technology became more 
sophisticated, the oceans and conventional force became less significant for an all-out attack. This 
gave each superpower the capabilities necessary to fully destroy its opponent.189 An all-out strike on 
the United States was not impossible, but it would certainly be a self-defeating policy. Moscow could 
not use war to alter the balance of power between the two states, because such a move would have 
led to the near-destruction of both societies. The superpowers had a shared interest in the 
perpetuation of the status quo, rather than a disruption of the balance of power system, because a 
breakdown of this system might have spelled the end of both societies. In that sense, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, a full-scale war was no longer a rational strategic means for achieving a 
power advantage. Instead, it would arise as the result of a system failure.190 A Soviet invasion would 
most likely have failed to achieve its primary objective: the destruction or surrender of the United 
States and Soviet survival and dominance. The United States’ nuclear capabilities effectively secured 
it against a power accumulation war. 
 Having secured itself against an enemy attack the United States’ secondary foreign policy 
goal was to ensure that the Soviet Union did not acquire a power advantage in the long term. A 
change in the balance of power could remove the barriers that made an imminent attack unlikely 
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and thereby jeopardize the American homeland. Its menu of choices essentially ranged in two 
dimensions. Firstly, the United States had to choose if it wanted to counter the Soviet Union 
militarily, or if it wanted to use its economy to gain a long-term advantage. In other words, it had to 
choose between investing in military capabilities, or in civilian and economic growth. Secondly, it 
had to choose if it wanted to build up alliances and institutions abroad or if it wanted to isolate itself 
behind its ocean barriers. Of course, these choices were related to one another. For instance, the 
decision to pursue a growth-oriented strategy based on civilian economic performance could 
produce a stronger presence in Eurasia to secure more markets overseas.  
The United States had to find the right balance between military spending and civil 
consumption. Aaron Friedberg argues that Washington did not make an either/or choice between 
these two alternatives. Instead, the United States built up some military capabilities – nuclear as well 
as conventional – that allowed it to deter an attack on the American homeland and to fight limited 
conventional wars abroad.191 Contemporary strategists, like Bernard Brodie, recognized that limited 
conventional war would continue to play a significant role for the overall grand strategy. The Korean 
War was an example of a limited war, where the great powers tested each other’s commitment to 
their alliances.192 
The United States did not invest all its resources directly into the military. After its zenith at 
around 38 percent of GDP in 1944, and a slight spike during the Korean War, the national defense 
outlay settled at a level around, or below, 10 percent of GDP (see figure 3.1. below). For the entire 
Cold War period, defense spending averaged at 7.6 percent of GDP.193 The labyrinthic nature and 
secrecy of the Soviet system makes it very difficult to arrive at any conclusive numbers, but most 
estimates indicate that Soviet military spending as a share of GDP was between 50 to 150 percent 
above the American level.194 Military spending could either be used to buy nuclear or conventional 
capabilities, yet for each of these options Washington chose to use less than the maximal resources 
available. In Friedberg’s words, 
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“the United States would field sufficient conventional (and tactical nuclear) forces to 
deal with at least some types of limited aggression without resorting to unrestricted use 
of nuclear weapons. But it would not invest in the types of forces or in the mobilization 
measures necessary to conduct an all-out conventional war, still less an unlimited 
nuclear and conventional one.”195 
 
The secondary power accumulation mechanisms explain the final outcome of the Cold War. 
Mutually assured destruction meant that neither of the superpowers could defeat the other solely 
through military means. It explains why the Cold War never became hot, but not why one of the two 
powers – the United States – managed to prevail in the long run. Deterrence was thus a facilitating - 
but not a decisive - cause. As Friedberg argues, the crucial factor that allowed an American victory in 
the Cold War was the effectiveness of its economic system.196 Washington chose a relatively limited 
strategy, where only some resources were used on military spending. This meant that more 
resources could be invested in the private economy, which led to a relatively high level of growth. As 
we argued before, in the long run, well-managed private capitalism economy makes the overall 
economy more effective. The planned economy of the Soviet Union had several endogenous defects 
that curbed the long-term efficiency of the system. As Anders Åslund has argued, the system’s only 
principle of organization was political decision-making, which made “[p]olitical obedience … more 
important than work performance.”197 The economy duly lost impetus because lack of competition 
meant that producers were not spurred to innovate, or demand improvements from their suppliers. 
Information about consumer preferences did not apply in the Soviet command system as it did in 
market economies.198 The Soviet economy performed well in its first decades, during its recovery 
from the world war, and it could generate growth simply through “catching-up” effects. It utilized its 
main advantages – the ability to mobilize resources to back long term strategies and its financial 
stability – to produce astonishing growth rates. However, after these low-hanging fruits had been 
picked, the internal flaws of the system meant that the USSR could not keep up with the United 
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States in the long run.199 As Darren Acemoglu and James Robinson put it, “[b]y the 1970s, economic 
growth had all but stopped.”200 
 
Figure 3.1. American defense outlays in percent of GDP, 1940-1991201 
 
 
As part of its propaganda effort, the Soviet Union did not publish reliable economic data, so we have 
to rely on estimates to illustrate the long-term performance of the American and Soviet economies. 
Figure 3.2. depicts the development in United States and USSR GDP per capita between 1950 and 
1989, as measured in deflated purchase power adjusted prices as reported by the OECD. The 
numbers for the Soviet Union are largely based on estimates made by the CIA.202 Because the 
numbers have been adjusted for purchasing power, they generally illustrate the standard of living, 
rather than the ability to purchase military hardware. The Soviet Union would most likely have 
access to fewer economic resources when it came to acquisition of military hardware. The figure 
shows how the United States kept a significant economic advantage over the Soviet Union over the 
course of the Cold War. From 1950 to 1989, the two societies had a somewhat similar average per 
annum growth rate (1.8 percent for the United States and 1.9 percent for the USSR). However, the 
Soviet economy largely stagnated after 1975, growing only 0.9 percent per year, while the American 
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economy boomed at 2.3 percent through the latter period. The disparity between the two societies 
can be illustrated by projecting when the Soviet Union would reach the GDP per capita level that the 
United States achieved in 1946. If the post-1975 growth rate is projected into the future, average 
Soviet citizens would to wait until 2017 to get a purchasing power on par with the one found in 
Truman’s America.203  
 
Figure 3.2. American and Soviet GDP per capita 1950-89 in 1990 international Geary-Khamis USD204 
 
 
Over the course of the period, this gave Washington significant leeway to pursue alternative policies 
to pressure the Soviets. When oil prices declined in the late-1980s, the USSR lost additional fiscal 
sustainability.205 In the long run, the USSR could not maintain its high military spending and provide 
a viable level of welfare for its citizens. To be sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union was not 
inevitable. Many non-economic causes, including decisions made by the ruling nomenklatura, and 
the development of Soviet ideology, played a part in its demise.206 Yet these factors only played out 
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because the USSR faced terminal long-term structural problems. The imbalance between military 
and civilian spending certainly forced the USSR into a corner where it could not compete with the 
United States in the long run.   
Friedberg also emphasizes that the existence of a free market economy gave the United 
States an additional advantage: The United States could purchase its arms and equipment from 
private contractors and outsource its technology development to private enterprises. The Soviet 
Union lacked both these possibilities because of its planned economy. The competition in the 
American private sector meant that companies strove to innovate, which increased the amount of 
military force gained per dollar spent. In the long run, this helped to increase America’s power 
accumulation, as the same amount of force could be acquired at a relatively lower prize. The 
resources saved through these operations could then be spent on additional military capabilities or 
be directed to the civilian economy, where it would yield higher returns in the long run.207 
 It is important to emphasize that the American economic system only became a decisive 
factor because the military factors allowed it to flourish freely. The United States held a distinct 
advantage in economic resources, and sophistication of military technology, from the outset of the 
Cold War. In terms of power resources, the United States simply began at a higher level than did the 
Soviet Union. This allowed the United States to secure itself from an imminent Soviet attack. 
Perhaps Moscow would have decided to attack the United States, had it had the upper hand when it 
came to military resources. If so, the American advantage in the long-term production of capabilities 
could have been off-set by the Soviet force superiority. One should be careful with counterfactual 
history, but it is possible that Soviet leaders would have chosen this route, had it been available to 
them and had they understood the long-term economic trends. Capitalism only secured victory to 
the United States because alternative routes were coincidentally blocked for the USSR. To be sure, 
deterrence in itself did not lead to American victory. Deterrence was a facilitating factor, which 
allowed the eventual decisive factor – American capitalism – to win the day. 
The United States’ relations to lesser powers – most importantly its system of alliances – 
also played a crucial role in ensuring that the economy could tip the balance in the end. Washington 
essentially had two options – internationalism or isolationism - each of which could have ensured 
that the two goals described above, securing the American homeland against a destructive attack 
and preserving its capitalist economy, could be achieved.208 In the end, Washington chose to pursue 
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the former course of action. The goal of American diplomacy was containment: to ensure that the 
USSR could not expand its share of the global military and industrial power by forcing other states 
into its system of alliances. Many of Washington’s key allies possessed plentiful reserves of military 
manpower, and an industrial production apparatus. As George Kennan told an audience at the 
National War College in 1948, America’s key goal was to ensure that it controlled the bulk of the 
global “centers of industrial and military power”: the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, 
and the Soviet Union.209 At the time of the address, the United States held four of these five centers. 
Great Britain, Germany, and Japan were key allies that had to be protected from Soviet 
encroachment, as a shift in the possession of these centers would make the American homeland 
more liable to a military attack. This strategy had both a military and an economic rationale. Building 
up alliances and institutions abroad could enhance American force posture should a military 
encounter with the Soviets become imminent. More importantly, Soviet control of the natural 
resources and production apparatus available in Eurasia would enable them to increase their 
production and development of arms, giving them a long-term advantage. To avoid this outcome, 
the United States consequently got involved in disputes in areas that were deemed of strategic 
importance, always supporting anti-Soviet forces, beginning with the anti-communist governments 
of Greece and Turkey in 1947.210 
The internationalist strategy was not the only feasible option. In a retrospective analysis of 
the American Cold War plans, Robert Art argues that isolationism was a viable, yet suboptimal, 
grand strategy. The American nuclear strike force would have been enough to secure the American 
homeland from an enemy invasion, even if the Soviets had controlled all of Eurasia. The United 
States would have been able to intercept a Soviet invasion armada, Art argues, either with 
conventional or nuclear means. Furthermore, the presence of vital strategic resources on the 
American continent meant that the American economy could have retained enough strength to be 
able to build the nuclear capabilities necessary to deter a Soviet attack.211 Losing Great Britain, 
Japan, and Germany would not have spelled the end of the United States. However, it would have 
made it more insecure. In addition, by protecting other key states, Washington kept its number of 
trading partners high, thus enhancing its potential for economic growth.  
 To be sure, the internationalist strategy had its downsides. Militarily, the United States 
risked overextending its engagements abroad, generating security promises that could be kept only 
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at the price of blood and treasure. By getting entangled in conflicts abroad, so the argument goes, 
the United States wasted military and economic resources and actually lost economic potential, 
which could have been used to out-compete the USSR.212 In Art’s words,  
 
“[h]ad the United States been concerned only with its own security, and not that of 
Western Europe and Japan, it would have needed only: (1) a relatively small strategic 
nuclear force, a reasonable portion of it invulnerable to destruction by a Soviet first 
strike; (2) a modest air force and navy able to sink any Soviet surface ships that attacked 
across the Pacific; and (3) a small army to deal with any minor border incursions from 
hemispheric neighbors or other states.”213 
 
Instead, Washington’s internationalist strategy entailed a much larger strategic nuclear force, a large 
stock of tactical nuclear weapons, which were deployed in Europe, a formidable navy and air force 
that were capable of controlling the seas and projecting power into all corners of the world, and a 
standing army of more than 750,000 men.214 In other words, the American commitment to Japan 
and Western Europe removed some of the dynamism out of the economic system by investing 
resources in additional military capabilities.   
 When all the pros and cons are considered, it seems evident that isolationism was a viable, 
yet suboptimal, grand strategy. The loss of the Eurasian industrial centers would surely have 
changed the entire Cold War gambit, making the United States the underdog to a threatening and 
powerful USSR. The United States won the Cold War because it was stronger at the outset of the 
conflict, which enabled it to deter a devastating military attack. Furthermore, its economy was much 
more dynamic than that of the Soviet Union, which enabled it to retain its lead over the course of 
the struggle. These advantages could have been lost had the United States had followed an 
isolationist strategy. The cost of its commitments to its allies did not surpass the importance a 
potential loss of the industrial capital of Japan, Germany and the UK.215 
 To summarize, the United States’ victory in the Cold War was primarily caused by the 
economic dynamism of its capitalist economy. Although conventional military force played a crucial 
role in keeping its global alliance together, it was not the crucial power generation tool. This also 
explains why Huntington’s prediction of Cold War societal civil-military relations did not fit the 
outcome of the conflict. Huntington erroneously anticipated that the Cold War would be decided by 
the state that was able to generate the maximum amount of military force. Instead, the liberalism 
that he dreaded actively helped fuel the dynamism that led to the American victory.  
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Conclusion 
Samuel Huntington understood the functional imperative as the threat of conventional war. This led 
him to argue that states that face a functional imperative will either become conducive to their 
militaries or succumb to an enemy invasion. The purpose of this chapter was to explore Huntington’s 
assertion examining the nature of the functional imperative. More specifically, I asked how warfare 
threatens modern advanced societies and how they counter this threat. States have many different 
tools for handling threats, including diplomacy, economic growth, and technological innovation.  
Conventional military force is thus just one of these means. For instance, the United States used a 
multi-faceted strategy to handle the threat of the Soviet Union. In the short-term, the United States 
was secure from a sudden attack from the Soviet Union, because of the combination of its 
geographical location and its significant nuclear deterrent. This allowed it to pursue a long-term 
strategy, where the superiority of its economic system and the large head start in terms of military 
and economic resources that it enjoyed at the onset of the Cold War enabled it to exhaust the USSR. 
It was thus the combination of military and non-military factors that enabled the United States to 
prevail over the Soviet Union.  
This illustrates an important point about societal civil-military relations, which has hitherto 
been ignored in the literature. Securing the state is not only a matter of maximizing its conventional 
military force. Power is a multi-dimensional concept that also includes economic and diplomatic 
means. The importance of the conventional military depends on whether or not war is an immediate 
option, or if the state is engaged in a long-term struggle for dominance. Furthermore, even if war is 
immediate, the nuclear revolution means that conventional force has become less decisive for 
absolute warfare. Diplomacy, economic dynamism, and technological innovation – factors that are 
generated outside of the military - are just as significant in ensuring the long-term survival of the 
state.   
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- 4 - 
The societal imperative 
 
In chapter 2, we saw that Huntington’s theory made an extensive prediction of the outcome of the 
Cold War, but that events did not unfold as he expected. Chapter 3 showed that the main reason for 
this problem was his understanding of the functional imperative: he underestimated that liberal 
societies are capable of using other power generation mechanisms, which give them a competitive 
advantage under certain structural conditions. Having explored the functional imperative, we still 
need to unpack the societal imperative – the second component of his framework for societal civil-
military relations. Interestingly, apart from a couple of cursory remarks, Huntington never defined 
the societal imperative nor did he explicitly identify the social factors behind it in The Soldier and the 
State.216 He used the societal imperative to derive his predictions of American Cold War civil-military 
relations, but he did not explain how it functions in depth.  
This is done in the present chapter. How, it asks, is the state’s ability to fend off external 
enemies hampered by domestic factors? The societal imperative is the degree to which domestic 
features of society obstruct the state from pursuing an optimal political course. It is shaped by a 
society’s ideologies, institutions, and special interests. Does the population understand the threats 
faced by the state? Are they willing to make the necessary sacrifices to meet threats? Are they 
capable of influencing the state’s policies?  
In modern society, the state is thought to be accountable to the population. Broadly 
speaking, this principle grew out of a legitimacy vacuum left by the breakdown of religious authority 
at the end of the Middle Ages. The societal imperative becomes problematic if the ideology 
dominating the government elite does not reflect the threats facing the state. They may either 
underestimate or overestimate the importance of military force. Furthermore, popular militarism 
may erode the civilian government’s position of authority vis-à-vis the armed forces. 
 This chapter progresses in three sections. The first section presents the basic building blocks 
of political sociology. It argues that all societies rests on the consent of the individual members of 
society, mechanisms of repression and social control, and socialization through various institutions. 
The second section then uses this framework to briefly describe how modern society developed. The 
societal imperative is then analyzed in the final section.  
 
The building blocks of society 
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Richard Feynman, the Nobel Prize winning physicist, once argued that all of science can be 
summarized in one sentence: “all things are made of atoms”.217 If we were to do the same for the 
social sciences, the corresponding dictum would be: “all societies consist of individuals”. Societies 
only exist because groups of individuals are willing to act in concert to pursue common goals. Of 
course, this insight is hardly a social theory. Understanding that a star simply consists of atoms tells 
us little about the intricacies of their celestial life. Likewise, useful knowledge about society cannot 
simply be derived from the individual. Stars and societies are both more than the sum of their parts.  
Three social mechanisms hold society together: consent, control, and socialization. 
Unpacking each of these mechanisms help us to understand how societies change over time and, 
indeed, why soldiers are willing to serve, fight, and die in the state’s service.  
 
1. Consent is perhaps the fundamental building block of any society. All societies rest on an 
implicit agreement between the ruler and those who have to consent to his rule. The individual’s 
agreement depends on the reciprocal obligations of the state. This reciprocal relationship is 
commonly understood as the social contract – that is, the implicit or explicit belief that a person’s 
political obligations to the state depend on reciprocal obligations from the state. All societies have 
been based on some notion of consent and reciprocity between the state and the individual.218 We 
can recognize an implicit principle of reciprocity as early as Plato's Crito. Socrates, sentenced to 
death by the Athenian assembly, refused to escape to save his own life because it would violate the 
tacit agreement that he had made with the city. By enjoying the fruits of communal life, Socrates 
argued, he could not abandon the rule of the laws now that its judgment went against him. 219 He 
would have known about war and the sacrifices it entails as he, according to Plato, fought for Athens 
at the battles of Delium, Amphipolis, and Potidaea during the Peloponnesian War.220 To be sure, 
Plato’s notion of reciprocity was never formulated into an explicit notion of a social contract. Many of 
the distinctions that we would draw – for instance, the basic distinction between community and the 
state – are entirely lacking from his treatment of the topic.221 However, some notion of consent goes 
back to the beginning of political philosophy.  
 Thomas Hobbes was one of the first thinkers who described the relationship between the 
individual and the state as a contract. As is illustrated by the famous frontispiece of his The 
Leviathan – which depicts the monarch as a giant composed of a collection of individuals – Hobbes 
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recognized that the state is an artificial institution, created by men.222 Hobbes stripped society of 
everything but the core of the social contract: the relationship between state and individual. Basing 
his theory of the state on the assumption that people are selfish utility-maximizers, Hobbes 
constructed an elaborate scheme that explains why these purely self-interested individuals can still 
found a state based on the fear of one another. If man is indeed "homo homini lupus" - a wolf against 
his fellow man - a state-less society will be in a constant state of war, where life is "solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short".223 Hobbes argued that rational egoists will recognize that the lack of a state 
make them worse off. They will subsequently install an all-powerful state, as gruesome as the 
Leviathan - a biblical monster from the Book of Job - with absolute power to punish anyone who 
steps outside of the law.224 Without a state to punish those who try to get an unfair advantage, 
society will degenerate under the constant competition and breaking of promises to “a meere warre 
of all against all”.225 
War was one of the crucial soft spots in Hobbes’ notion of the social contract.226 It illustrates 
the importance of other factors not included in the notion of a self-interested and rational individual. 
In war, the state, according to Hobbes, asks the individual to step into a situation of danger. However, 
he could not explain why someone who is solely interested in his own well-being will be willing to 
fight - and perhaps die - for the state. The individual only owes the state his loyalty because it offers 
him protection from death. To die in order not to die is, of course, an absurd idea. If a person follows 
Hobbes' individualistic assumptions, he should either run away or shift allegiances as soon as he 
finds himself faced with the terrors of the battlefield.227 
The solution to the Hobbesian problem is that people are not rational egoists. The standard 
textbook version of the history of political ideas would highlight Rousseau’s contribution to this 
debate. Reviving and reformulating an idea that had its origins in classical Greece, Rousseau 
famously reversed Hobbes’ ideas and argued that people are naturally good and only corrupted by 
civilization.228 Thus, “nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state (…). [H]e is restrained by 
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Natural pity from harming anyone himself and nothing leads him to do so even after he has received 
harm.”229 Being member of a group or a community is a fundamental part of being human, and 
creates bonds for which people are willing to die. These bonds, Rousseau argued, are still the 
foundation of modern society – in a society, however, that punishes goodness and rewards vice.  
Later sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and psychologists - even Rousseau’s 
contemporaries – would hesitate from making an either/or assertion about the benevolence or 
malice of human nature. According to David Hume, the discussion about human nature was a “vulgar 
dispute … which is never likely to have any issue”.230 Instead, Hume began with the empirical 
observation that people sometimes act altruistically, and sometimes act to further their own ends; 
and he focused on exploring the former while bracketing the latter.231 This notion of a dual nature of 
man is the same model we see in most modern social theory. Most scholars hold that people are 
concurrently self-oriented and collectivity-oriented. Talcott Parsons, for instance, argued that this 
choice between individual needs and those of the community was one of the fundamental questions 
facing every human being.232 People are neither complete egoists nor perfect altruists. Most of us 
carry both propensities.  
Philosophers and social scientists have generally accepted that people are social beings, but 
refrained from exploring why this is so. It makes intuitive sense that taking care of one’s own needs 
would offer one an advantage in life. Explaining why people become oriented to collectivities is 
more challenging. Recent research within the biological sciences may help us to understand the 
origins of our orientation towards communities. In pre-modern society, cooperation and the 
formation of affectionate bonds towards others, this research argues, was a superior evolutionary 
strategy, which favored individuals who were disposed to form such bonds. For instance, 
cooperation between close relatives is a superior evolutionary strategy. Biologists believe that 
genetic survival - and not simply the survival of a specific individual - is the primary mechanism 
driving evolution. The survival of a specific individual does not matter for evolution – it only awards 
those who spread as large a percentage of their genes as possible. In other words, individual 
sacrifice can be an evolutionary superior strategy if it allows other, genetically similar individuals to 
continue breeding. Following that logic, it makes sense for individuals to help others with whom they 
share a large percentage of their DNA. We typically share half of our genes with our siblings. Helping 
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them to procreate thus spreads a quarter of our own genes. Similarly, helping a first cousin spreads 
one eighth of our DNA.233 
Scholars find it more difficult to explain why we form affectionate relationships with people 
to whom we are not genetically related. There is generally no consensus about the origins of non-
genetic altruism. The most convincing explanation also finds its origins in evolution and the long-
term survival of pre-modern groups. Having a propensity for developing friendships and for giving to 
our friends, so the argument goes, is a superior strategy both for group and individual. Friendship 
result in closely knitted social groups and these social groups are more likely to survive in the long 
run. People without the propensity for friendship would be excluded or killed and thus unable to 
procreate. The propensity for cooperation and affection towards non-relatives, it is argued, is still 
hard-wired into our brain, even though civilization has disconnected us from evolution.234  
 As we shall see in later chapters, the notion of collectivity-orientation is essential for 
understanding the notion of military sacrifice. On the battlefield the soldier fights for his comrades in 
arms, his friends, his family, and his community. While it seems nonsensical to sacrifice oneself for a 
society which is based solely on one’s own, personal benefit, sacrificing oneself for the good of 
others is a another matter. Although the social contract is essentially between two parties – the state 
and the individual – it cannot be understood unless a third party, the community, is included in the 
equation, as illustrated in figure 4.1. If we look narrowly at the relationship between the state and 
the individual, we will notice its instrumental nature. The individual only submits to the state 
because he gains something – protection and services – from this exchange. Similarly, the state 
requires loyalty, taxes and manpower from the individual. This instrumental relationship cannot force 
the individual to sacrifice himself, as that would contradict the utility principle upon which it is 
based. It is only when we add the third party – the community – that the social contract becomes 
more than a purely instrumental relationship. The state can now pay some of its dues to the 
community, which the individual reciprocates by providing loyalty, taxes and manpower. Because 
communities can persevere beyond the death of the individual, this enables individual sacrifice. The 
individual may die on the battlefield, but his family, community, or nation lives on.   
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Figure 4.1. The social contract 
 
 
Not all groups or individuals are necessarily part of the same social contract. Sometimes, the state 
requires more from a specific group than from others. In those cases, it makes sense to create a 
separate social contract with that specific group. When different groups and classes are given 
different rights and obligations for administrative or socio-economic purposes, we can say that 
society is characterized by a dual social contract. For example, the aristocracy typically functioned as 
an administrative middle layer between the ruler and the people prior to the modern age. An 
illustrative example – to which we shall return again in later chapters – is the social contract in 
Frederician Prussia, where the nobility held special privileges, for instance a near monopoly on 
military commissions, by virtue of their birth. The aristocracy had one social contract with the king, 
which demanded fairly extensive sacrifices and discipline from the nobles in exchange for generous 
social advantages. The population at large, though relatively heavily taxed, had fewer burdens in 
terms of services for the state, but also had fewer social and political rights.235 
 
                                                          
235
 Mączak, Antoni (1996): The Nobility-State Relationship, in Reinhard, Wolfgang (1996): Power Elites and 
State Building, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 189-206; Descimen, Robert (1996): Power Elites and the Prince: 
The State as Enterprise, in Reinhard, Wolfgang (1996): Power Elites and State Building, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, pp. 106-10; Fukuyama (2011), pp. 328-29; Giddens (1987), pp. 202-03; Mann, Michael (1986): The 
Sources of Social Power. Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A. D. 1760, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 458-61.  
Loyalty 
Taxes 
Manpower 
Protection 
Services 
State 
Individual 
 
Community 
  
Protection 
Services 
Functional pressure 
82 
 
2. The social contract is only one of three clusters of mechanisms around which modern society 
is based. Some groups – voluntary or involuntary - fall outside of the social contract. The state uses 
social control - mechanisms of isolation, violence, coercion, and surveillance - to repress these 
groups and incentivize members of the social contract to stay within its bounds.236 Some groups are 
forcibly held outside of the social contract, and, in some cases, enslaved for labor. For example, 
ancient Sparta based its economy on the wide-scale repression of the helots, a slave class which 
probably consisted of conquered peoples. It was only the citizens of Sparta who had an agreement 
with the state, guaranteeing certain benefits in return for their consent to its rule. The helots, by 
contrast, had no claim to anything whatsoever, not even the right to life.237 According to Plutarch, 
Spartan youngsters, who excelled in their military education, would engage in krypteia, an annual 
ritual where they were allowed to assault and kill any helot they met at night.238 Sometimes, 
members of the social contract voluntarily decide to leave it. The state typically then uses social 
control mechanisms to incentivize them to return to the fold. Wars of secession are examples of 
large groups trying to abandon society. On a smaller scale, we can refer to deserters or tax evaders. 
Social control can never totally replace the need for consent. The use of instruments of 
violence and repression requires someone to organize and implement the oppression. As Hannah 
Arendt put it,  
 
“Even the totalitarian ruler, whose chief instrument of rule is torture, needs [consent 
from] the secret police and its net of informers. … Even the most despotic domination 
we know of, the rule of master over slaves, who always outnumbered him, did not rest 
on superior means of coercion as such, but on … the organized solidarity of the 
masters.”239 
 
Even in a slave state like Sparta, where the repression of some groups reached an almost 
unimaginable level, the social structure depended on a social contract between the city and its 
citizens. A great example is the painful and prolonged destruction of Nazi Germany in the final years 
of the Second World War. Puzzled by why Germany managed to keep on fighting even after it was 
obvious that the war could not be won, Ian Kershaw has explored the intricate processes that 
yielded this surprising outcome. By late 1944, Kershaw argues, the German population was no 
longer driven by a broad support of Hitler’s course. If possible, it was ready to denounce its 
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leadership in order to end the war. In other words, the social contract had broken down. However, 
two domestic factors held German society together.240 Firstly, the extensive use of government 
terror – the ultimate mechanism of social control – meant that individual citizens could not voice 
their opposition, nor act in concerted defiance against the government. The courts penalized 
dissenters without hesitation. Deserters and disruptive elements within the ranks were punished 
severely: 20,000 German soldiers were executed by the state during the Second World War, by 
contrast to only 150 Germans who suffered the same fate during the previous world war.241 The 
population’s best chance was to wait out the war and hope that the Allies would prove more 
merciful than the Nazis. Secondly, select groups still consented to the state’s course of action. These 
groups typically controlled the various bureaucratic branches of the state. Members of the Nazi 
party knew well that they would have no future in an occupied Germany. They therefore had no 
choice but to fight on. Military officers and government bureaucrats were also driven by a type of 
consent, but theirs was often a consent based on blind loyalty rather than active political agreement. 
Kershaw concludes that, without these consenting groups, the German state would never have been 
able to fight on for so long as it did.242 
To be sure, social control is costly and the state prefers to avoid using it whenever possible. 
It is the last resort, to which it may turn if the normal mechanisms of agreement do not suffice. 
When societies break down, the social contract is narrowed down and left to cover fewer and fewer 
people. As this process occurs, the state can no longer count on the voluntary participation of the 
populace. Instead, it has to dedicate resources to isolate and punish non-conformists. In these 
extreme cases, the relationship between the state and the individual becomes parasitical rather than 
symbiotic, as the state enslaves the population to ensure its own survival.  
  
3. The social contract and social control do not tell the whole story of how society stays 
together under the threat of war. Socialization – that is, the individual’s adoption of norms or culture 
- also plays a crucial role in this process. Communities are not formed in isolation. The state has 
access to powerful institutions that can facilitate the creation of communities, and can help shape 
them in a way that is opportune to the state.243 For instance, in ancient Greece the phalanx was a 
splendid venue for the creation of social bonds. It required that the fighters formed an impenetrable 
wall of shields by standing shoulder to shoulder. It needed enormous discipline from every warrior 
as a hole in the formation could be used to break the barrier of shields down. Greek warriors were 
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therefore disciplined to stay put and to enjoy the results of communal effort.244 Without these 
institutions, it is doubtful if the ancient city-states would have been able to generate the solidarity 
needed to establish neutral laws for a common good. For Aristotle, the relationship between hoplite 
tactics and democracy was almost self-evident. As he put it in The Politics, “as city-states grew larger 
and hoplite weapons became a stronger force, more people came to participate in the 
constitution.”245 Here, we see that the relationship between war and political order is dialectical. The 
military root of citizenship is evident from the Greek word for it - "polites" - which literally meant 
"defender of the citadel".246 Similarly, in modern society, the state has access to various institutions 
which it uses to socialize the population into a distinct national sense of community. For instance, as 
Pierre Bourdieu argued, the state uses different institutions to shape the categories that individuals 
develop to make sense of the world. The state uses the education system to socialize the individual 
into a specific cultural frame of mind. This process is enhanced by the control of language and even 
through the categories developed within social science.247  
These mechanisms focus not only on people who find themselves within the social contract. For 
example, as Michel Foucault has famously shown, the prison allows the state to discipline 
delinquents to submit to the social order. The state has gone from making the punishment of non-
conformists a violent spectacle of torture, which was meant to scare off potential dissenters, to using 
the prison to socialize the individual to accept his role as a member of a larger community.248 
  
To sum up, society is held together by consent, control, and socialization. Members of society 
engage in a social contract with the state, in which the latter commits to providing protection and 
services to them and their primary communities in exchange for loyalty, taxes and manpower. Those 
who choose to violate the social contract are repressed through various social control mechanisms, 
such as isolation, violence, coercion, and surveillance. Finally, the state continuously uses various 
mechanisms of socialization to create communities that make them susceptible to supporting the 
state. 
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The birth of modern society 
Understanding how our present society works is best illustrated by looking at how it grew out of 
other, less complex types of social formation. The constellation of consent, control, and socialization 
changes from epoch to epoch. Different eras have had their own unique conditions for each of these 
mechanisms. Societies have changed as various factors have made one or more of these 
mechanisms more salient. 249  
Gathering the various driving forces of history together, we can understand the 
development of modern society as going through three stages.250 
 
1. Theocratic society was characterized by a divine principle of legitimacy and a weak state, 
which had to rule via various middle-men, mainly the nobility and clergy. The social contract was 
fairly complex and reflected both the religious understanding of legitimacy and the socially layered 
nature of society. The state’s legitimacy was bestowed by God. It may be difficult for modern people 
to understand, but the theocratic state rested on the belief that the king’s rule was divinely 
ordained.251 Contemporaries rarely questioned this belief, but if one did so, one would notice an 
implicit incentive structure that made authority legitimate, even if one did not accept the need for 
submission prima facie. The expedient and the divine overlapped in complex ways. Firstly, God was 
the ultimate source of morality and the individual had to follow His representative insofar as he felt 
compelled by his conscience. Secondly, this moral imperative was combined with a personal 
incentive to submit. To obey the state was to do God’s bidding, which would eventually secure the 
individual a place among the righteous, come Judgment Day. Finally, the state’s legitimacy was 
secured even without appeals to the individual’s conscience and belief in heaven. As God’s 
representative on Earth, the king was seen as having Providence on his side in politics. God’s support 
simply translated into good luck, which secured a good harvest and success on the battlefield. Even 
if one did not believe that disobedience would get one sent to hell, God intervened on the side of 
the king in secular matters as well, thus giving him a superior ability to rule in this life.252 These forms 
of authority were of course intertwined, so that the skills of the king signaled his connection to God 
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as well. The more potent the king, the stronger the authority bestowed by God.253 In certain periods, 
this even led to the belief that the king had personal healing powers. In Shakespeare’s Macbeth, for 
instance, the righteous legitimacy of the English king (in contrast to Macbeth, who has usurped the 
Scottish throne) is illustrated by his ability cure scrofula through touch. As Malcolm says to Macduff,  
 
“A most miraculous work in this good king;  
Which often, since my here-remain in England,  
I have seen him do. How he solicits heaven,  
Himself best knows; but strangely-visited people,  
All swoll'n and ulcerous, pitiful to the eye,  
The mere despair of surgery, he cures,  
Hanging a golden stamp about their necks,  
Put on with holy prayers, and 'tis spoken,  
To the succeeding royalty he leaves  
The healing benediction. With this strange virtue,  
He hath a heavenly gift of prophecy,  
And sundry blessings hang about his throne,  
That speak him full of grace”254  
 
The belief that good fortune reflected divine blessing was so powerful that when Charles I saw his 
power base crumble during the English Civil War, the royal touch was a significant tool used to shore 
up support for the royalists. Similarly, when Charles II, his son and heir, tried to reestablish the 
Stuart monarchy during the Restoration, massive displays involving the royal touch was one of the 
mechanisms used to shore up support. So frequent were these events that historians estimate that 
Charles II touched around 100,000 patients during his 24-year reign.255 
 The theocratic state was weak and had a very loose control of its own territory. Social 
organization and technology did not allow the king to personally oversee many of the affairs of his 
realm and he was therefore forced to rely on the conscience of middlemen to ensure that his 
bidding was followed.256 The result was a type of double social contract, where the king had one 
agreement with the administrative layer and another with the population at large. The state 
bestowed expanded privileges to the nobility in exchange for the services that it provided.257 
Commoners lived in a local world, with their village or township at the center. They probably cared 
more about the rule of their specific local liege than about the rule of the king. 
                                                          
253
 Walzer, Michael (1974): Regicide and Revolution. Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 14-21.  
254
 Shakespeare, William (2010b):  MacBeth, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, pp. 98-99. Editor’s footnotes 
removed, JRC.  
255
 Bloch, Marc (1973): The Royal Touch. Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 208-13.  
256
 Giddens (1987), pp. 88-89; Tilly (1992), pp. 99-107.  
257
 Walzer (1974), pp. 47-53.  
87 
 
Theocratic society’s complex divine principle of legitimacy depended on governmental 
control of a near-duopoly on information, which allowed the power-holders to use propaganda and 
social control to cover tensions.258 The church and the state controlled all the key sources of 
information and the main seats associated with legitimate government. Furthermore, the sword, 
stake, and rack enabled them to strike down dissenters and non-conformists, who were not 
convinced by the arguments of the authorities. The spectacle of the auto-da-fé was often enough to 
deter potential opposition forces.259 The inconsistencies in religious doctrine were therefore not 
allowed to feed into rival interpretations that destabilized the divine source of legitimacy - the fates 
of the Hussites, Lollards, and Huguenots serve as a case in point.260 In spite of the infighting between 
church and state, this nexus of control proved surprisingly stable over the course of centuries.  
The sources of the transformation of the principle of legitimacy are many, yet surely the 
invention of movable types and the printing press around 1450 played a pivotal role. A highly trained 
scribe could produce a few manuscripts a day – the same time as it would take a fully functioning 
late-16th century printing press to manufacture more than 3,000 copies of the same manuscript. In 
1500, some historians estimate, there were already more than 20,000,000 printed volumes in 
circulation all over Europe. A century later, that number had increased tenfold.261 Information and 
learning began to dissipate into the population at large. Jürgen Habermas argues that expanding 
trade networks and the spread of commercial information and general mail created the foundation 
for journals and newspapers.262 This meant that the authorities’ near-duopoly on information was 
broken. A steady decline in religious authority and a separation of earthly and religious matters 
followed. This was exacerbated by the wars of religion and the rise of Protestantism.263 The massive 
influence of religion in politics took centuries to unravel, yet slowly principles of secularism were 
introduced in political life. Religious belief gradually became a personal matter and detached from 
the state’s legitimacy. Although people continued to believe that God intervened directly in the 
world, they little by little stopped seeing Him as the source of government legitimacy.264 These 
changes are perhaps best illustrated by the 1755 Lisbon earthquake – an event that happened fairly 
late in the process, where these ideas had fermented and grown popular, at least among the 
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intelligentsia. Lisbon, at the time, was one of the leading trading hubs of the continent and the 
capital of one of the great powers of Europe – a state renowned for its religious zeal and devout 
Catholicism. Striking on the morning of All Saints’ Days, the quake and the ensuing tsunami and fire 
destroyed most of the city’s buildings, killing roughly a fifth of its population. According to Walter 
Benjamin, the disaster “was roughly equivalent to the destruction of London and Chicago today.”265 
The fact that it happened on a Catholic holiday, destroying the majority of the churches in the capital 
of a country devoted to the papacy – while largely sparing the city’s red light district – contradicted 
the doctrine of Providence. The Lisbon earthquake was hardly the first calamity of its size to hit 
Europe in a way that contradicted official doctrine. However, the slow speed of communications and 
the distribution of information by non-government or church sources prevented a full incorporation 
of the events into a religious worldview. Recalling his boyhood reaction to the news of the quake, 
Goethe remembered feeling  
 
“not a little perplexed. God, creator and upholder of heaven and earth … had, by 
delivering up to destruction alike the just with the unjust, shown Himself not at all 
fatherly. In vain the young mind struggled against these insinuations, but with little 
success, because theologians and intellectuals could not agree about the way one must 
regard such a phenomenon.”266 
 
According to Theodor Adorno, it was the destruction of Lisbon that led Voltaire to write Candide, a 
1759 satirical novella that lampooned the notion that we live in the best of all possible worlds.267 
Candide, a naïve and impressionable youngster, travels from disaster to disaster with his teacher 
Pangloss, who explains their many mishaps – war, torture, venereal disease, and the Lisbon 
Earthquake to name a few - as part of God’s plan.268 The acceptance of events – and with them social 
hierarchies – as a given was breaking down. Though widely banned, Candide became an instant 
bestseller, hence illustrating and cementing the loss of authority and transformation of legitimacy 
that occurred in that period.269 
 
2. In nobility society, the legitimacy of the state was no longer justified solely in religious 
doctrine. Instead, securing the happiness and freedom of each individual was steadily becoming the 
purpose of the state. This is perhaps best exemplified by Thomas Hobbes’ contractarian view of the 
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relationship between state and individual. Without the belief that God would reward or punish the 
citizenry – in this realm or the next - for their submission to the state, Hobbes could only appeal to 
the individual’s earthly interests.270 As we have already seen, he developed an argument based on a 
highly individualistic view of people as pure utility-optimizers, who care only for their own, personal 
needs. Based on these assumptions, he argued that the king acquires his authority from his 
administrative prowess. By protecting the citizens from one another, the king is recognized as a 
legitimate ruler.271 Ordinary individuals gain a weak protection against arbitrary power, which is 
considered a basic prerequisite for the legitimacy of the state.  
Contemporary thinkers and practitioners began to recognize that the king owed his legitimacy to 
the population. For example, Frederick the Great’s Anti-Machiavel, published anonymously with 
Voltaire’s help almost a century after Hobbes’ work, described the king as the steward of the 
people’s interests. As the work’s title betrays, Frederick, an autocratic ruler to be sure, followed the 
Enlightenment Zeitgeist and took offense with Machiavelli’s separation of the normative and the 
expedient. Instead, he argued, the virtuous prince could stabilize his power base by being concerned 
with the interests of his people.272 
The weakness of the state meant that it still depended on an aristocratic class for local 
administration. The state’s legitimacy emanated from the people, but had to filter through a layer of 
noblemen. For a ruler who depended mainly on his administrative proficiency, the king’s powers 
were surprisingly weak. The mechanisms of power were still too crude to allow the state to control 
its territory directly and the nobility was therefore indispensible as middlemen between king and 
people.273 Again, the solution was a double contract, which on the one hand regulated the 
relationship between king and nobility, while concurrently installing a relationship of weak duties 
and obligations between the state and the population at large. 
 To be sure, the disappearance of religious authority was a continuous process, which only 
slowly spread throughout society. Superstition and religious beliefs still played a crucial role in 
keeping society together. The British Queen Anne still claimed she could cure illnesses through 
touching as late as 1714.274 As religious unity disappeared, it was replaced by the nation as the 
primary community. In his seminal study of modern nationality, Benedict Anderson argues that the 
nation is an "imagined community" - that is, a feeling of fraternity, delimited from other 
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communities, among large groups of people, based on an imagined communality between them.275 
As Craig Calhoun highlights, an imagined community is an indirect extension of the individual’s 
everyday life. Everyday life is the individual’s immediate experience of the world and it is therefore 
normally based on the local phenomena that surround him. However, through books, newspapers 
and other media, the individual experiences phenomena that are physically removed from him – 
most importantly the presence of others - which then becomes part of his everyday reality. He 
mirrors himself in people who are not physically present and comes to see them as his brethren.276 
Technology meant that the individual’s ability to form communities expanded, allowing him to 
become part of the groups of millions that we call nations. The phenomena which led to improved 
arenas for debate and discussion thus also caused the extension of communities. The individual 
came to see himself as sharing certain common traits with others, when he read about other people 
acting independently, yet simultaneously being part of the same story.277 
 
3. National society was characterized by a popular principle of legitimacy, based on the sense of 
community emanating from the nation, and an increasingly powerful state, which had now become 
capable of controlling its territory without help from the aristocracy. National society saw the end of 
the dual social contract. The individual was given increased legal and democratic rights, but also 
increased duties vis-à-vis the state. He was motivated by the new rights that gave him protection 
against arbitrary power and allowed him a voice in decision-making through the steadily growing 
democratic institutions. This allowed him to secure protection and services for the communities that 
he cherished.  
Welfare became a means for buying the loyalty of the citizenry. Furthermore, it increased the 
quality of soldiers. As Michael Howard points out, many of the welfare mechanisms that are today 
assumed as natural part of the state’s portfolio of responsibilities, originated because they had 
military value. For instance, the spread of public health initiatives and universal education in the 19th 
century partly came into being because the state needed healthy, literate soldiers to engage in the 
increasingly complex activities of war.278 
The development of the nation as a crucial community was a precondition for this new 
societal form. The state depended on the dedication of its population – a dedication that erupted 
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onto the world stage with the French Levée en masse during the Revolution - to field the massive 
armies that characterized 19th and 20th century warfare. The individual would only face the horrors of 
Spotsylvania, Somme, and Stalingrad because he felt he fought to better the conditions for his family, 
local communities and nation.279 This was only possible because new communications technologies 
and the general spread of information allowed each individual citizen to understand government 
policies and form an opinion about them.280 
The state had become steadily more powerful through the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century. This was in part due to new social and material technologies that allowed the state to 
control and survey large territories directly. The development of the nation and the incorporation of 
the population at large also created bonds of solidarity that made it easier to control individual 
behavior. There was no longer a need for indirect rule. The aristocracy therefore lost its importance 
as the middlemen between state and individuals. The state and the nation became mutually 
reinforcing. Not only did the new national principle enable stronger government institutions, these 
institutions also allowed the state to shape the individual’s community allegiance by interfering in 
the socialization process. Schools, prisons, the military, and even social science became venues, 
where the state could mould the individual’s sense of group membership.281 
Modern national society, Jürgen Habermas argues, is characterized by a “Janus-faced” 
tension between the principles of citizenship and nationality - two necessary, yet incommensurable, 
understandings of the individual. Citizenship refers to the status of the individual as a rational 
person, whose rights to autonomy is protected by the state. This view reflects the simple Hobbesian 
notion of the social contract between state and individual, where society is but a voluntarily 
established entity comprising of freely consenting citizens.  
In national society – where much is asked of the individual – he is also bestowed with 
extensive rights. He has a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Furthermore, his rights 
are not limited to these private interests alone. He also has a right to have a say in public matters 
through the democratic process. This perspective contains a cosmopolitan dimension, in that most 
people are rational (or have the potential to become rational) and therefore have the right to the 
same protection. If one follows this line of reasoning to its end, human rights are not limited to 
members of one specific society, but should – in principle at least – be extended to all of mankind. 
Nationality, on the other hand, establishes the individual as a member of the nation. In this 
view, people are products of society, because they owe their identity to communal socialization 
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processes. They cannot be understood as independent, rational individuals in the sense described 
above, because their identity is formed by their membership of a specific society. This identity is 
inherently particularistic, because the individual is a member of just one of many nations. It cannot 
be squared with the cosmopolitanism inherent in the citizenship principle.  
Habermas argues that both of these ideas are fundamental to modern society. Without the 
nationality principle, society would lack the fundamental solidarity that enables smooth social 
interaction. People are only willing to contribute to common social mechanisms because they 
appreciate the other members of the community. Furthermore, no-one would be willing to make the 
sacrifices characteristic of modern warfare. Conversely, social and political rights are necessary for 
mooring the nation in the state. Only when the people have a say in political decision-making could 
the state truly claim to represent the nation. Both of these principles are shaped by the 
improvement of the conditions for debate, supported by the inventions, such as the printing press, 
that arose as the influence of religious dogma reduced and the conditions for rational debate were 
improved.282 
 
In that sense, our exploration of the origins of modern society is complete. The conditions of modern 
society developed over centuries, as the way the state was legitimized and the creation of 
communities changed. The Medieval religious legitimacy was replaced by a state that was legitimized 
by its claim to represent the people. Modern society is thus characterized by a principle of 
accountability. It is only by claiming to represent civil society that the state can draw significant 
sacrifices from it. Together with the institutions of social control and socialization controlled by the 
state, this principle forms a nexus of mutually reinforcing mechanisms that shore up support for the 
state, based on national community. However, accountability is built upon a seemingly intractable 
tension between the universal principle of citizenship and the particularistic principle of nationality.  
 
Ideologies and the societal imperative 
The societal imperative depends on the ideologies, institutions, and special interests dominant in 
society.283 It becomes a problem for the survival of the state if elites are driven, either by conviction 
or acquiescence, to advocate ideas that lead to policies that diminish the state’s ability to wield 
power. As we saw in chapter 3, faulty ideas can be lethal for society. The Morioris failed to stand up 
to the Maori invaders, not for want of material, military capabilities, but partly because they lacked a 
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strategic culture that allowed them to realize the danger they faced. The cultural values of Moriori 
society led to its demise.  
In modern complex societies, state elites are somewhat isolated from the population at 
large. Ideas are the driver of policies, but it matters where the ideas come from, and if institutions 
and special interests allow them to influence policy. It not only matters if the ideas in society are in 
accordance with the challenges facing the state – it also matters if these ideas actually influence the 
government. The population may possess a rudimentary understanding of international relations, 
but this need not be problematic if it does not influence the government’s course of action. 
Consequently, one can imagine three types of societal imperatives that may put the state at risk. 
Firstly, the population and elite may both hold an erroneous understanding of international 
relations. Secondly, the government elites may hold a dangerous notion of international politics and 
may be isolated from the population at large. The population will then be incapable of correcting the 
state’s policies. Finally, the elite may hold a correct view of international politics, while the 
population is influenced by a flawed conception of the international realm. If the government 
depends wholly on the whims of the population, it may feel forced to follow policies which are not 
beneficial in the long run. In other words, does the population at large understand the threats faced 
by the state and, if so, is it willing to work for the continued existence of the state? Furthermore, do 
the political institutions allow the population to have a say in shaping policy? Is it possible for it to 
voice its opinion and shape it through a public debate? Are there informal channels that allow 
special interests to claim excessive influence over the course of the state?  
The key question is whether the ideas dominating the government elite reflect the needs 
arising from the functional imperative. Basically, these ideas can either underestimate or 
overestimate the importance of military force. Huntington explored the former of the two problems 
extensively, looking at how ideas in society can make it less likely to develop essential military 
capabilities. In democratic societies, he argued, groups can be liberal or conservative – two 
categories which, he implied, saturate the spectrum of possibilities. He treated democratic ideology 
as a discrete, binary variable – a democratic polity can either be liberal or conservative, but no such 
thing as an intermediate version is possible.284 Huntington’s distinction between liberalism and 
conservatism basically corresponds to an idealist form of individualism, or a realist acceptance of the 
need to defend status quo through violent and possibly immoral means. Crudely put, liberalism 
focuses on an abstract goal, conservatism on finding effective means. Conservatism allows using the 
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military means necessary to defend the state; liberalism lets its choice of means be colored by its 
ideals and thus possibly endangering the state.285 
Liberalism, in Huntington’s view, is essentially individualism writ large. It arises from an 
Enlightenment notion of human emancipation that defines individual freedom as the purpose of 
society. In that sense, it is a transcendental philosophy aimed at creating a society that maximizes 
individual freedom. The goal of politics is to ensure that universally acceptable moral principles are 
spread, thus ensuring the freedom and dignity of the individual. Society shall only pursue policies 
that do not violate every individual’s right to personal freedom. This, Huntington argued, creates a 
tension between liberalism and military thinking. What is war but a violation of the individual liberty 
of those who fight? Whereas liberalism is critical towards policies that do not directly strive towards 
human emancipation, military thought focuses mainly on the protection of society and is willing to 
sacrifice the lives of others to achieve that goal. Liberalism, according to Huntington, is naturally 
hostile to military affairs. Liberals will tend to shy away from making the Realpolitik choices that have 
become the core of international relations.286 
Conservatism, by contrast, seeks to secure society against threats without looking at 
whether or not the social order is morally impeccable. Curiously, Huntington equated conservatism 
with pure immanence – an absolute appreciation of the present – rather than a longing for the past. 
Conservatism is not a return to the past, but rather a change of focus from morality to expediency. 
Conservatism, in his sense of the term, cannot contain any ideal – not even an idealized past - 
beyond an appreciation of the present. It does not strive to shape society to reflect a specific 
morality, but rather appreciates the present society, and consequently makes the defense of the 
present the primary goal of political action.287 “[C]onservatism, unlike the other three ideologies, is 
not monistic and universalistic”, Huntington wrote. “It does not attempt to apply the same ideas to 
all problems and human institutions.” 288  Huntington’s version of conservatism is essentially 
immanence taken to its logical extreme.  
The purpose of politics is to protect the status quo, regardless of the morality of the current 
situation. In a democratic state – like the United States – conservatism is also a democratic force. It 
seeks to protect the status quo, which, in this case, means defending the democratic institutions. 
However, unlike liberalism, it does not refrain from actions that may be amoral in isolation, if it 
serves the wider purpose of protecting the state. To defend the status quo is to defend the current 
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nation-state. Society must be defended, even if it involves acts that infringe on the personal liberty 
and dignity of certain groups. It is therefore a Realpolitik ideology. This focus on continuity, 
Huntington argued, makes conservatism compatible with the military’s core ideas.289 Conservatism, 
in his view, is thus the appropriate response to the functional imperative.  
There are two problems with the way Huntington understood ideas and ideologies. The first 
is a rather technical problem concerning his conception of ideologies as discrete options. A 
democratic society, he argued, could either be liberal or conservative, but no such thing as an 
intermediate version was possible.290 As Peter Feaver has correctly highlighted, it seems peculiar that 
Huntington did not allow intermediate versions of the two ideologies, such as “liberal hawks” or 
“idealist conservatives”.291 Ideologies never form discrete alternatives. Instead, as ideology scholar 
Michael Freeden has shown, they are malleable and can brush over logical contradictions. They infer 
meaning around certain core concepts, yet are not capable of capturing all of social reality. 
Consequently, they naturally contain tensions that destabilize them, yet need not be solved.292 To 
use one of Huntington’s ideologies, liberalism strives to enhance individual liberty. However, in some 
situations, the defense of liberty requires that one violates liberty itself. War, for instance, 
commonly entails committing horrible acts for the defense of the state, which can be detrimental to 
liberty itself. Liberalism does not necessarily offer an answer to this conundrum, nor does it 
necessarily need to do so. War is a relatively rare occurrence. Only when an ideology is placed under 
great pressure will tensions and inconsistencies come to the fore.293 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, Huntington was too obsessed with the danger of 
underestimating the need for military action. He failed to explore the opposite danger: the possibility 
that society would come under the sway of militarism. This was partly caused by his misconceived 
understanding of the functional imperative. Because he ignored the wide palette of power 
generation tools available to the state, and argued that the functional imperative is simply a matter 
of generating military force, he did not grasp the possibility that too much emphasis on military force 
can be a liability to the state.  
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Militarism is an exaggerated emphasis of military power or appreciation of the military 
institution. There is no standard definition of militarism and the term is often used colloquially as a 
slur in political discourse. This colloquial usage has detached the study of militarism from 
mainstream war studies. As Martin Shaw has observed, militarism “is academically marginal: 
strategists, and with them many historians, eschew the term because of its association with political 
opposition to military power as such.”294 Consequently, both academic and political debates tend to 
be characterized by a confusion of terms.295 One should distinguish between two types of militarism, 
each of which is problematic for different reasons. Elite militarism occurs, when government elites 
overestimate the importance of military force for the survival of the state. This may occur either 
because the elites are convinced that a militarist policy is the best course of action or because the 
power constellations of the state only permit them to retain power by following a militarist policy. In 
other words, elite militarism may be the result of deeply felt conviction, or pragmatic acquiescence. 
It is the mirror image of the problem explained above: whereas some individualist ideologies risk 
overlooking the need for military force, elite militarism leads to policies that overemphasize military 
force and marginalize other power generation tools. Militarism generally relies on some degree of 
Realpolitik thinking. It only makes sense to advocate for military solutions if one believes that society 
should be defended, and that one is allowed to kill to achieve this goal. However, what separates 
elite militarism from other strains of Realpolitik thinking, is the failure to see, indeed often the 
refusal to even consider, that the threats facing the state may be handled by non-military means. 
Elite militarism is thus a type of misperception that affects the actions of government elites.296 
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For instance, Gerhard Ritter showed that elite militarism was particularly prevalent in 
Austria-Hungary before the First World War. Faced with the centrifugal forces of nationalism, the 
multi-national empire was confronted by the risk of imminent disintegration. Powerful circles within 
the Austrian elite, most importantly Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces, came to believe that only military victories against its enemies could save the 
Habsburg state. Most importantly, the destruction and dismemberment of Serbia would remove an 
influence that inspired hopes of independence among the empire’s five million South Slavs.297 Ritter 
points out that these ideas were almost ludicrously incoherent:  
 
“[W]as the military power that stood behind such plans really impressive enough for such 
audacious ventures? None knew Austria’s weaknesses better than Conrad. What inspired 
him was political ambition rather than a realistic assessment of his resources. His confidence 
was obsessive rather than soundly based. Added to this was a grave lack of clarity with 
respect to political goals. How could the problem of South Slavic nationalism really be solved 
by the military subjugation of Serbia? Was that not bound to lead to protracted military rule 
and rebellion after rebellion?”298 
 
The belief in the expediency of military means was prevalent in several European states at the 
time.299 However, the errors of this belief are blatantly obvious in Austria-Hungary, where the 
fundamental threats against the state were clearly of a political nature. It was based on a 
fundamentalist, almost mystical, belief in the normative goodness of the Austro-Hungarian state. 
This entity could only be defended with military means.300 Ritter argued that the Austrian militarist 
movement contributed significantly to Vienna’s exaggerated reaction to the assassination of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. It thus became one of the many causes of the First World War.301 
A second, yet related, ideological issue is the problem of popular militarism.302 Popular 
militarism is the belief, held in civil society, that military force is the most expedient way of ensuring 
the survival of the state, and that the military institution, rather than the civilian government, 
possesses the best judgment of when and how to use it. For instance, during the First World War, a 
veritable Hindenburg cult developed amongst Germans after the commander’s victories on the 
Eastern front at Tannenberg, Masurian Lakes, and Lodz. The Field Marshall’s popularity was soon 
increased by government propaganda that used him as the figurehead for various war programs. For 
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example, the government’s 1916 program of industrial mobilization was called the Hindenburg 
program.303 Unlike elite militarism, which is politically important because it guides the actions of 
political elites, popular militarism is defined by being a sentiment held in civil society. Whereas elite 
militarism is problematic because it may lead to erroneous or often dangerous policies, popular 
militarism may cause problems if it affects the constitutionally guaranteed civilian control of the 
armed forces. It may thus destabilize the democratic process. It affects elite civil-military relations, 
the relationship between civilian and military elites, by giving the military another way of exerting 
counter-punishment against the civilian government (the concept of counter-punishment is 
introduced, defined, and discussed in chapter 6). If politicians and generals differ about the overall 
strategy, the military may use its popularity in the population at large to pressure the government to 
accept its point of view. For instance, the German high command used Hindenburg’s popularity to 
accumulate power at the expense of the civilian institutions of government. In strategic 
disagreements between the civilian politicians and the general staff, the latter held the upper hand, 
as any threat of resignation by Hindenburg or Ludendorff, his deputy, was met with horror by 
Wilhelm II and his advisors. In time, the generals’ influence eclipsed even that of the Kaiser and led 
to the Silent Dictatorship. At the zenith of its power, the High Command was capable of bringing 
about the downfall of Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor.304 Even after the 
war, Hindenburg’s popularity meant that he could walk out of a potentially incriminating Reichstag 
commission hearing on the failure of the wartime leadership without repercussions.305 
Unlike elite militarism, popular militarism is not necessarily a type of misperception. Elite 
militarism is defined by being strategically problematic. Popular militarism is interesting because it 
affects the constitutional relationship between generals and politicians, regardless of whether or not 
it is true. It does not have to be erroneous to be democratically dubious. Even if the generals are 
right, the fact that they have the option of forcing their views upon the civilian government is 
democratically problematic.  
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Popular militarism is a sentiment that is present in nearly all societies. There will almost 
always be groups who distrust their politicians, and who advocate that the military acts as political 
guardians. Popular militarism may be present, and indeed cause elite civil-military problems, even in 
societies where civilian elites have a correct conception of the importance of military force. I will 
return to these issues when I discuss elite civil-military relations in part III.  
Recently, several scholars and commentators have argued that elite and popular militarism 
have become prevalent – and potentially democratically problematic – forces in American civil-
military relations.306 Whether or not this assertion is correct is largely an empirical question. 
Theoretically, the fundamental problem is that Huntington’s lack of a concept of militarism meant 
that this debate has become an aside in the civil-military relations literature. The two types of 
militarism pose a risk for any democratic society and, as we shall see in chapter 6, it affects the 
relationship between civilian and military elites.  
In summary, the societal imperative is shaped by the ideologies, institutions, and special 
interests dominant in society. It clashes with the functional imperative if elites are driven, either by 
conviction or acquiescence, to advocate ideas that lead to policies that diminish the state’s ability to 
wield power. There are two types of dangerous societal imperatives. On the one hand, excessive 
individualism and utopianism may make government elites reluctant to make the necessary 
investments in military capabilities. On the other hand, elite militarism may make government elites 
invest too much in military capabilities, thus crowding out investments in other power generation 
tools. Finally, popular militarism increases the power of the military and may affect elite civil-military 
relations.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the nature of the societal imperative – the second of the two forces that 
shape societal civil-military relations. The societal imperative is shaped by the interaction of the 
ideology, political institutions, and special interests in society. Understanding accountability is a 
precondition for grasping the nature of civil-military relations. The accountability principle came to 
the fore as a replacement for the divine principle of legitimacy that disappeared in the late Middle 
Ages and early Renaissance. The development of better conditions for public debate, stronger state 
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institutions, and national consciousness created a new foundation for society. Modern society is 
thus built on a double foundation, where the principle of citizenship and the principle of nationality 
are in contest with one another. The societal imperative may undermine the security of the state, if 
the ideas dominating the government elite do not reflect the needs arising from the functional 
imperative. Simply put, these ideas can underestimate the need for military power, thus preventing 
the state from making the necessary investments in military capabilities. Conversely, they can also 
overestimate the need for military force, thus crowding out other power generation tools. Finally, the 
state also faces the democratically problematic danger of popular militarism. This dissertation can 
now turn to elite civil-military relations – its primary topic of concern - having defined the functional 
and societal imperative that frame these relations.  
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Part III: Elite civil-military relations  
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- 5 - 
Military expertise 
 
The previous part focused on societal civil-military relations – that is, the relationship between the 
military and society, including the relationship between the military and civilian actors who are not 
members of the political elite. The final part of the dissertation – which is comprised of chapters 5, 6, 
7, 8, and 9 – focuses on elite civil-military relations. Elite civil-military relations denote the 
interaction between soldiers and civilians within the state: relations between members of the 
executive and legislative branch and leading members of the officer corps.  
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the fundamental building blocks of elite civil-
military relations. It focuses especially on military expertise, which I argue is perhaps the basic 
feature that defines that relationship. In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington argued that 
the modern officer corps is a professional group of experts on par with doctors or lawyers. This 
notion was central to Huntington’s general argument. As James Burk has recently shown, the status 
of the military is closely connected to its claim to a scientific expertise.307 As long as military experts 
hold a privileged access to the military expertise, it is easy to argue that a clear division of labor 
between soldiers and civilians is the preferable pattern of elite civil-military relations.308 In this 
chapter, I argue that the military man’s expertise is less predictable than Huntington claimed. The 
modern military man is an expert in warfare. However, because of the unpredictability of war, 
military expertise is, to a large extent, a type of creative judgment. Consequently, as we shall see in 
later chapters, elite civil-military relations cannot be an unproblematic division of labor.309 
 This chapter progresses in three stages. I give an overall outline of the structure of elite civil-
military relations in the first section. In the second section, I provide a historical overview of the 
appearance of military expertise. Having shown that military expertise came to define officership in 
the post-Medieval period, I explore the limits of this expertise by looking at Carl von Clausewitz’ 
conception of war as both an art and a science in the final section. 
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Structure of elite civil-military relations 
Turning to elite civil-military relations involves a change of scale and analytical lens. When we 
explored societal civil-military relations, we looked at grand scale historical trends and phenomena, 
the tectonic shifts of societies over centuries, and the changes of material and ideational forces. Elite 
civil-military relations, by contrast, are processes between elite individuals within the state. These 
individuals strive for various political goals and are limited by their incomplete understanding of 
reality.  
Our cognitive abilities are infused with culture. The way we see the world is colored by our 
tacit knowledge of reality. Adapting to outside threats depends on the cultural categories one uses 
to understand the world. In chapter 3, we used the story of the Moriori tribe to illustrate how the 
functional imperative can lead to the destruction of an entire society. The story also shows that the 
military’s ability to adapt depends on the sophistication of their culturally embedded ideas about 
warfare and strategy, what we normally term “strategic culture”.310 As Colin Gray has noticed, 
strategy is permanent and universal, but the way that each society thinks about strategy is 
influenced by cultural assumptions.311 War has a real existence that punishes cultural conceptions of 
strategy that are out of tune with it. Because New Zealand was ravaged by almost permanent 
warfare, Maori strategic culture was more attuned to the real nature of war.312 In comparison, the 
strategic culture of the peaceful Moriori was so underdeveloped that they did not understand that 
they held a potential military advantage over the Maori.  
 The moment we move into the state – as we are doing in this third part of the dissertation – 
everything becomes colored by strategic culture. All decisions are made by individuals who perceive 
the world through culturally infused lenses. The key strategic question is: do we have understood 
reality correctly?313 It is important to stress that strategic culture is colored by the society it protects. 
The military’s ability to develop a culture that can handle warfare rationally depends on the 
sophistication of the culture that characterizes society at large.  
Elite civil-military relations are caught between two imperatives that grow out of the 
functional and societal imperatives. The elite civil-military system has to produce legitimacy for the 
state, while ensuring that the armed forces remain effective. As we saw in chapter 4, the modern 
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state is based on an accountability principle, whereby it gains legitimacy by being responsive to the 
wishes of the population. The state asks the citizenry for taxes and loyalty, and it reciprocates by 
providing services and protection. This means that all government policies, in principle at least, 
should reflect the interests of civil society. Elite civil-military relations play a part in this process by 
ensuring that the military is accountable to the government, which is in turn accountable to the 
population. The civilian government’s legitimacy decreases whenever it loses control of the military.  
 In chapter 3, we saw that conventional military force is one of the tools used by the state to 
handle outside threats. Civilian and military elites are meant to ensure that the military is capable of 
using force effectively and that it is used for politically beneficial purposes. In simple terms, the arm 
of the state should be strong and used for tasks that increase the security of the state. As we shall 
see later on, determining and implementing political goals necessarily involves elite civil-military 
interaction. Civilians need military advice to determine if the goals they set are attainable. They rely 
on the military to collect information before a decision is made and to implement it afterwards. 
Well-functioning elite civil-military relations secure military effectiveness.  
 Legitimacy and effectiveness generally overlap. An effective state capable of rebuffing 
outside threats will typically be more legitimate than a state that struggles to defend its own 
territory. Vice versa, a legitimate state will often be more effective, because it does not have to 
spend as many resources on securing the acquiescence of its population. However, this relationship 
is not always valid. Sometimes additional legitimacy is bought at the price of diminished 
effectiveness. The state may find itself in a situation where the expedient course of action involves 
actions that are considered illegitimate in the wider population.  
 The legitimacy and effectiveness imperatives define the structure of elite civil-military 
relations. The need for effectiveness means that the state allows the existence of an independent 
military institution that is specialized in maximizing the state’s potential for political violence. It is 
simply more effective for the state to delegate some decisions to an independent organization. 
Conversely, the need for legitimacy is perhaps the primary reason why the military is placed under 
civilian control. The state is only legitimate because civil society determines the goal of policies via 
its elected representatives.  
 The study of elite civil-military relations contains two analytical perspectives: civilian control, 
and military effectiveness. Studies look either at how civilian leaders control the military, or at how 
different patterns of elite civil-military interaction make the state militarily effective. This separation 
is based on the assumptions made about actor motives. Civilian control explores if the military is 
motivated to accept civilian supremacy. Civilian control is basically a study of military incentives. It 
looks at the many factors that ensure that officers feel motivated to allow civilian supremacy. As we 
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shall see in the coming chapters, two clusters of mechanisms influence the officer’s motives. 
External control mechanisms are institutions that allow the civilians to monitor military behavior and 
punish shirking. They influence the military man’s motives by raising the price of military shirking. 
Internal control mechanisms affect the military man’s norms and values directly. Civilian control is 
ensured by using a combination of those factors. Civilian control focuses on the processes through 
which decisions are made, but pays less attention to the consequences of these decisions. Open, 
democratic and well-functioning processes are one of the cornerstones of legitimacy. Consequently, 
civilian control studies will typically focus on questions of legitimacy, while effectiveness is of only 
secondary importance.  
 Military effectiveness, by contrast, is the study of the effect of elite civil-military relations. 
Military effectiveness studies do not look at how military actors become motivated to accept civilian 
supremacy. They assume that the military and civilians have at least a minimal degree of shared 
interests and explore the effects of the way in which they interact. Whereas civilian control studies 
focus on explaining behavior, military effectiveness studies focus on the consequences of that 
behavior. Whereas civilian control studies mainly focus on one actor (the military), military 
effectiveness studies focus on two actors (the military and the civilians). As we shall see later on, 
military effectiveness involves a choice between creating a division of labor between soldiers and 
civilians and ensuring strategic coherence by allowing civilians to meddle and dictate details of 
military policy. These policies are evaluated on the basis of whether or not they maximize the state’s 
ability to exert force. Military effectiveness studies do not a priori assume that civilian supremacy is 
a superior organizational principle. In principle at least, military effectiveness studies should be open 
for the possibility that military influence over policy may be more effective under some 
circumstances. Legitimacy is of secondary importance for military effectiveness studies. It is typically 
included by these studies, because illegitimate behavior often diminishes the effectiveness of the 
state.  
The distinction between civilian control and military effectiveness is mainly of analytical 
importance. Civilian control and military effectiveness largely reinforce one another. That is, states 
where the civilian governments are able to control the military will typically also be highly effective 
at exerting military force. Analytically, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to design a study that 
concurrently explores these two topics, because each topic makes different analytical assumptions 
about the motives and interests of civilian and military actors.  
To sum up, the study of elite civil-military relations contains two incommensurable analytical 
perspectives: civilian control and military effectiveness. I explore elite civil-military relations using 
this distinction in the following chapters. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on civilian control, while chapter 8 
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looks at military effectiveness. When I look at civilian control in chapters 6 and 7, I bracket the 
question of how the system is meant to generate military effectiveness. I only look at the 
mechanisms the civilian leadership employs to ensure that the military follows its bidding. Of course, 
when I look at military effectiveness in chapter 8, I reverse this procedure. I collect these thoughts to 
support a comprehensive description of the elite civil-military system in chapter 9.  
 
The military skill 
The military is one of the two poles in elite civil-military relations. The military has had a unique 
status in political theory since the discipline developed in ancient Greece. In The Republic, Plato 
famously argued that society should be based on a natural division of labor between three core 
groups, one of which was a class of military guardians.314 The military fulfills a function that is 
essential to most societies. The military man has a unique skill that makes it functionally expedient 
to allow him to occupy a separate institution in society.  
If we look narrowly at the functional requirements for participating in warfare, the story of 
the modern military is the story of how an abstract system of knowledge became the key 
determinant in conflict. In premodern society, warriors were defined by their mastery of the 
technique of warfare. Today, the prototypical officer is an expert. Modern militaries are large 
bureaucracies that fight using advanced and potent technology. The officer is an expert in 
management and engineering, which he uses to enhance his ability to project force in combat.  
 The development of the modern military occurred after the end of the Middle Ages. The 
competition for power and security forced states to develop steadily more effective militaries. As 
war became more complex, it required more drill and training, and understanding of technology. 
Concurrently, the states also became more proficient in controlling their own territory without 
interference from domestic rivals. Over the course of centuries, the nobility and the church were 
gradually phased out as challengers to the state.315 The military no longer had to play a part in 
domestic conflicts for power and could therefore dedicate more resources to interstate war.316  
The functional dimension of the modern military was thus shaped by both a transformation 
of warfare and of society as such. The development of large bureaucracies dedicated to violence led 
to separation of the different functions of warfare. In early warfare, the ideal officer was a “doer” 
who led by example. In modern warfare, bureaucratization and the increased potency that follows 
from new technology enabled a separation of the functions of strategizing, organization, and actual 
combat. The ideal officer is an expert in the abstract systems of military knowledge.  
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The military officer could only become an expert because knowledge became accepted as a 
separate reality from mythology, and because rational enquiry became seen as an expedient 
practice. Sir Francis Bacon may, in fact, not be the father of the phrase, but “scientia potentia est” 
certainly summed up the Renaissance and Enlightenment Zeitgeist in which the modern military was 
born.317 The material power of the state flourished through science, which was concurrently 
reinforced by an increased cultural acceptance of science and expertise.  
Pre-modern society was largely based on untheorized practices. Knowledge steadily became 
problematized during the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Suddenly, norms and values had to be 
justified with the use of arguments. Hitherto tacit knowledge about the world was articulated into 
theoretical terms and debated in public discourse. Knowledge about the world was divorced from 
morality and theology and led to the first primitive science. All in all, with the economic and cultural 
transformation of society “it became”, in Keith MacDonald’s words, “possible for individuals to 
develop an area of learning and expertise and to become repositories of knowledge in their own 
right and … to form groups of specialists.”318 
The essential difference between pre-modern and modern society is the latter’s ability to 
formulate explicit theories. In modern society we formulate explicit theories of how strategy works. 
Simple societies, such as the Moriori and the Maori, did not developed theories. They did not 
formulate axioms or identify chains of causality. Strategic thought took the form of untheorized 
practices that worked primarily on an intuitive level of thought.319  
To be sure, knowledge was always part of the military skill, even for the pre-modern 
warrior.320 Our term “strategy” has its origins in the ancient world, where it is derived from the 
Greek “strategos”, which meant “general”.321 It only became an abstract system of knowledge in the 
modern age. It is the invention of writing, anthropologist Jack Goody argues, that separates the pre-
modern frame of mind from ours. Writing allows societies to rationalize the way they analyze 
physical phenomena and to develop a more complex understandings.322 Warfare was one of the 
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areas in which this transformation occurred, we might add, as writing and theoretical knowledge 
allowed societies to develop strategic thought. In primordial society, knowledge of the physical 
world was intertwined with religious myths that established a social and normative order.323 The 
development of modern thought was thus a disentanglement of the descriptive from the normative 
sphere of thought. Postulates had to formulated and supported by various sub-claims, which could 
then be scrutinized and tested through empirical observation and critical thought. Goody 
emphasizes two features of writing that sparked this process. Firstly, writing allows one to store 
information, which “permits communication over time and space, and provides man with a marking, 
mnemonic and recording device.”324 Before writing, information was stored in oral tradition and 
resided in the “wetware” of the human brain. The human brain is a relatively unstable medium for 
information storage, and important lessons were easily forgotten. Secondly, writing allows one to 
formalize logical statements in a way that it is not possible in oral transmission. One can easily 
identify ambiguities in writing, and it thus becomes feasible to develop more sophisticated 
paradigms for understanding the social world. To illustrate this point, Goody invites us to consider 
how an oral presentation of a complex philosophical text – in this case Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions - would function: 
 
“Imagine … Kuhn’s book as an oral discourse. No listener, I suggest, could ever spot the 
twenty-one different usages of the word ‘paradigm’. The argument would flow from one 
usage to another without anyone being able to perceive any discrepancy. Inconsistency, 
even contradiction, tends to get swallowed up in the flow of speech … [. T]he oral form 
is intrinsically more persuasive because it is less open to criticism.”325 
 
Taken together, the oral storage of knowledge placed a significant barrier on simple societies’ 
abilities to examine knowledge through testing. Instead, they either “make it or break it”, as it is 
difficult to decipher which elements of an experiment caused the failure.326 
Primordial strategy was untheorized. To theorize, one must detach oneself from the 
specificity of current context and elicit axioms and explicit chains of causality that are applicable 
beyond the current moment. In lieu of these logical categories, planning and strategy rarely 
becomes a formalized process, whereby explicit knowledge and principles are applied to a situation. 
Instead, primordial strategic thinking is rooted in a context and takes the form of standardized ruses 
and tricks that change the context of the encounter. Anthropologists tell us that simple war-bands 
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display an impressive tactical sophistication and increase their killing efficiency by using ambushes 
and surprise attacks.327  
 Warfare in ancient Greece provides an example of pre-theoretical strategy. Greece was a 
literate society that had developed frames of thought more complicated than the ones found in 
primordial society, but which had yet to attain the level of complexity found in modern society. The 
Greeks were definitely capable of acting strategically in their military endeavors. The second Persian 
invasion of Greece in 480 B.C. was perhaps the “finest hour” of Greek military thinking. After the 
Greek defeat at Thermopylae - where the Spartan king Leonidas famously delayed the enemy’s 
advance with only a small force – the Persian army now threatened the independence of the Greek 
city states. According to Herodotus, Xerxes, the Persian king, brought with him an army of more than 
2.5 million warriors.328 Modern historians estimate that the number of men was significantly 
lower.329 Greek warfare traditionally consisted of two infantry-based hoplite armies in a phalanx 
position meeting each other head on in a pitched battle. Historians emphasize how this type of 
warfare was deeply ingrained in Greek culture, which celebrated the communal being-together-as-
one as the cultural basis for both the phalanx and for life in the polis.330 This time, the Greeks, led by 
Athens, realized that they could not use this strategy against the overwhelming Persian force. 
Through strategic ingenuity, they managed to break with several cultural practices, whereby they 
changed the conditions of the battle. In the end, this led to the remarkable victory at Salamis.  
 Firstly, the Athenian population was evacuated to Salamis, an island off the coast of Attica, 
leaving Athens to be taken by the Persians. This strategy diverged from Greek cultural norms, which 
saw the city as the basic gathering principle of the community. Secondly, the Greeks relied on their 
navy defeating the Persians. The Persian were thought to have an advantage at sea, as they could 
field a larger fleet and depend on the rich sea-faring tradition of their Phoenician and Egyptian 
vassals. The Greek strategy was therefore seen as daring, if not highly risky. To off-set their superior 
numbers, Themistocles, the Athenian commander, set up a ruse to lure the Persians into the narrow 
straits northeast of Salamis. He sent an envoy to Xerxes, telling him that he planned to surrender. 
Eager to destroy the Greeks once and for all, Xerxes split his forces to block all escape routes and 
entered the waters where the Greeks were waiting. Caught by surprise and by the narrowness of the 
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straits of Salamis, the Persians suffered a massive defeat.331 Historians claim that more than 40,000 
Persians lost their lives. If these numbers can be trusted, the Battle of Salamis is one of the bloodiest 
sea battles in history, eclipsing the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the battles of Lepanto, 
Trafalgar, Jutland, and Midway.332 It stopped the Persian advance and precipitated the battles of 
Plataea and Mycale the following year, where the weakened Persian force suffered its final defeat.   
 The Battle of Salamis reveals the sophistication of Greek strategic thought. Carl von 
Clausewitz would later argue that the essence of warfare was to identify and hit the enemy’s center 
of gravity. This was essentially what the Greeks did at Salamis. Faced with almost insurmountable 
obstacles, the Greeks redefined the conditions of the war to turn their weak spots into strengths. 
They broke with cultural norms and changed the entire scope of thinking about themselves and their 
surroundings. Abandoning their city and resorting to naval warfare were fundamental breaks with 
their tradition. They were capable of reading the terrain and the intensions of the enemy, predicting 
where his weak spot was and striking at the right time.  
The Greeks possessed an ingenious sense of strategy, which they developed in early written 
tracts on war. This separated them from their more primordial predecessors.333 They did not, 
however, develop a theory of warfare and strategy as such. Their lessons of war were stored in 
historical and epic narratives, or as practical advice that did not separate the eternal nature of war 
from the concrete skills needed in Greek war. Herodotus’ Histories was a mixture of historiography 
and epic prose. As one modern historian argues, The Histories was ripe with tactical and strategic 
mistakes and flawed analyses, which illustrates the immaturity of Greek military thought.334 In his 
History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides tried to correct what he saw as the flaws of 
Herodotus’ method by focusing squarely on the report of events and the analysis of the forces 
underpinning them.335 In that sense, his work is much closer to our understanding of theory. Indeed, 
one commentator notices that Thucydides did comprehend the fundamental paradoxical nature of 
strategy and he has been a source of inspiration for the development of the modern study of 
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international relations.336 However, Thucydides did not develop a theory of international relations or 
war in any modern sense of the word. His insights were woven into a historical narrative about a 
single event. It lacked the coherence, the scope, and the interest of general laws, normally 
consistent with theoretical thinking. As Michael Clark puts it,  
 
“Thucydides' disposition at every point seems to be very nearly the opposite of what 
good theory requires. Beyond his refusal to express his views in the form of empirical 
laws, there is a complementary and systematic refusal to appeal to any level of 
abstraction; a palpable absence of system, though not of structure; and an ascetic and 
steadfast disinterest in (except to depreciate) any parallel events outside of his chosen 
case. Nor is this all. There is, in fact, a rather inescapable, if endlessly interesting, 
irresolution to the work as a whole. The work is riven with impasses (between structural 
and decisional explanation, for example), omissions (most notoriously, of almost 
anything having to do with finance or tribute), narrative breaks and stylistic 
unevenness”.337 
 
Of course, the Greeks also provided the first Western tracts dedicated solely to warfare. For 
instance, Aeneas Tacticus – probably the most interesting military thinker in ancient Greece– wrote 
several pieces dedicated to the technique of warfare. However, the fragments of his thought that we 
have access to gives us a picture of a military thinker who focused on practical recommendations 
instead of developing a theoretical analysis of warfare.338 
Although the late classical and Medieval period definitely saw refinements in military 
thought, it was not until the so-called military revolution that we see the slow birth of a scientific 
approach to warfare.339 Military historians disagree about the origins of the military revolution and 
the exact periods in which it happened: some identify the 16th and 17th century as crucial, while 
others claim that it happened as late as 1660-1760.340 The military revolution led to a need for 
efficiency on the battlefield, to which the commanders of the period responded by building complex 
military bureaucracies. Technology and social organization became ways of enhancing army 
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efficiency, and thus crucial determinants for victory. 341  From this followed a period of a 
rationalization, exemplified by the introduction of drill and discipline by Maurice of Oranje and 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.342 According to David Eltis, the changes in warfare included  
 
“a marked increase in the scope of warfare, reflected in a corresponding increase in the 
normal size of the armies of the major powers … . Hand in hand with the new larger 
armies went standardisation of weapons, the introduction of uniforms, the creation of 
standing armies with a fixed hierarchy of ranks, military academies and more 
burdensome financial levies to pay for it all.”343 
 
In general, the military revolution marked the beginning of the modern military, that is, a 
bureaucratic organization dedicated to fighting wars. In Jacques van Doorn’s words, 
 
“for the first time in Western European history a well-organized and well-disciplined 
large scale army was formed. ‘The army no longer was to be a brute mass, in the Swiss 
style, nor a collection of bellicose individuals, in the feudal style, it was to be an 
articulated organism of which each part responded to impulses from above.’”344 
 
The need for lengthy training drove up the costs of war.345 The large armies required an officer who 
was proficient in the complex knowledge of social organization, and who understood the new, 
complex weaponry used on the 17th century battlefield. It was a precondition for developing an 
actual abstract system of knowledge about warfare. Science came to play an increasingly central role 
in warfare during the 17th and 18th centuries. Of course, the development was gradual. At the turn of 
the seventeenth century, the focus was on still on drill and training. As John Keegan argued, efficient 
social organization of armies was the competitive edge until the 19th century, when technology and 
industrial output took over.346 This process was being systematized, but war had not yet become an 
abstract system of knowledge. 
Science first played a role in the warfare through adjacent disciplines such as management 
and engineering. For example, in 1742, Benjamin Robins – a mathematician and engineer who would 
later be known as the Newton of gunnery - published New Principles of Gunnery, a scientific work 
that married Newtonian physics, Boyle’s Law of thermodynamics, and meticulous observations of 
swinging pendulums to outline the basic principles behind artillery ballistics. The 1745 German 
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version– translated by Leonard Euler, the great mathematician - included a table that outlined how 
projectiles could reach their target under certain conditions, which made Robins’ theory accessible 
to most gunnery officers.347 Using these tables required that gunners underwent scientific training 
that allowed them to understand the basic conditions under which different settings should be 
used.348 War was fought using science. Military schools were introduced all over Europe, mainly as 
engineering schools.349 However, technology was mainly useful for lower officers and the military 
academy therefore had yet to become a mark of prestige for the officer class as such.350 
The Enlightenment also saw the first attempts to develop a science of warfare. Inspired by 
the importance of science for the increase of force, these thinkers believed that the true essence of 
war was cognitive – that war could be reduced to a set of scientific principles. By systematizing this 
knowledge, war would become predictable, because every great general would follow the same 
superior scientific formula. As the emblematic thinker of the time, Heinrich von Bülow, put it, “[w]ar 
will no longer be called an art, but a science[.]  … [T]he sphere of military genius will at last be so 
narrowed, that a man of talents will no longer be willing to devote to this ungrateful task”.351 For von 
Bülow, war could be reduced to calculations of force ratios, and the superior force would always win 
an engagement.352 
Carl von Clausewitz’ On War – published posthumously in 1832 – was in many ways a 
reaction to the early Enlightenment thinkers’ belief in science, and it essentially marks the beginning 
of modern military science. For Clausewitz, combat was the essence of war – “a strand that runs 
through the entire web of military activity and really holds it together.”353 War consists of many 
different activities and is essentially a subpart of another sphere – the political realm.354 However, 
unlike normal politics, the essential military quality is combat. As he put it in a crucial passage of On 
War: 
 
“Fighting is the central military act; all other activities merely support it. … The object of 
fighting is the destruction or defeat of the enemy. … [T]he concept of the engagement 
lies at the root of all strategic action, since strategy is the use of force, the heart of 
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which, in turn, is the engagement. So in the field of strategy we can reduce all military 
activity to the unitary concept of the single engagement”.355 
 
By defining fighting as the core activity in war, Clausewitz found a seed from which an entire theory 
of warfare could grow. He realized that war in its essence is a type of politics, yet it is a type of 
politics fought with force rather than words. Whereas the earlier Enlightenment thinkers reduced 
war to force only, Clausewitz saw that war depended on visions and ideas, yet was fought with force. 
Generalship required knowing how to maximize force, yet it also required that one understood the 
motives of one’s opponents and the desires of one’s men. Consequently, war could never be 
reduced to calculations of the use of force only. It had to be an art and a science. 356 
 All in all, the story of the modern military is about how an abstract system of knowledge 
became the key determinant in conflict. As social organization and technology became more 
important, a military expertise of how these forces worked became crucial. Clausewitz was the first 
thinker to understand the nature of warfare. He grasped that war could not be reduced to either a 
science or an art. Understanding how war is concurrently a science and an art is the key to 
understanding the modern military expertise. That is the topic of the next section.  
 
Military expertise as both an art and a science 
One of Huntington’s most important observations was that officers, qua the function they fulfill in 
society, tend to view the world through a realist lens. Because their work revolves around the 
maximization and use of violence, they are likely to have a fairly unsentimental approach to power. 
As a servant of the state, the officer’s ideological range is inherently somewhat communitarian. It 
does not make much sense to sacrifice oneself for the state, if one does not think that it plays a 
benevolent role.  
This does not, of course, mean that the officer is not driven by normative concerns. As we 
have already seen, care for various groups, if not humanity as such, is crucial for motivating most 
military men. The crucial thing is that the officer’s concern with normative questions is balanced 
against a constant concern with expediency. The state is largely seen as a force for good. It is 
because of this conception that the soldier remains loyal to the state, even when pressured by the 
strain of war. The long-term cause can justify short-term actions that, in isolation, would be seen as 
immoral. Killing can be justifiable if it secures the state. Power is a means to an end. The officer’s 
realism is also grounded in the fact that he, more than anyone else, bears the brunt of unwise 
military adventures. The military man is therefore reluctant to use military force to pursue minor 
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foreign policy objectives. Force should be used to pursue goals that matter.357 He is an opponent of 
adventurism. To quote Huntington, the “military man contributes a cautious, conservative, 
restraining voice to the formulation of state policy.”358  
 When the decision to use force has been made, the question of how to do it – the essentially 
military question – comes to the fore. This is where the military man’s expertise becomes crucial. To 
understand how this expertise functions, we must examine the Clausewitzian notion of war as an art 
and a science.359 Clausewitz was a child of the Enlightenment who understood the importance of 
knowledge and the scientific outlook as a tool in war. War essentially consists of a plethora of factors 
and it can, in principle at least, be predicted scientifically. If one had perfect knowledge of all these 
factors, one would be able to predict war with scientific precision. Military expertise is cognitive – it 
is about possessing a set of categories and being able to recognize which cases fall within each 
category. A doctor is a medical expert, because of his knowledge of the mechanics of the human 
body. Similarly, an officer is a military expert because he knows the factors that shape warfare.360  
Expertise, however, is not unproblematic. Because of the Popperian falsification principle, 
we can never know if our knowledge is correct or if it has yet to be falsified. We can never know if 
there is some so far hidden factor that disqualifies an expert’s judgment. For instance, a medicine 
may have side-effects that have yet to be discovered. Our knowledge in everyday life thus always 
depends on a high degree of trust.361 Furthermore, as Anthony Giddens argues, expertise has 
generally become ambiguous in modern society. The steadily rising complexity of social life has 
meant that experts have become unable to comprehend an entire field of knowledge. Disagreement 
between experts, and divergent expert advice, have become commonplace. Individual medical 
studies, for instance, do not agree about the sources of cancer – instead, studies often contradict 
one another. When laymen, who have no chance of seeing past scholarly debates, are presented 
with diverging views, their trust in the medical expertise is eroded.362 
Military expertise is even less secure than other types of expertise. Like other types of 
expertise, it is riddled with the aforementioned problems. However, the characteristics of war add 
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complex challenges to military expertise. In Clausewitz’ writings, one can find three reasons why 
military expertise is even more problematic than the expertise of other professions. Firstly, warfare 
generally contains more uncertain factors, compared to other fields of knowledge. Furthermore, 
military organizations do not react smoothly. Instead, because of accidents and wrongful 
information – what Clausewitz calls “friction” – military maneuvering is an uncertain business. Sheer 
chance also obfuscates the predictability of war.363 War’s complexity makes it impossible for the 
general to know all the factors involved. He cannot predict the weather, for instance, nor have a 
total overview of the morale of his men. Sometimes a simple coincidence has enormous 
consequences for a campaign. Because of his general understanding of warfare, the general is 
capable of reducing this element of uncertainty, but certainty is a luxury that he is never allowed.  
Secondly, war is essentially a social activity – it always involves the interaction between at 
least two conscious opponents. As Clausewitz put it, “unlike in any other science or art, in war the 
object reacts”.364 War is not a simple game like chess, where the rules are agreed upon beforehand. 
Instead, the combatants define the rules of war, thereby changing its very character. War is not the 
simple application of a universal strategic science to a concrete case, because each party adapts to 
the strategy of the other. Instead, the scientific facts of war are just one element in a larger creative 
exercise where each commander tries to understand his opponent’s way of thinking. The rationality 
of the opponent becomes a factor in the commander’s strategic thinking.365 War thus contains a 
feedback loop, whereby certain factors change depending on one’s own actions.  
Finally, war cannot be separated from its political purpose. As Clausewitz famously 
observed, war is “a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”366 By this 
he meant that war is a type of politics that cannot be wholly separated from the political purpose for 
which it is fought. In principle at least, even the smallest military decision has a political side to it. As 
we shall see later on, the border between a purely political and military judgment is indistinct. Unlike 
other spheres of expertise, where the expert can have a purely advisory role, the military man’s 
decisions always overlap with the domain of the political principal. Soldiers are forced to take the 
logic of politics into consideration. 367 
The limits of military expertise are a result of the plethora of factors shaping war. There are 
simply so many different variables affecting the situation that any complete mapping of them would 
be impossible. In On Exactitude in Science, one of his famous short-stories, Jorge Luis Borges told the 
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tale of empire that revered exact mapping. Finally, a map was produced, “whose size was that of the 
Empire, and which coincided point for point with it.”368 Given that the map actually filled the entire 
territory it was supposed to depict, it was soon recognized as useless and abandoned. The morale of 
Borges’ story is that any map –indeed, any scientific understanding – must be a simplification. It 
cannot contain all the variables that influence the outcome. Some factors must be abandoned, lest 
one’s comprehension should become too complex for actual use. War functions like that. In 
principle, it can be mapped scientifically if every factor – the features of the land, the psychology of 
the opponent, the force of his army, the morale of every single soldier serving under one’s flag – and 
the causal relationship between them could be meticulously measured. However, this is impossible 
in practice. Only some of the features can be determined in a scientific manner. These, however, 
engage in a complex context which shapes the war beyond the planning capacity of any general.  
This is why Clausewitz argued that war was both an art and a science.369 The military man 
has to be a scientist who measures the measurables of war. Concurrently, he has to be like an artist, 
who uses his intuition to predict what he cannot measure. When scientific cognition fails, we have to 
turn to other senses to guide us through practical life. Imagination, Immanuel Kant argued, is the 
faculty we use when we cannot measure reality exactly, using steadfast categories. When we stand 
in the midst of events, we do not have the luxury of the casual spectator, who can gather an 
overview of the situation from afar. We have to be able to create categories that can guide our 
action.370 Kant argued that our imagination allows us to create these categories out of insufficient 
data.371 The imagination is particularly helpful in social interaction. We can never know the motives 
of others for certain, but we can imagine how we would react if we were in their place. This allows 
us to approximate how they will react and predict their future behavior.  
Although everyone has a common sense and a sense of taste, we do not all share the same 
sensory reactions. The ultimate judgment will therefore be individual. Coming to a final strategic 
analysis of a situation is an individual practice, although it is embedded in discussion. Furthermore, 
developing a strategy that breaks with the present categories and changes the situation beyond 
current thinking requires a genius. In The Critique of Judgment, Kant defined genius as “a talent for 
producing that for which no definite rule can be given; it is not a mere aptitude for what can be 
learnt by a rule. Hence originality must be its first property.”372 The genius is an unusual individual 
who can not only understand situations for which there is no general rule – he can also create 
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something new that breaks with the categories held by other commanders. In war, it is this ability to 
break with the predictable that allows him to turn the tables and destroy a superior enemy.373 
This argument might seem overly abstract, but it is within the limits of cognition and the 
faculties of the imagination that we find the reason why the individual general is still admired and 
why there is no easy formula for elite civil-military relations. The nub of the matter is that military 
superiority cannot be achieved solely through organizational practices or perfect institutions. 
Strategy is sometimes an individual practice, which depends on the skills of the general in question. 
Having a genius – a Themistocles at Salamis, a Hannibal at Cannae, a Mannstein in the Ukraine – in 
command is a significant advantage. But even without the presence of genius, military leadership 
depends on the imagination and intellect of the general. It requires the ability to imagine the 
motives and thought patterns of enemy generals and to innovative ruses that may catch him by 
surprise.  There is no a priori optimal institutional solution to it. It is unavoidably messy and 
complicated.  
In conclusion, the modern military man is an expert in the science and art of war, which is an 
abstract system of knowledge about the strategic use of force for political purposes. He uses 
scientific knowledge as an element in a strategy judgment, which is fundamentally creative in 
nature. Military expertise is not universal. The officer has privileged access to the judgments 
involved in war, but this judgment is as much a result of individual genius and creativity as it is a 
universal scientific expertise.  
  
Conclusion 
In The Soldier and the State, Huntington claimed that the professional soldier is a scientific expert on 
par with for instance doctors or lawyers. In this chapter, I have presented views that largely support 
Huntington’s conclusions, yet add nuances to our understanding of military expertise. The military 
became professionalized over a century-long process, caused by various factors, the most important 
of which is probably the steadily increasing competition between states. Scientific understanding of 
technology and social organization became increasingly important for the officer, who thus became 
an expert. The military expertise, however, is more fickle than other types. War involves a high 
degree of uncertainty. It is necessarily competitive and intricately connected to politics. This means 
that military expertise is both an art and a science. It necessarily involves the use of individual 
intuition. Two officers confronted with the same situation will not necessarily arrive at the same 
conclusions. Consequently, we cannot see military expertise as an apolitical sphere of pure 
knowledge. Instead, military expertise will often be contested. 
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- 6 - 
Civilian control 
 
In this and the following chapter, we turn our attention to civilian control – one of the two core 
topics of elite civil-military relations. We look at civilian control, while temporarily bracketing the 
issue of military effectiveness. How, I ask, does the executive branch of government generally 
control the military? What are the basic variables determining civilian control? Is the literature up to 
speed with the basic problems of civilian control? I answer these questions with an integrative 
reading of the existing theories of civilian control. Civilian control is established by using two tools. 
External control mechanisms entail building institutions that make military disobedience difficult and 
costly. Conversely, internal control mechanisms refer to the creation of norms of loyalty and political 
neutrality within the military personnel. By making the military feel loyal to the government, the 
civilian leadership can relax their use of external mechanisms. 
This analysis entails a critique of the existing civilian control literature. I show that most 
theories of civilian control fall into either the externalist or internalist modes. I argue that civilian 
control cannot be reduced to either of these tools. Civilian control is generally established through a 
combination of external and internal means.  
 The chapter consists of four sections. I define civilian control in the first section, where I 
explain how it springs out of the need for accountability, and how the fundamental problem is one 
of delegation and information asymmetry. The second section looks at the different civilian control 
policies that the civilian government may employ. These policies affect the various social 
mechanisms that ensure civilian control. I then examine these mechanisms in the last two sections. 
In the third section, I look specifically at external mechanisms for control, while I explore internal 
mechanisms for control in the final section.   
 
Structure of civilian control 
Civilian control is a subpart of elite civil-military relations concerned with the civilian leadership’s 
ability to control the armed forces.374 The need for civilian control grows out of the legitimacy 
imperative. In chapter 4, we saw that accountability is the core of modern democratic society. The 
state shores up legitimacy by being responsive to the wishes of civil society.  
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The state is of course not a unitary actor. It consists not only of a leadership, but also of an 
administrative branch that implements the policies decided through civilian institutions. The political 
leadership delegates the implementation of its policies to the bureaucracy. In principle, the 
administrative branch will be an apolitical tool in the hands of the civilian leadership that will 
implement the policies decided by the civilian government without demurring. However, public 
administration does not run this smoothly in real life. The bureaucracy may have its own policy 
preferences, and the delegation process gives it the power to ensure that at least some of its 
administrative energy is used to pursue these alternative policies.375 
 One of the many strengths of Peter Feaver’s rational choice approach to elite civil-military 
relations is that it provides an overview of the delegation problem that constitutes the crux of elite 
civil-military relations. Rational choice theory assumes that actors have fixed preferences. By 
assuming that norms and culture are irrelevant and that actors essentially try to maximize their own 
utility through strategic interaction, rational choice theory allows us to isolate the different 
processes that shape civilian control.376 In essence, the relationship between civilian and military 
elites is a principal-agent relationship. The civilian government is the principal by virtue of the 
accountability principle. The principal delegates the implementation of a policy to an agent. This 
delegation occurs because the agent has functionally important knowledge and skills, to which the 
principal does not have access.377  The effectiveness imperative makes delegation necessary. 
Delegating the implementation of the policy is therefore the optimal policy-choice for both parties. 
The agent has some leeway to pursue policies that differ from the ones preferred by the 
civilian principal. This divergence in policy preferences need not be the result of malign intent. Of 
course, the agent may wish to pursue different policies because it is interested in maximizing its own 
utility. It may also think that the principal’s policies will not lead to a greater good, or it may have 
misunderstood the government’s policies. There are many types of shirking. It ranges from simply 
slacking off over misinterpreting orders to pursuing a different course of action to outright 
disobeying orders. The most extreme type of shirking is of course a military coup d’état.378 Needless 
to say, the principal prefers to minimize the effects of any divergent preferences, regardless of their 
source. However, the government has no way of controlling everything that its agent does, because 
the agent has more knowledge of what the job entails than the principal. This is the fundamental 
reason for delegating the implementation of the task in the first place. This information asymmetry 
allows the agent to pursue its own interests, to some degree, at the expense of the principal. The 
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task for the principal is therefore to control the acts of the agent to ensure that it pursues the 
principal’s preferences.379 
Civilian control constitutes a special type of principal-agent interaction. Firstly, the civilian 
principal is not a unitary actor. Civilian decision-making is divided between the executive and the 
legislative body in most democracies. Each of these is elected by the population to make sure that 
the state acts in accordance with their wishes. For instance, in the American system, civilian 
decisions are made by the President and Congress in tandem. Though he does serve strictly under 
the executive, the military man should first and foremost be loyal to the Constitution. Congress and 
the President are ultimately agents of the people. In that sense, the executive is the military’s 
principal, yet it is also the agent of the legislature. Both executive and legislature are the people’s 
agents. The military thus works for several principals, who do not always share the same interests.380 
Most European societies, such as the United Kingdom, place less emphasis on checks and balances 
between the executive and the legislature. Authority over military policy is typically held by the 
executive branch only. The military consequently has less room to use the legislature to counter-
punish the executive. However, as Deborah Avant points out, civilian mistakes are typically more 
costly in such systems, as there are no rival parties to force the government back on track.381  
Secondly, the information asymmetry between civilian and military actors is greater than in 
most other policy areas, because of the necessary secrecy in national security affairs. Many of the 
normal information channels that the government would use to monitor the bureaucracy are closed 
off, thus exacerbating the information asymmetry.382 
Finally, unlike most principal-agent relations, the relationship between civilians and soldiers 
contains what we could call counter-punishment. When social scientists use the principal-agent 
model to analyze delegation, they normally assume that the principal has the authority and power to 
punish shirking. When it comes to civilian control, though, the military is nominally more powerful 
than the civilian government. The armed forces control the main power resources in society and can, 
in principle, overthrow the government if it so wishes.383 This does not, of course, happen often in 
well-developed democracies. The nub of the matter is, as we shall see later on, that this only 
happens because of factors that are outside of the principal-agent relationship. The military 
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essentially refrains from turning against its civilian masters because it shares the bulk of their values 
and policy-preferences. These internal mechanisms are not included in the principal-agent 
relationship. The military can essentially use four types of counter-punishment.  
 
1. The most extreme type of counter-punishment is a military putsch. The military has, as 
described above, the tools necessary for dismantling the civilian government.384 This is what Peter 
Feaver calls “the civil-military problematique”: the military can only protect society by being 
powerful enough to dismantle the civilian government of the state.385 Under extreme circumstances, 
where the military is dissatisfied with the punishments laid upon it by the civilian government, the 
armed forces may choose to use these options to remove the civilian government and take over the 
executive reins. Though some scholars have warned against the possibility of a military coup in the 
United States, there are many reasons why this is an unlikely event in modern society.386 However, it 
still represents the most extreme version of counter-punishment and shadows the entire framework 
of civilian control.387 The remaining three options are less extreme, but also more common in 
modern democracies. Two of them involve the military allying with a civilian party, who is then 
either empowered, or convinced to punish the government. 
 
2. The military may ally itself with the civilian opposition, typically in the legislature, to damage 
the government. This option goes to the heart of the accountability principle that underpins the 
need for civilian control. Civilian decision-making is, as we saw above, divided between the executive 
and legislature. In the American system, the military man has obligations to both Congress and the 
President, and they are typically enshrined in formalized duties. A crucial aspect of this system is 
Congress’ ability to hold hearings to investigate the policies of the executive. These hearings often 
make the civilian decision-makers more attentive to military affairs, because they make them 
accountable for decisions made by the military. Furthermore, they are a useful tool in the system of 
checks and balances within the civilian government. Simply put, they allow Congress to be up to 
speed with the White House’s policies. 
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This system depends on the military man’s conscience. Will he testify truthfully, or will he 
use the opportunity to destabilize the executive branch? We cannot assume that the military 
invariably does what is right. It may choose to pursue its own narrow interests. In that case, 
Congressional hearings function as powerful weapons for counter-punishment.388  
The military can, of course, ally itself with the legislature in a more clandestine manner by 
establishing informal contacts to its leading members. This allows it to feed information to the 
opposition in a way that does not compromise its observable loyalty to the government in public. 
This practice involving informal influence is generally thought to be a legitimate part of the 
democratic process. It provides the opposition with information that allows it to ask more accurate 
questions of the government. However, the line between informing and advocacy is very fine. 
Furthermore, the moment the opposition draws the military’s critique into the public light, and uses 
it to score political points against the government, the relationship becomes a democratic liability by 
discrediting the military’s loyalty.389 For example, such a confusion of roles happened during the 
Korean War, when Representative Joseph Martin, the GOP House Minority leader and avid Truman 
critic, publicized a letter written to him by General MacArthur, in which the UN commander-in-chief 
lambasted Truman’s handling of the Korean War. By publishing MacArthur’s critique, Martin was 
borrowing some of his clout to back up his own critique of Truman. The general was fired within 
days. To be sure, Truman and MacArthur had previously clashed over the general’s use of the press, 
and his meddling in what were considered political matters. The publication of the letter was the 
proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.390 The point of the matter is that having a general’s 
direct critique of a sitting President read aloud in Congress was widely seen as illegitimate. It is one 
thing for a general to correspond with members of Congress, but quite it yet another to get openly 
entangled in the political contest for power.391  
 
3. The military can also use its popularity within civil society at large to punish civilian leaders. 
The military is not detached from society. It consists of the sons and daughters of members of civil 
society. Insofar as the military has been effective in its previous missions, it may have a reputation 
for competence and efficiency. Popular militarism – which we explored in chapter 4 - may thus allow 
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the military the power necessary to punish the government. For example, it may weaken the civilian 
government if it chooses to speak out against it. Public criticism from serving, high-level generals is, 
however, generally considered to be illegitimate. For instance, during the tumultuous months of 
conflict with the President, Douglas MacArthur made several public statements that stepped outside 
the boundaries of a general’s jurisdiction. The democratic decision-making process contains several 
checks on the behavior of the executive. The legislative branch and the media scrutinize the policies 
of the executive. It is therefore not the responsibility of serving officials to criticize their own 
government. If generals disagree with the policies put in place by the executive and they do not 
think that the normal democratic checks are fulfilling their role, they should resign.392  
 The armed forces have more furtive ways available to influence the public at large. Military 
officers can express their dissatisfaction with the government policies anonymously or leak 
information about internal dissent. Leaks are often impossible for the government to trace – it is not 
even necessary that they can be traced back to the military, let alone the specific officer responsible. 
For instance, when the Army disagreed with President Eisenhower’s grand strategy, which 
emphasized nuclear deterrence rather than conventional, land-based force, it began to use 
anonymous sources to criticize him.  Army opposition was leaked through various channels – via 
articles authored under pseudonym and in public speeches, through doctrinal documents and as 
anonymous sources in the media – and these leaks caused severe problems for the White House.393  
 Officers can also use resignations – or the explicit or implicit threat of resignations – to 
pressure the government. Resigning is in of itself a perfectly reasonable practice, which cannot be 
abandoned altogether. It is expected that officers who vehemently disagree with government 
policies resign to leave their posts to officers who believe in the cause. However, resigning 
necessarily involves a political signal that can hurt the government. 394 An officer who resigns in 
protest against a political or strategic decision sends a fairly clear political indicator about his opinion 
about that policy. Even a “quiet” resignation can weaken a government, either because it is 
interpreted as a discreet but significant political signal by the press or because the specific officer 
has widely admired military skills, the lack of which may harm the state’s ability to implement its 
policies. For instance, during the First World War, it was the fear of both of these effects that kept 
the civilian German government from accepting Hindenburg’s many resignation offers. Even if the 
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Kaiser and his advisors had not appreciated the importance of Hindenburg’s skills as a commander, 
they surely feared the anger that the resignation of the popular field marshal would have triggered 
in the German population.395 
 Furthermore, criticism from retired officers can severely weaken a government politically. 
Generals are widely recognized as experts on military matters, and any significant concern of theirs 
will be seen as a critique of the sitting administration. Again, this is a tool of power that can hardly 
be removed without accepting severe restrictions on officers’ right to follow their consciences. 
Retired officers have a right to free speech, like everyone else in a democratic society. One can 
hardly expect them to sit idly by and watch the government pursue a policy which they believe to be 
hazardously erroneous. The main problem, of course, is that it is impossible to distinguish earnest 
political opposition from critique motivated by more narrow concerns. There is always the possibility 
that the retired officers will act as surrogate voices for the current military brass. For instance, in 
2006, during the final days of Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure at the Pentagon, six retired generals 
criticized the way he had handled the Iraq War and called for his resignation.396 One can debate if 
the generals were violating the code of their profession, but the fact of the matter is that it did not 
prevent them from issuing the criticism, or the public from accepting it as a valid and legitimate 
point of view.397 It demonstrates how retired generals can wield significant power over defense 
policy, even if the legitimacy of this instrument is debated. 
  
4. The military can also affect government policies by refraining from implementing them 
precisely and effectively. When a decision has been made and a policy is to be implemented, the 
military can choose to execute it in a counterproductive manner, either by implementing the policy 
at a slower pace than it is capable of, or by following a different course of action. The information 
asymmetry between the executive and the armed forces and the former’s vulnerability to domestic 
opposition often give officers the opportunity to use these strategies. Hitler, for instance, clashed 
with some of his commanders over the priorities of Operation Barbarossa. A group of officers, which 
included Halder, Bock, and Guderian, argued for a massive push by Army Group Center towards 
Moscow to destroy the heart of the Red Army and gain control of an essential center of Soviet 
industry. When Hitler decided to go against this advice and use Army Group Center to support the 
German advances around Leningrad and in the Ukraine instead, he was met by opposition. 
Guderian, hoping that events would lead Hitler to see the folly of this endeavor, delayed his move 
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away from Moscow by deliberately seeking an unnecessary battle at Roslavl.398 The execution of 
Hitler’s decision was thus made more difficult by deliberately poor implementation. Guderian used 
veiled insubordination to further a strategic change.  
 
The military thus holds significant power resources, which it can use to influence the civilian 
leadership. It does not have to actually use these resources – sometimes even the possibility that it 
may do so will be enough. The civilian leadership will typically try to accommodate the armed forces 
to avoid a potential conflict. For instance, according to Bob Woodward, President Obama and his 
staff went to great lengths to ensure that its new surge strategy for Afghanistan had the military’s 
support before it was announced in December 2009.399  
 In summary, the need for civilian control grows out of the accountability principle that 
defines modern society. Simply put, ensuring that political leaders control the military is part of the 
social contract. However, civilian control becomes difficult because of the structural relationship 
between the government and the armed forces. The military has its own preferences and it can use 
its access to information conduits to pursue policy goals that differ from those favored by the 
government. 
 
Civilian control policies 
Having outlined the basic structural features of the relationship between soldiers and civilians, we 
can now turn to the policies that the civilians use to maximize their control of the armed forces. As 
we saw in chapter 2, Samuel Huntington presented two policies for controlling the military in The 
Soldier and the State. “Subjective control” entails ensuring that top officers share the values of the 
civilian faction in charge, typically by firing and replacing officers who have different values, or who 
are loyal to opposition factions. The military necessarily becomes political, because appointments 
depend upon political affiliation. The entire military organization becomes significantly civilianized. 
“Objective control”, conversely, involves making the armed forces independent of political struggle. 
Instead, the military is allowed to handle an autonomous area of expertise, typically tactical and 
operational decisions, without civilian interference. Promotions are determined by officers’ success 
in handling these issues correctly. By disconnecting promotions from political squabbling, so 
Huntington’s argument goes, the military will refrain from becoming involved in the political sphere. 
The military will become both effective and controllable.400  
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 However, the distinction between subjective and objective control does not fully describe 
the fundamental policy dilemma facing political leaders in most advanced democracies. One must 
add two nuances to capture the policy choice. Firstly, as Peter Feaver has shown, subjective and 
objective control constitute the two extremes on a continuum of different degrees of civilian 
meddling in military policy (see figure 6.1.).401 Objective control (which he prefers to call “delegative 
control”) involves very little interference. Civilians are involved in strategic and grand strategic 
decisions, but leave tactical and operational decision-making to the armed forces. Subjective control 
involves extensive meddling: the civilians interfere in all areas of military policy and effectively 
civilianize the entire military organization.  
Civilians have one more policy option, Feaver argues, that falls between the extremes of 
subjective and objective control. Assertive control is defined as “direct civilian supervision over the 
military, particularly over military operations [and tactics].”402 Whereas objective control allows the 
military autonomy with regards to tactical and operational decisions, an assertive control policy 
involves civilians meddling in these details. However, this meddling only focuses on policy and does 
not involve appointments or organizational structures. Thus, whereas subjective control involves 
civilianizing the military organization, assertive control permits the continued existence of an 
independent military organization, where appointments are based on merit rather than political 
connections.403  
  
Figure 6.1. Direct civilian control policies based on degree of civilian meddling 
 
 
In most modern democracies, civilians have to decide between objective and assertive 
control. Though certainly an option, subjective control is rarely used as a control policy in modern 
democracies. Instead, it is more common in non-democratic societies. The highly inefficient Soviet 
political commissar system is a modern example of subjective control.404 Therefore, when scholars 
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discuss elite civil-military relations in modern democracies, they typically focus only on the use of 
objective and assertive control.  
Civilian meddling has generally become easier since the Industrial Revolution and the 
ensuing spread of steadily more sophisticated communications technology. Traditionally, civilian 
leaders could only interfere in tactics by setting out general rules of engagements. However, even 
when doing so, civilian leaders had little opportunity to establish if the rules were actually followed. 
The civilian leader and the head of the military was either one and the same person - like Napoleon 
at the height of his power. Or the civilian leader simply trusted the judgment of his commanding 
general and gave him discretion to make tactical, operational and sometimes even strategic 
decisions as he saw fit. The British Prime Ministers Portland, Perceval, and Liverpool did just this 
with the Duke of Wellington.405 The development of new communications technology now allows 
civilians to assess and direct even tactical decisions. Cohen emphasizes that the invention and 
spread of the telegraph “transformed the role of high-level political authority in monitoring events 
on the battlefield.”406 Control of tactical operations has therefore not only become possible, but also 
more important.407 
Secondly, these policy options are only concerned with the direct meddling in military policy. 
However, civilian control policy can also take an institutional form. Policymakers have the option of 
creating additional external institutions for control. As we shall see in this chapter, external control 
institutions are one of the main mechanisms for civilian control. Adding institutions allow civilians to 
survey military policy and punish any wrong-doing by the military. They typically do not involve 
meddling directly in military policy. In that sense, they are different from the policy choice between 
subjective, objective, and assertive control. They will be presented in more details below.  
Abraham Lincoln, for instance, developed alternative channels of information, when he 
began to distrust the honesty and nous of his generals. He consulted not only his commanding 
generals, but also lower-ranking officers who imparted a second opinion on strategic matters. He 
also used former high-ranking officers as impartial advisors. For instance, when Lincoln suspected 
that George McClellan, the General-in-Chief, had left Washington insufficiently protected (thus going 
against a direct order from the White House), he consulted major general Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a 
retired field commander and veteran from the Mexican-American War, who served as a special 
advisor to the War Department. When Hitchcock confirmed Lincoln’s suspicions, it fuelled his 
dissatisfaction with McClellan and eventually led to his dismissal.408 
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The civilian control policies affect two types of social mechanisms that ensure civilian 
control.409 Firstly, external control describes the use of external institutions to monitor and punish 
military actors. Civilians can try to minimize the information asymmetry by acquiring more 
information about the military’s course of action and by punishing what it sees as erratic behavior. 
By surveying its behavior, the civilian leadership diminishes the military’s room for shirking. By 
punishing it for shirking, the civilian leadership makes it less profitable to step out of the narrow 
confines of the original agreement. These mechanisms ignore the military’s policy preferences and 
focus on correcting its behavior. 
Secondly, internal control refers to the creation of a military culture of loyalty. The civilian 
government can create civilian control by ensuring that the military has the same preferences as 
itself. The information asymmetry inherent in the principal-agent relationship only becomes 
problematic, if the military has different policy preferences that it wants to pursue. If the civilian 
leadership can ensure that the officer corps values loyalty to the state as a policy-goal, building 
elaborate monitoring and punishment mechanisms becomes superfluous. The key task is to identify 
the mechanisms that ensure that the officer corps feels loyal towards the civilian government. These 
mechanisms focus on affecting the soldier’s core beliefs. 
Theories of civilian control have tended to focus on either external or internal tools for 
control. Peter Feaver is the most prominent external control theorist. He uses rational choice theory 
to explain how civilian and military actors are driven by the external pay-offs. Though his theory is 
not a purely externalist model, it does highlight how external institutions shape civilian control.410 
Samuel Huntington, by contrast, is the most prominent exponent for internal control. Huntington 
argued that if officers felt fully professional, they would automatically also be loyal towards the 
civilian leadership. He implicitly argued that internal mechanisms were enough to establish civilian 
control.411 
 To sum up, theories of civilian control typically emphasize how it is secured through either 
external institutions or internal norms within the military. My overall argument is that civilian 
control cannot be reduced to either external institutions, or by internal norms. Instead, civilians rely 
on different combinations of external and internal control mechanisms. In the following pages, I will 
therefore present the main tenets of both external and internal control and show that neither of 
these mechanisms can, alone, secure civilian control of the military. Theories of civilian control 
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should therefore focus on when and how civilian policymakers combine internal and external 
mechanisms of control.  
 
External control 
External control refers to the ability of civilians to control the military through institutions that 
detect and punish erratic behavior. This approach assumes that actors pursue their own narrow 
interests. Institutions essentially influence the payoffs of behaving in one or another manner. How 
these preferences are developed is an entirely different matter that cannot be included in a purely 
externalist approach. If an externalist approach has to include matters of preference formation in its 
causal explanation, it stops being purely externalist. Rational choice theory, for instance, assumes 
that actors pursue their own strategic interests. The formation of those interests is outside of the 
model. The only way of affecting the behavior of the actors is to change the institutional set-up, or 
the strategic behavior of the other actors in the game.412 
 External control tools have generally played a somewhat confusing role in the civilian control 
literature. External mechanisms for control only played a scant role in Samuel Huntington’s theory of 
civilian control. Instead, he focused mainly on internal control mechanisms, and he chiefly wrote 
about external institutions to highlight how they diminish the prospect for this type of control.413 
Samuel Finer highlighted this problem and provided an alternative framework, which include 
reflections on how external institutions play an important role in securing civilian control over the 
military.414 More recently, Deborah Avant has used more systematic tools that focus on external pay-
offs to analyze elite civil-military relations.415 However, it was only with Peter Feaver’s Armed 
Servants that theories of external control became a serious competitor to internalist theory. Feaver 
uses rational choice theory to analyze civilian control as the strategic interaction between two 
utility-maximizing parties. He provides a couple of simple assumptions about civil and military 
preferences, and then map out the most rational strategies for each actor. This enables him to 
outline how external mechanisms for control function in very clear terms. He then validates his 
model empirically by showing that it is largely in line with patterns of civilian control in the United 
States during and after the Cold War.416 Examining his insights shows us how external control 
functions, and whether civilian control can be explained by looking at these mechanisms only.  
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Tools of external control 
As we saw above, the military agent is able to shirk because of the information and power 
asymmetries between principal and agent. Military slack can be prevented if the civilian leadership 
can detect and punish shirking. External control therefore focuses on institutions that allow the 
civilian leadership to monitor and punish the military. Through effective punishment, the civilians 
are able to discourage military shirking. In Armed Servants, Feaver provides a list of five tools of 
external control available to the civilian principal, ranging from the subtle to the highly intrusive.417 
The first tool is screening and selection – that is, surveying military personnel and selecting only 
those who display the right preferences for entrance and promotion. In the United States, for 
instance, Congress votes on all officer promotions in the military, determining the worth of each 
candidate through hearings. This gives Congress a tool – albeit an imperfect one – to detect and 
block candidates who do not display the appropriate preferences for civilian control. This creates an 
incentive structure for approving of civilian control.418 
Secondly, the military is also controlled through the use of external groups for monitoring – 
what rational choice theorists refer to as “fire alarms”. Allowing third parties to explore the behavior 
of the military is a way of circumventing the information asymmetry between civilians and the 
armed forces. For instance, the media generally function as a fire alarm. The institutional interest of 
the media is to present better and more sensational stories about government slack and they are 
often capable of finding information of which the civilian leadership may not immediately be aware. 
Similarly, think tank experts generally also have an interest in exposing bureaucratic failings. 
Independent experts often have an extensive knowledge of military affairs that rivals that of the 
military. Finally, interservice rivalry may also function as a fire alarm. Because the military services 
compete for the same resources, individual services will generally seek to expose the failures of 
other services whenever possible. They will also generally sound a fire alarm if they detect that one 
of the other services is scheming.419 
The third external tool is institutional checks. An institutional check is an actor who can block 
or veto a policy through legal or physical means. Whereas fire alarms function by making civilians 
aware of irregularities, an institutional check can block the policy without alerting the principal. 
Strictly speaking, the difference between a fire alarm and an institutional check revolves around the 
punishing power of the monitoring actor. Institutional checks not only detect problems – they also 
have the means to block any irregular behavior. For example, if branches of the armed forces 
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decided to rise against their civilian masters, the existence of several services and the National 
Guard function as institutional checks that can prevent a coup d’état through force.420 
Fourthly, the principal may also monitor the agent by establishing offices that direct 
investigations of the actions of the military. In rational choice theory, this is called “police 
patrolling”. Among Feaver’s many examples are audits, reporting requirements, hearings, 
committees, and government offices, like the Congressional Budget Office and the General 
Accounting Office. These mechanisms collect information from the bureaucracies under the threat 
of legal prosecution.421 
Finally, the most intrusive type of monitoring is direct civilian micromanagement of military 
action – that is, the effective displacement of military commanders with civilians, who then take 
over all military planning on the strategic, tactical, and operational level. This type of monitoring 
means that the principal-agent relationship is moved further down the ranks. Even when the 
principal makes the tactical and operational decisions, it still faces an information asymmetry 
between itself and soldiers who have to implement its policies on the ground. In that respect, the 
principal-agent-relationship still exists under these extreme circumstances.422 
Principal-agent problems are not solved solely by ensuring that the principal discovers the 
agent’s shirking. The principal also has to be capable of punishing the agent. This approach assumes 
that actors solely aim to maximize their own political preferences. It is only when shirking causes a 
loss of utility that the agent will change behavior. By punishing the agent, the principal decreases the 
utility of slacking, thus making it less advantageous than loyalty. Standard principal-agent theory 
commonly assumes that the principal is capable of punishing the agent. However, as we saw above, 
this picture is radically different in elite civil-military relations. The military can retaliate against the 
government by using its own channels for counter-punishment. 423 
This does not mean that civilian punishment is impossible. Though acknowledging that 
counter-punishment diminishes the civilians’ scope for punishment, Feaver highlights that the 
civilian government has five types of punishment tools. Most of these target the head of an agency 
either directly - by demoting, halting promotions, firing, prosecuting, or political purging – or 
indirectly by diminishing the power of his agency. Firstly, the military is averse to the various types of 
monitoring techniques mentioned above. Avoiding intrusive surveillance mechanisms may therefore 
create an incentive for the military to stay within bounds. For instance, erratic behavior may lead the 
government to reform the structure of a military agency in order to ease surveillance. This gives the 
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agency director less room to excel and thus makes his road to promotion more cumbersome. 
Secondly, the civilians may also decide to cut the budgets of agencies that have acted outside of the 
given boundaries. Likewise, they may also halt promotions of the agency head. Both of these 
mechanisms are obviously unpleasant for the leader of the agency. Thirdly, the civilians may go as 
far as firing the leading individuals of an agency. Fourthly, in extreme cases, the civilians may use the 
military justice system to prosecuting the head of an agency who has stepped outside of the law. 
Finally, the civilians can use political means to rebuke the head of a department. This ranges from 
telling off the person privately, to political purges.424 
External institutions have one significant downside. They typically involve a significant waste 
of resources. For instance, interservice rivalry – one type of external institution – wastes 
administrative energy, when different departments are concurrently doing the same work. 
Furthermore, strategizing may be buried in competition for resources. For instance, in his meticulous 
analysis of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the early Vietnam War, H.R. McMaster 
highlights how interservice rivalry was one of the most important reasons why the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff did not fulfill their role properly. In one instance – the July 1964 decision to increase the 
American presence from sixteen to twenty-two thousand troops – interservice struggle meant that 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented its recommendations three days after President Johnson had 
approved the troop increase.425 External institutions thus increase civilian control, but diminish the 
military effectiveness of the state.  
All in all, civilian decision-makers have a wide palette of tools for monitoring and punishing 
the military. However, these tools are never perfect. The civilian government never has complete 
information about the military’s behavior, which leaves the military with some room for action, 
which may allow it to act against the interests of the civilian leadership. This problem is exacerbated 
by the possibility of counter-punishment.  
 
The theoretical limits of externalism 
External mechanisms cannot stand alone as a civilian control paradigm. The military controls the 
means of violence in a society. If the military’s only preference is to maximize its own utility – if it 
does not have a shared interest with the civilian government - it could do so by simply seizing power 
through a military coup. It is only because the military – or at least parts of the military – sees civilian 
supremacy and the survival of the state as beneficial that this does not occur. We cannot explain 
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civilian control without exploring the preferences of the military. An externalist model has to be 
paired with an internalist approach.  
 This is obvious from Peter Feaver’s theory of civilian control. Feaver explicitly situates 
himself within a rational choice approach, where he uses a principal-agent model to explain civilian 
and military behavior. He cannot stay within this explanatory mode, though. Instead, he has to add 
identity factors to his model to explain military preferences. He stresses that “[w]hereas economic 
agents may generally prefer shirking to working, political agents are likely to be motivated (at least 
in part) by a substantive interest in the policy itself.”426 He then adds three assumptions about 
military preferences, which he argues capture the difference between the military and a standard 
economic agent. He argues that the military is driven by a preference for effective national security 
policies, a need for personal honor and recognition, and an appreciation of autonomy.427 This is a 
violation of the assumptions underpinning any purely externalist approach to civilian control. A 
purely externalist model assumes that actors have exogenous preferences. They want to maximize 
their preferences given the actions of the other party and the institutional framework of their 
situation. Outcomes are predicted based on the strategic interaction between actors only. Pure 
externalism cannot include the preferences of the actor. Feaver does include such internal factors in 
his explanation, because it is impossible to explain civilian control based only on strategic 
interaction. Pure externalism is therefore impossible. A theoretical framework of civilian control has 
to add an internalist dimension that explains how military preferences are created.  
 Feaver would argue that this is not a problem for his specific theory, because he has never 
claimed to use a purely externalist model. He has simply mixed rational choice theory with simple 
assumptions about military preferences in order to predict elite civil-military interaction. His theory 
stands up to the empirical record. When he tests it on elite civil-military interaction during the Cold 
War, he is able to explain most of the behavior.428 Feaver is correct to defend his theory on these 
grounds. However, his need to add assumptions about military preferences illustrates the limits of 
externalism. Feaver never explains why the military has these, and not other, preferences. Why does 
the military value national security over the utility acquired by shirking? Why does honor define the 
military man? Feaver cannot answer these questions without adding an internalist dimension that 
explains how military preferences are formed. The fact that he draws them in as assumptions, 
without explaining why these assumptions are reasonable, leaves his model with a theoretical 
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gap.429 Adding assumptions about actor preferences is a perfectly legitimate practice if, as Feaver 
does, one develops middle-range or case-specific theories. However, it detracts from the 
generalizability of the theory. Feaver’s theory cannot trace changes in these preferences. It cannot 
be used in contexts where military actors may have other preferences. Though Feaver’s theory 
explains large patterns of civilian control within the United States, it cannot stand alone. It has to be 
supplemented by a model of internal control.  
In sum, civilian control is secured through the use of external institutions of surveillance and 
punishment. It cannot, however, fully explain why the military does not simply use its structural 
advantages to overthrow the civilian government. This can only be done by examining the internal 
norms and preferences that govern the military man. Externalism has to be supplemented by an 
internalist theory of civilian control.  
 
Internal control 
The internal norms of the military are the second factor that enables civilian control. The supporting 
argument behind this is fairly simple: civilian control need not be a product only of government 
institutions. Instead, it can be established if the military feels loyal to the civilian leadership. There 
will be little need for establishing institutions to control the military if it is already loyal to the civilian 
leadership.  
This was essentially the logic behind Samuel Huntington’s approach to civilian control. 
Huntington provided the most important internalist model. 430 His basic argument, as presented in 
The Soldier and the State, is summarized in figure 6.2. The core of Huntington’s argument was the 
causal chain between civilian control policy, military professionalism, and political neutrality. 
Basically, he claimed that neutrality follows automatically from military professionalism. Professional 
soldiers, he argued, are neutral and loyal because they see themselves as professionals. The 
professional soldier is “imbued with the ideal of service to the nation” – “an awareness that his skill 
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can only be utilized for purposes approved by society by its political agent, the state.”431 Simply put, 
military professionalism leads to political neutrality, which then allows internal civilian control.  
 
Figure 6.2. Huntington’s political neutrality argument  
 
 
Huntington argued that civilian policy-makers have a chance to foment internal control. The civilian 
control policy can affect military professionalism, and thereby increase internal control. The key is to 
give the military autonomy to act like professionals. A professional military does not want to be 
involved in politics, and prefers to stay neutral in political matters.432  If the government pursues an 
objective control policy and allows the military autonomy to handle operational and tactical matters, 
he argued, the military can retain its professionalism and become loyal to the government. A civilian 
control policy that allows the military a free space to develop professionalism will therefore 
maximize civilian control.433 
 The civilian control policy is not the only condition for developing internal control. 
Huntington emphasized that professionalism is a strictly modern condition. In addition to the civilian 
control policy, he listed four factors that helped explain the long-term development of 
professionalism: functional specialization of distinct groups within society in general; the 
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development of the nation-state; the development of democracy; and the destruction of the nobility 
and the unification of authority in the state.434 Firstly, war had become a specialized activity, where 
it was impossible for one person to master all the activities involved. This was a function of a large-
scale transformation of society stemming from technological innovation, industrialization, and 
urbanization. As Huntington put it,  
 
“[w]ar, like everything else, was no longer a simple, uncomplicated affair. Armies were 
larger, and, more important, were composed of increasingly diverse elements. Once, all 
the men in a military force had performed the same function: engaging the enemy with 
spears or swords as the case might be. Now armies and navies became complex 
organisms, embodying hundreds of different specialities, creating the need for still 
another type of specialist: the specialist in coordinating and directing these diverse 
parts to their assigned goals.”435 
 
The growth of the nation-state is a second precondition for internalism. Only the nation-state 
needed an independent, professional officer corps, and only the nation-state had the resources to 
finance such a corps. The inter-state military competition forced each state “to create a corps of 
permanent experts devoted to the interests of military security. The loss or threatened loss of that 
security by war … was for each nation the immediate road to professionalization.”436 
 Thirdly, democracy also spurred the development of professionalism. The early democrats, 
Huntington argued, were vehemently opposed to any class differentiation. They therefore tore 
down the traditional aristocratic principles that had long governed the military. They tried in vain to 
replace it with citizen militias and democratic principles of election to military posts. This first wave 
of democratization was destined to fail. However, instead of a backlash to aristocratic privilege, the 
military became organized along professional lines.437 
 Finally, Huntington emphasized that “the existence of a single recognized source of 
legitimate authority over the military forces” was conducive to the development of political 
neutrality.438 It is easier for the soldier to be politically neutral, he argued, when he can “be loyal to 
some single institution generally accepted as embodying the authority of the nation. Where there 
are competing authorities, or competing ideas as to what ought to be the authority, professionalism 
becomes difficult if not impossible to achieve.“439 One of the factors hindering civilian control in the 
United States, he claimed, was that authority was divided between different institutions. The checks 
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and balances system set forth by the nation’s founders, which divided power between President and 
Congress, was detrimental to internal control.440 
 Huntington thus provided a causal model that explained how various factors led to the 
development of political neutrality within the ranks. He emphasized military professionalism as the 
crucial variable that facilitates the development of political neutrality. This factor, in turn, depends 
on certain historical and social factors that have allowed the conditions for internal control to 
develop in the modern era only.  
 
The limits of Huntingtonian internalism 
When it was first developed, Huntington’s model signified an immense leap in our understanding of 
civilian control. However, one could argue that it lacks consistency by modern theoretical standards. 
Though more rigorous than the models developed by other internalist scholars, Huntington’s model 
suffers from three limitations.  
 
1. Huntington never defined professionalism. Although it was the cornerstone of his argument, 
professionalism remains an elusive entity that changes meaning from section to section. Sometimes 
it is a habit of thought or a specific culture.441 In other passages, it is a product of certain institutions 
and organizations.442 Sometimes it is a vocation.443 In other instances, it is a “functional group”.444 
Huntington identified several characteristics of professionalism – it involves a specific expertise, 
sense of responsibility, and corporate membership – but he never pinpointed its very nature. 
Definitions are supposed to describe the nature of an object succinctly. This involves breaking the 
object down into component parts, not just identifying some of its empirical characteristics. For 
instance, claiming that an apple is red and spherical does not amount to a satisfactory definition. By 
that definition, one could confuse it with a tomato, a red ball, or the planet Mars. To define an 
apple, we would have to say that it is a fruit, a type of living organism, which consists mainly of 
carbon and water. We would have to try to describe its very nature. To define professionalism, we 
would have to establish if it is a type of culture, a personal attitude, a behavioral pattern, an 
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institution, or an organization. We would have to fit it within the basic building blocks of all social 
theory. By these standards, Huntington’s main variable was left undefined. 
The background for this theoretical limitation can be found within the sociology of the 
professions. The professions were an object of study from the earliest moments of sociology. They 
for instance played a crucial role in Herbert Spencer’s hyper-functionalist 19th century conception of 
society.445 The modern sociology of the professions developed as a separate sub-discipline in the 
1920s and -30s with the works of Alexander Carr-Saunders and Paul Wilson and, later, Talcott 
Parsons. The professional was seen as providing a clue into the nature of modernity. The sub-
discipline was driven by the curious empirical observation that many different professions came into 
being during the early industrial era and seemed to embody somewhat similar traits and develop 
along similar patterns. Max Weber had warned that modernity could cause the universal spread of 
selfish individualism. The capitalist businessman seemed to fit this stereotype. Yet the professional 
expert seemed to work diligently, without the need for monetary compensation. This man of 
modernity was as rational as any other “type”, yet seemed to embody communal, unselfish 
norms.446 
The sociology of the professions, however, always suffered from one fundamental problem: 
it could not explain why anyone would become unselfish, and focus on communal values simply as a 
result of scientific training. This kept the professions from becoming a theoretically valid concept – 
one that could be adopted in macro-sociological explanations of modernity. Sociologists could 
observe that the professions existed, yet professionalism alone could not explain why the 
professionals would be motivated to act unselfishly. In the 1970s and -80s, this problem led to a 
surge of critical studies that exposed how professionals gain monetary and non-monetary privileges. 
The unselfishness of the professional was questioned empirically and the ideal of the unselfish 
expert was duly shattered.447 Yet, for a brief while – in the 1950s and early -60s, when Huntington 
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wrote The Soldier and the State – these problems had yet to surface. Huntington followed the 
sociology of professionalism as it had developed at his time of writing.448 He asserted that the 
military officer is diligent, unselfish, and first and foremost preoccupied with the needs of his 
community. In view of the later problems associated with the sociology of the professions, this claim 
needs further theoretical investigation.  
 
2. The lack of a definition means that Huntington never fully explained how military 
professionalism leads to neutrality. Why does professionalism necessarily make soldiers more 
neutral in political matters? Huntington stated, rather simplistically, that professional men are 
necessarily loyal – the professional soldier had a “sense of social obligation” and “must always be 
subordinate to the statesman”.449 Yet he never provided a satisfactory explanation for why this is so. 
As Bengt Abrahamsson points out, Huntington’s argument was circular at times, confusing the 
dependent and independent variable:  
 
“a ‘professional’ officer corps is one which exhibits expertise, responsibility and 
corporateness. ‘Professionalism’, however, to Huntington also involves political 
neutrality; as a result, ‘professionalism’ and ‘objective control’ are inseparable as 
theoretical concepts. The immediate consequence of this is to rule out the empirical 
possibility of establishing the relationship between the degree of professionalism and 
the degree of political neutrality. … In other words, professional officers never 
intervene; because if they do, they are not true professionals.”450 
 
Huntington’s argument became tautological, because he did not separate the characteristics of 
professionalism from the political neutrality it is supposed to explain. Of course, without a definition 
of professionalism it is also impossible to define how that variable might affect other variables. In 
that sense, the missing causal explanation behind political neutrality within military culture was a 
consequence of the lack of a definition of professionalism.  
 Thus, the assertion that professionalism necessarily leads to loyalty is empirically dubious. 
For instance, even Clausewitz, surely a diligent and conscientious officer if there ever was one, 
experienced bouts of mixed loyalties that ultimately led him to fight against his parent government. 
The Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806 made him hors de combat, and Prussia a forced ally of Napoleon. 
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In 1812, Clausewitz - then already a seasoned soldier and erstwhile aid-de-camp to one of Frederick 
the Great’s brothers - decided to go into Russian service. By switching sides, he could continue to 
fight Napoleon, even if it meant that he would eventually be opposed to his own fatherland.451 
Loyalty to the Prussian state involved asking complex questions, and going against the official 
authorities of the Prussian state. The soldier’s sense of obligation is certainly not simple and 
unquestionable.  
Similarly, as Andrew Bacevich has shown, the US Army’s resistance to Eisenhower’s 
deterrence-focused grand strategy was largely motivated by military professionalism. Faced with the 
costs of increased military competition and an electorate averse to tax increases, Eisenhower 
decided to pursue a more cost-effective grand strategy. “Massive Retaliation” emphasized the 
deterrence of nuclear weapons over conventional force. It demanded large cuts in the Army and 
new investments in the Air Force. General Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, publicly and privately 
espoused the values of military loyalty and the ethos of professionalism. However, because he 
believed that Eisenhower’s policy was strategically wrong and morally detestable – in his view, the 
policy would not only lead to a weakening vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it would also make nuclear war 
more probable - Ridgway’s professionalism led him to resist the President’s policies in ways that 
were at least democratically questionable.452 His professional conscience led him to the brink of 
disloyalty. Eventually, the White House forced him into early retirement. Professionalism is not, in 
and of itself, a guarantee for loyalty.  
Tellingly, at one point, Huntington likened the professional officer to “Shakespeare’s soldier 
in Henry V, [who] believes that the justice of the cause is more than he should ‘know’ or ‘seek after’. 
For if the king’s ‘cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.’”453 
Huntington argued that a professional identity, and the sense of duty within this identity, could 
prescribe normative loyalty. However, he refrained from quoting King Henry’s reply to the soldier in 
the very same scene: “Every subject’s duty is the king’s; but every subject’s soul is his own.”454 One 
cannot understand loyalty without understanding why the soldier finds this allegiance normatively 
appropriate. A sense of duty alone cannot explain the motives of men.455 I will return to this issue in 
chapter 7. 
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3. The causal chain that leads to professionalism is also unclear. As we saw above, Huntington 
identified several factors which, he argued, cause professionalism. Firstly, and most importantly, 
professionalism grows out of the civilian leadership’s ability to allow the military to act like apolitical 
professionals. Curiously, Huntington never explored the relationship between civilian involvement 
and the development of a professional military.456 He only looked at subjective and objective control 
– the two extreme options facing policymakers. Furthermore, he did not explicitly describe how 
these policies affect the degree of military culture. Nor did he analyze how assertive control, a much 
more common civilian control policy, could influence the development of political neutrality within 
the ranks. Why does civilian meddling have any influence on the development of military culture? 
Developing a model that explains the relationship between assertive and objective control and the 
degree of political neutrality in military culture is a precondition for making internal explanations a 
viable supplement to external theories.  
Huntington also identified four large-scale factors, which he argued are necessary for 
developing professionalism. However, this connection of his model to the general political sociology 
of the modern state is haphazard and incomplete. Besides listing these four factors on five pages of 
the historical background section of The Soldier and the State, Huntington provided no general 
analysis of these trends nor did he fully explain how they are related to one another and to general 
political trends within society. If we are to know if professionalism will continue to create political 
neutrality, we need a more complete understanding of how the causal factors that allow this 
development are related to one another. Society is constantly being transformed and we must 
explore if these grand scale changes are facilitating or impeding internal control. However, without a 
profounder understanding of the link between the mechanisms that create political neutrality and 
the wider grand-scale factors of society, we cannot identify these trends. Besides this list of 
seemingly randomly chosen factors, Huntington unfortunately did not explain this causal logic in 
more detail.  
 
In summary, the theoretical consistency of Huntington’s internalist model is limited. It lacked a 
definition of professionalism, an explanation for why professionalism led to political neutrality, why 
professionalism depended on the civilian control policy, and a clear overview of the external factors 
that led to the development of professionalism. We therefore need to explore the motives that drive 
the military man. I will return to this matter in the next chapter.  
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Conclusion 
Civilian control is one of the two general problems in elite civil-military relations. The state has to be 
accountable to civil society and, thus, it has to control the actions of the military. However, as in all 
bureaucracies, the information asymmetry between soldiers and civilians allows the military some 
discretion, which it can used to pursue its own policy goals. The need for secrecy in national security 
affairs exacerbates this condition. Furthermore, the military also has some additional leverage vis-à-
vis the government, because it has the opportunity to counter-punish the civilian leadership. Two 
sets of social mechanisms secure civilian control. External control mechanisms are institutions that 
allow the civilians to monitor the military and punish erratic behavior. Internal mechanisms, by 
contrast, aim to shape the military’s preferences in a way that makes it avoid erratic behavior. 
Internal control is essentially established by creating norms that makes the military politically 
neutral.  
Neither of these mechanisms is sufficient for creating civilian control. External control alone 
cannot make the military loyal. The dominant model of internal control does not allow us to reach 
the same conclusion for internalism. This, however, is not because internal control is a panacea. 
Instead, the theories of internal control are too unsophisticated to allow us to analyze internalism 
systematically. I will explore internalism more thoroughly in chapter 7.   
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- 7 - 
Military values and political neutrality 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 outline civilian control – one of the fundamental topics of elite civil-military 
relations. In chapter 6, I showed that the available theories are based upon either external or 
internal mechanisms. My overall argument is that neither of these models is a panacea and that 
civilian control is typically established through a combination of external and internal mechanisms. 
In chapter 6, I showed that externalism could not explain civilian control in and of itself. I could not 
demonstrate the same thing for internalism, because the theories in this field lack the theoretical 
sophistication necessary to make such a claim. Samuel Huntington’s theory from The Soldier and the 
State is the best internalist theory available. However, I showed that his model lacks a coherent 
causal story that explains how different factors create internal norms of loyalty within the military. 
Theoretical frameworks are meant to provide an overview of the causal processes that influence a 
specific phenomenon. They need not specify which of these causal links is the most important one, 
but they must provide a summary of the potential causal chains. The lack of a coherent causal story 
is therefore a significant weakness in Huntington’s framework.  
I explore the factors causing political neutrality within military culture in this chapter. To 
what extent, I ask, is the development of norms of political neutrality within military culture caused 
by professionalism and the government’s civilian control policy? In essence, I make two arguments. 
Firstly, that professionalism does not singlehandedly cause political neutrality. To be sure, 
professionalism is an important factor, and the arrival of professional institutions shaped the norms 
of political neutrality within military culture. However, it is only one of several factors in this causal 
chain. Secondly, I show that although an objective control policy may facilitate the development of 
political neutrality within the armed forces, it cannot fully eradicate the patrimonialism that erodes 
civilian control. Consequently, internal factors cannot ensure civilian control, but must be 
supplemented by external control mechanisms.  
The argument progresses through three stages. I explain the notion of political neutrality in 
the first section. The second section contains a historical overview of the development of the 
modern military. Based on the insights from the first two sections, the final section looks at the 
motivation systems that make the military man serve and fight. It focuses particularly on the role of 
professionalism and the government’s civilian control policy within this causal chain.  
 
Neutrality 
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The core of internalism is the claim that the armed forces can be controlled by developing a culture 
of political neutrality within its ranks. The first step is to unpack the concept of neutrality and the 
motivation that drives people to stay neutral. Political neutrality is the practice of refraining from 
taking a stance in a political dispute. It involves abnegating one’s right to express one’s opinion 
about a matter. As Max Weber once pointed out, we must understand a person’s actions from the 
motives that drive him.457 People are motivated to stay neutral, when neutrality serves a good that 
exceeds the good that would come out of winning the argument. For instance, Sweden remained 
neutral for almost two centuries, because doing so diminished the chance of Swedish involvement in 
a destructive great power war. Leaders in Stockholm was opposed to Nazism and Communism in 
principle, but valued the diminished risk of destruction on Swedish soil over the positive contribution 
that Sweden might have achieved in the fight against these ideologies. Neutrality was not an end in 
itself, but rather a mean to achieve the end of preserving Sweden as an independent democratic 
state.  
 Similarly, a bureaucrat’s neutrality is an expression of his ideological appreciation of the 
state. A bureaucrat is neutral, not because he values neutrality per se, but because he appreciates 
the benefits of having a neutral state administration. He becomes neutral because neutrality has a 
positive effect for himself personally, and for the groups he cares about. Neutrality allows the state 
to develop more efficient administrative processes and to garner legitimacy from the population. 
Being neutral is thus a way of strengthening the state. Political neutrality is a transposed 
appreciation of the state, and of the democratic process by which it is governed. 
 The soldier becomes politically neutral when he appreciates that the democratic state – and 
not a specific political party - provides protection and services for him and his groups of 
identification. However, it is important to stress that allegiance to the state alone is not enough. The 
officer must also appreciate and respect the democratic process by which civilian leaders gain 
authority. As Samuel Finer has highlighted, appreciation of the state alone can lead to illegitimate 
disobedience.458 If the soldier appreciates the state, yet believes that only one particular group can 
protect the state, he might become motivated to intervene in politics.  
The soldier has few reasons to respect civilian supremacy if he is driven only by an 
appreciation for the state. Here, we have to add an additional distinction between the appreciation 
of the state, and the appreciation of the democratic process. The military man becomes politically 
neutral, when he believes that it is the democratic process that secures services and protection. If he 
recognizes that a neutral process that allows different factions to compete peacefully creates more 
wealth and thus more services and protection, the soldier will adopt this neutral attitude. Genuine 
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political neutrality arises from an appreciation of the democratic process, rather than the loyalty to 
any specific faction within society.459 
The military can only exist because individual soldiers and officers decide to serve and, if 
they find themselves on the battlefield, fight bravely.460 The military system therefore depends on 
being generally in sync with the values and experiences of the individuals who serve and fight. The 
military has to integrate the individual wills of the soldiers into a consistent pattern that corresponds 
with its institutionally required strategies. War involves sacrifices. In many instances, it is indeed 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. It only occurs because the individual soldiers and officers see 
this endeavor as meaningful, and the military as a legitimate institution. 
 As we saw in chapter 4, when sociologists explore individual motivation, they generally 
distinguish between the orientation to the individual’s own interests (self-orientation) and 
orientation to the interests of others (collectivity-orientation). The military uses three techniques to 
motivate its personnel. Firstly, it may simply offer rewards that satisfy the person’s individual 
interests. Material rewards - such as wages or the opportunity to plunder - have always been a key 
motivational tool. Etymologically, the English word “soldier” comes from the French “soudier” - a 
term derived from the Latin name of a specific Roman coin (“solidus”) - which means one who serves 
in the army for pay.461 Furthermore, war can also be individually satisfying in of itself. Some scholars 
have highlighted how war can be a life-affirming activity, and how some soldiers use warfare to 
prove their own worth to themselves. Works like Ernest Jünger’s Storm of Steel convey the 
satisfaction that these warriors experience during war.462 People like Jack Churchill - a decorated 
Second World War commando, whose fondness of pre-modern tools of war led him to charge 
German positions armed with a claymore and a longbow – seems to have relished the excitement of 
war.463 However, this is true only of a small group of men. For most soldiers, material rewards are 
the most important individualistic motivation tool.  
It is difficult to have a military that is driven purely by material rewards, because material 
enjoyment requires life, but the cost of military service may be death. Why would anyone “march up 
to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish” (to borrow a 
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phrase from John Locke) if he was only motivated by a desire to acquire possessions?464 As Hegel 
once noted, pure materialistic individualism comes with a  
 
“disinclination for military service, because this service is the opposite of the universal 
wish for quiet and uniform enjoyment. It brings with it hardships and even death, the 
loss of the chance to enjoy anything. (…)Therefore, to (…) [expose oneself] to the danger 
of death would have been to do something ridiculous, since the means, death, would 
have forthwith annulled the end, property and enjoyment.”465 
 
However, Michael Walzer shows that purely materialist motivation carries a significant weight in 
explaining the soldier’s decision to serve and fight. A rational individual may want to increase his risk 
of dying if the compensation - or what economists would call the “risk premium” - is large enough. 
Death is a risk in many activities. A rational person therefore takes the risk of dying involved into 
account, when he calculates the compensation he needs in order to perform an activity. However, in 
spite of this, pure hedonists rarely make good soldiers. Faced with actual danger, they are likely to 
jump ship to increase their pleasure elsewhere.466 Militaries that primarily use individualistic tools 
for integration therefore face significant principal-agent problems when they engage in battle.  
Secondly, the military can also use what military sociologists call “primary group 
identification” within its own ranks. Soldiers can be driven by an orientation towards a specific 
collective within the military: his comrades in arms. In a seminal article, Edward Shils and Morris 
Janowitz argued that Wehrmacht units were held together by the individual solder’s affection 
towards his comrades in arms.467 In their words, “as long as [the German soldier] felt himself to be a 
member of his primary group and therefore bound by the expectations and demands of its 
members, his soldierly achievement was likely to be good.”468 Primary group identification requires 
selective recruitment or an extensive socializing effort by the military’s institutions. To use an 
esoteric example, in Ancient Greece, primary group identification was developed in the Theban army 
by recruiting homosexual lovers to fight side by side.469 By contrast, in modern militaries, these 
bonds are created between men who are strangers when they enter the force. Through military 
training, and the experience of warfare, bonds of affection and friendship are created within the 
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unit, which then become the soldier’s primary group. Primary group identification does not 
necessarily lead to military integration. If soldiers are driven purely by their affection towards their 
primary group, they may only fight for the good of that group. This would lead to a principal-agent 
problem, where units pursue other goals – for instance, their own survival – rather than those 
required by the military.470 
Thirdly, the military may claim to represent extra-military collectivities, such as family, 
society, or humankind.471 By fending off an enemy invasion, the soldier may be protecting his family, 
or local groups, indirectly. Similarly, a wish to protect more abstract communities plays a significant 
role in motivating soldiers, even under strenuous and inhuman conditions. For instance, recent 
scholarship has shown that many soldiers in the First World War continued to fight for abstract 
ideals – the nation, democracy, religion, or humankind – even after years of abhorrent experiences 
in the trenches.472 
Grasping the relationship between the soldier and his primary groups is thus the first step 
towards understanding their political neutrality. The soldier is integrated into the armed forces 
through a combination of a concern for himself, and for various groups, for whom he is willing to 
work, fight and, in many instances, die. There are essentially three such groups. Firstly, the military 
man serves and fights for his comrades in arms, with whom he forms a bond within the ranks, 
through their shared experience of the toils of training and fighting. Secondly, he is driven by a 
concern for local groups, such as his family, friends, and local community. Finally, he is driven by a 
concern for broad and abstract groups that are outside his immediate sphere of experience, such as 
his nation or humanity in general. It is in these three types of concerns that we must find the 
soldier’s appreciation of the democratic state.  
 Parochialism – the overriding concern with narrow personal interests - is detrimental to 
political neutrality. If a soldier looks out for other groups before he looks out for the interests of the 
democratic state, the chances of him acting in a way that undermines the principle of civilian control 
will increase. However, in most advanced democracies these tendencies are kept in check by the fact 
that soldiers are not asked to make the hard choice between their faction, the military bureaucracy 
and the state. In most modern societies, the state takes care of the military by providing it with 
generous pay and good conditions. Similarly, it secures most, if not all, its citizens and provides 
extensive benefits and services for them. The military man does not have to choose between his 
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state and his faction. By serving the state, he is also serving himself, his community, and the military 
bureaucracy.473 
 To sum up, political neutrality is but transposed appreciation of the democratic state. The 
state develops this appreciation by bettering the conditions for the soldier and his primary 
communities. In that sense, the line between political neutrality and parochialism is very fine. 
  
The road to the modern military 
Having outlined the military officer’s main interests, we can now see how these interests have been 
used to make the military loyal to the state over the course of recent history. A quick look at late- 
and post-Medieval military history reveals three military ideal-types: the mercenary, aristocratic, and 
popular military.474  
 
1. During the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, most Western militaries were 
made up of mercenary forces. For instance, wars amongst the Italian Renaissance city-states were 
mainly fought between rival bands of condottieri (literally “contractors”). Obviously, the mercenary 
soldier was driven mainly by personal rewards. During the military revolution, mercenary forces 
became increasingly advanced as they adopted the principles of drill and complex organization. This 
changed the integration principle of the army. As William McNeill has pointed out, repetitive drilling 
resulted in stronger social bonds within the mercenary military.475 In his words,  
 
“when a group of men move their arms and legs in unison for prolonged periods of time, 
a primitive and very powerful social bond wells up among them. … Drill, dull and 
repetitious though it may seem, readily welded a miscellaneous collection of men, 
recruited often from the dregs of civil society, into a coherent community, obedient to 
orders even in extreme situations when life and limb were in obvious and immediate 
jeopardy. … Military units became a specialized sort of community, within which new 
standardized face-to-face relationships provided a passable substitute for the customary 
patterns of traditional social groupings[.]”476 
 
Drilling had a strong psychological effect that created a bond of affection between soldiers. The 
mercenary soldier fought for his own livelihood, but also for the comrades that he made within the 
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ranks. An important side-effect of professionalization was primary group identification within the 
force. The military continued to rely largely on mercenary units well into the 17th century.477 In 1632, 
the armies of Gustavus Adolphus – known by the epithet “the father of modern war” – consisted of 
more than 90 % foreign mercenaries.478 These units were increasingly held together by primary 
group identification rather than by individualistic motivation. Here we see the curious relationship 
between professionalization and military integration for the first time: professionalism creates 
primary group identification within the corps.  
Charles Tilly highlights two overarching problems that eventually led to the mercenary 
military’s demise. First, mercenaries’ loyalty to the state was fickle, as it was driven only by 
monetary concerns. This led to several principal-agent problems. Mercenaries would commonly try 
to fulfill their contracts using as few resources as possible. They could also decide to suddenly 
terminate their contract if they saw other more profitable business opportunities, either through 
rebellion or shifting allegiances. For instance, in The Prince, Machiavelli complained that  
 
“Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous (…). [T]hey have no affection for 
you or any other reason to induce them to fight for you, except for a trifling wage, which 
is not sufficient to make them want to risk their lives for you. They are very glad to be in 
your service as long as you do not wage war, but in time of war they either flee or 
desert. (…) [T]he present ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than the reliance 
over so many years on mercenary armies.”479 
 
A large mercenary army could also decide to depose the government and take over the 
state. Many mercenaries began to plunder their host nation, if they did not receive their pay or if the 
state terminated their contract at the end of a conflict. Second, the mercenary system was a 
relatively costly way of recruiting troops, and placed a substantial fiscal burden on the state. This 
burden was exacerbated when the cost of war rose as a consequence of the military revolution and 
when the rise of other industries made manpower relatively expensive.480 
  
2. Through a complex process, which began in the late Middle Ages, the state slowly became 
more advanced and acquired more sophisticated tools for motivating its soldiers. By the 18th 
century, the state had become able to shift the balance away from mercenaries towards local groups 
motivated by more idealist reasons for fighting. The state needed to replace the self-sufficiency of 
the mercenary with a corps to whom dedication to a collective end was perceived as higher than 
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personal gain. The aristocratic military was defined by an officer corps consisting mainly of nobles, 
characterized by a strong idealistic belief system, and swathes of regular troops recruited from the 
lower classes for pay. By developing an officer corps driven by idealist motivations, the early-modern 
state could diminish the two evils that had afflicted the mercenary military. Firstly, it was more likely 
that an idealist military man could be made loyal to the state. Secondly, a soldier driven by abstract 
goals would be cheaper, compared to a mercenary who demanded a risk premium that outweighed 
the dangers of war.  
Most states had had standing armies for centuries. When the Hundred Years’ War ended in 
1453, European states found their territories plagued by their disbanded armies. Soldiers who had 
never known any other occupation than violence and war would roam the countryside in search for 
plunder. The states followed the advice given by the merchant Jacques Coeur to Charles VII of 
France: the king should hire a small nucleus of soldiers to force the disorganized masses into civilian 
life.481 This strong corps soon became a standing force that the king could rely on. As Alfred Vagts 
notes, “[t]he first standing army was thus, paradoxically, the outcome of the idea that armies should 
not be permanent.”482 The nobility soon came to lead the standing army, which thus formed the 
core of what became the aristocratic military.483 
 Perhaps Frederick the Great’s dynastic Prussian state represents the most advanced attempt 
at developing an aristocratic military.484 The Prussian officer corps consisted almost solely of nobles - 
when Frederick died in 1786, only six of 732 senior officers were commoners.485 This reliance on just 
one societal segment permeated the entire society. It consisted of three estates that each had a 
unique function to fulfill to uphold the state. Just as a body consists of distinctive organs, each 
necessary for the body’s survival, so the three estates were kept separate from one another: the 
nobility administered the agriculture system, and held a near-monopoly on the bureaucracy and the 
officer corps; the bourgeoisie generated national income by dedicating itself to commerce, trade, 
and education; and the peasantry farmed the land and filled up the lower echelons of the military. 
None could exist without the other. Each individual acquired his status within this system from birth 
rather than on merit. The nobility was not allowed to engage in trade, while the bourgeoisie, in most 
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cases, was prevented from acquiring noble lands and entering the officer corps. 486 The nobility 
functioned as a middle layer between the king and his subjects, and were responsible for carrying 
out his orders. As Charles Tilly has argued, the king ruled indirectly through the nobility.487 
The key difference between the mercenary and aristocratic military system was that the 
officers in the latter were partly driven by honor and dedication to the state. In Frederician society, 
the king focused on serving the interests of the nobility class, while generally claiming to serve the 
interests of the population at large. If we focus on the latter part first, it was clear that this was a 
divergence from the dynastic principles that had characterized feudal monarchies. Unlike the feudal 
king, who was appointed by God and held the state as his personal property, Frederick had a social 
contract with his subjects, through which he owed his subjects to pursue the best possible policies 
for the state, just like they owed him their allegiance. The Prussian state, though not in any way a 
modern democracy, was based on a proto-popular principle of legitimacy, where the state, at least 
in principle, represented the good of the people.488 
The nobility had a strong sense of honor that kept individual officers from stepping outside 
the boundaries of appropriate behavior. Honor is a feeling of self-respect, supported by the external 
recognition of one’s peers.489 The Prussian officer was driven by a need for recognition by the 
aristocracy at large. Curiously, the culture among the officers defined that service to the state was of 
primary importance for honor. Loyalty to the state became a necessary condition of being member 
of the nobility. The aristocratic officer was loyal to the state not because it was good in of itself, but 
because it was seen as a crucial part of being an aristocrat. The nobleman’s honor code resembled 
primary group identification. The officer identified with his peers because they all were members of 
the same social group. Primary group identification was not created by the military’s institutions. It 
was, rather, formed among noblemen in society and imported into the military through selective 
recruitment.490 The Frederician state gave special privileges to the nobility. During Frederick’s reign, 
the aristocracy had several privileges, including the abovementioned near-monopoly on military 
positions and noble lands, tax breaks, and direct financial support from the state. Furthermore, the 
state refrained from acquiring noble estates.491 These policies ensured that the officer had a clear 
class interest in the continuation of the status quo. Even officers who were motivated by strictly 
personal motives had an interest in preserving this state of affairs. 
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However, honor was not a completely stable principle for creating loyalty to the state. The 
requirements of honor could lead to disobedience. During the Seven Years War against Austria, for 
instance, Prussian Colonel J. F. A. von der Marwitz was ordered to sack a hunting lodge as revenge 
for a similar crime perpetrated by Prussia’s enemies. Von der Marwitz, touting the honor of his 
corps, refused, claiming the task unsuitable “for the commandant of His Majesty’s Gendarms”.492 His 
career was halted, but he stood his ground. His famous epitaph - “He chose disgrace when 
obedience brought no honor” – was chiseled as a sign of esteem.493 For von der Marwitz, obeying 
the King would lead to disgrace in the eyes of the nobility. When forced to choose between his 
loyalties, his bond to the aristocracy outweighed his allegiance to the state.  
 
3. The aristocratic military met its demise with the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. On 
August 23rd 1793, pressured by internal uprisings, and war with the European great powers, the 
French National Assembly extended the national levy, which had been introduced just months 
before. The levée en masse not only installed general conscription for all men aged 18-25, but called 
upon contributions from all citizens:  
 
“Young men will go to fight, husbands will forge weapons and manage the transport 
services; wives and daughters will make tents and uniforms and will serve in the 
hospitals; old men taking their stand in public places will inflame the bravery of our 
soldiers and preach hatefulness of kings, the unity of the Republic.”494 
 
The army more than trebled in size, compared to pre-levy numbers, to roughly 750,000 serviceable 
men at arms.495 In part spurred on by proto-nationalism and concern for the Revolution, the 
haphazardly trained forces rebuffed France’s enemies during 1793 and -94, proving that a significant 
change had occurred in military organization.496 The bourgeoisie, previously excluded from the 
military, suddenly flooded in. In 1804, just three of the 18 marshals in the French army were former 
nobles. 497  This transformation was one of the main explanations for Napoleon’s successful 
                                                          
492
 Carsten (1989), pp. 38-39. Muth, Jörg (2011): Command Culture. Officer Education in the US Army and the 
German Armed Forces 1901-1940 and the Consequences for World War II, Denton: University of North Texas 
Press, p. 170.  
493
 Muth (2011), p. 170.  
494
 Best, Geoffrey (1982): War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870, Bungay: Fontana, p. 87.  
495
 Best (1982), pp. 85 & 87; Strachan, Hew (1983): European Armies and the Conduct of War, London: Unwin 
Hyman, p. 39. 
496
 Howard (1976), pp. 80-81. The civilian effort, driven by the revolutionary spirit, increased the strength of 
the army, for instance by almost doubling the pieces of cutting-edge field artillery (McNeill (1982), p. 194n23).  
497
 Mann (1993), p. 426. 
155 
 
campaigns across the European continent.498 The ability to muster massive forces under arms gave 
the citizen republic a competitive advantage over the dynastic states of the Ancient Regime. 
The events of 1789 marked the birth of the modern, liberal-democratic nation-state – the 
political unit which we still live in today. The military that slowly took form during the levée en masse 
had the same basic features as today’s military. The nobility gradually became redundant as the 
middlemen between the state and the general public. The indirect rule of the previous era was 
replaced by direct rule.499 The military stopped being an organization dedicated to preserve the 
interests of a single class – the aristocracy – and slowly became a tool embedded in the larger ideals 
of national society. The social contract placed more burdens on both citizenry and the state. More 
loyalty, taxes and duties were now required from the citizenry. In exchange, the state increased their 
political, and eventually social, rights.  
The notion of universal rights for all citizens, secured by the state, now became society’s 
defining principle.500 The armed forces, however, did not become a democratic institution. Instead, it 
became a meritocratic organization, where position was determined by skill rather than birth.501 This 
process did not happen overnight. Around 90 percent of the German generals were drawn from the 
nobility until the 1890s. Noblemen made up more than half of the German officer corps at the eve of 
the First World War.502  However, the general trend turned towards militaries that allowed 
commoners to become members of the officer corps.  
In many ways, the popular military resembled its aristocratic predecessor. The system was 
held together by a combination of appeals to the individual’s personal incentives, and his orientation 
to various collectives. The essential difference was that new social classes were drawn into the 
military, and the mechanisms used to attract and cajole prospective military men were adjusted 
accordingly.503 The military still used appeals to the officer’s collective orientation to ensure his 
loyalty. Each officer could, of course, be oriented towards many different groups. As we saw in 
chapter 4, by the early 19th century, the nation was becoming a steadily more important point of 
identification. Furthermore, the state extended its claim to other groups besides the nation. If the 
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individual was oriented to other groups – for instance his family, or civil society – the state also 
claimed to look after their interests via the universal principles of citizenship. Because every person 
was a citizen, and therefore the responsibility of the state, there was no group that the state did not 
protect. To serve the state was to serve for one’s family, friends and community at large.  
Besides bonds between the officer and societal groups, the state could create bonds of 
affection within the military. As had been the case in previous militaries, the experience of drilling, 
training, and fighting together forged a bond of comradeship between soldiers. Belonging to a band 
of brothers was a salient part of the military experience. As several studies have shown, these bonds 
were then instrumental for the state when units engaged in combat. Even when disaffected by the 
greater cause of the war, soldiers would fight for their comrades in arms.504  
One important difference between the aristocratic and the popular military was that these 
bonds were largely forged within the military. Whereas the aristocratic military had recruited 
officers from one specific class who felt a strong attachment to that class, the popular military 
gathered its officers from the population at large and installed a sense of military community in 
them afterwards.505 The key factor that allowed the military to forge these bonds was the increased 
importance of military institutions. As described above, war was becoming an increasingly scientific 
matter, and dedicating oneself to military education at the academy and staff college became an 
indispensable part of every officer’s career. These institutions presented a unique setting for forging 
bonds between military men.506 
Stronger military institutions also allowed the state to develop a unique military culture that 
accentuated the importance of loyalty. The military academy was the perfect venue for socializing 
the officer into this culture.507 Disobedience was seen as unprofessional. To be sure, this professional 
ideal was a social construction that covered the aforementioned tensions. The professionalization of 
warfare had forced the officer into the professional institutions, which were now instrumental in 
creating a feeling of loyalty within him. In that sense, loyalty was an instrumentally important side-
effect of professionalization. 
To sum up, the loyalty of the soldier was increasingly influenced by large-scale social 
currents and specific changes within the military. Within the military, military institutions created a 
professional military culture and bonds between bands of brothers, which both ensured 
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comradeship and loyalty. Outside of the military, loyalty was created as the state became the 
legitimate protector of the communities that the individual was oriented towards. Professionalism 
was important because the professional institutions enabled the military to forge intra-military 
bonds, and to socialize its officers in a military culture of loyalty.  
 
The military motivation system  
The outline of the history of the modern military showed that professionalism was only one of the 
factors shaping the soldier’s loyalty to the state. However, we still need to reach a more detailed 
understanding of the motives that drive the modern soldier. Only by mapping these motives can we 
see how professionalism and the government’s civilian control policy create political neutrality 
within military culture. This is the purpose of this final section. It takes the perspective of the soldier 
and tracks the main factors that cause political neutrality to be a meaningful attitude to the state. To 
be sure, the purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical framework of political neutrality 
within the ranks. The section only sketches the most important causal links that determine whether 
or not the military man is politically neutral. Determining which of the causal links is the most 
important one would be tantamount to developing a theory of political neutrality – a task that is 
well-beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, the section unpacks the rather complex causal 
chain that generates the military man’s loyalties  - a task that may be somewhat tedious at times. 
But describing this dry causal chain is an absolute necessity if we are to understand the importance 
and causes of political neutrality.  
In the following description, the causal chain is broken up into three manageable 
components. The first subsection describes the professional-bureaucratic nexus and how it causes 
political neutrality. The second subsection looks at how other factors – the civilian government’s 
control policy and the constitutional set-up of the state – facilitates, or hampers, the professional-
bureaucratic nexus. The final subsection explores how military trust – an alternative chain of 
causality – also shapes the military man’s loyalties. The causal chain is illustrated in figure 7.1., which 
can be found in the end of this section. Each step of the causal chain is assigned a letter, allowing the 
reader to follow the description of the causal map in the figure.  
 
The professional-bureaucratic nexus 
As was evident from the historical outline, professionalization and bureaucratization both helped to 
shape the military man’s loyalties. Professionalization and bureaucratization did not appear 
simultaneously, but once the conditions for both were in place a synergy effect was created that 
permitted the creation of a military culture that values political neutrality. The professional-
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bureaucratic nexus is the co-development of bureaucratic organization based on meritocracy and 
the professionalization of the officer corps (A). It covers three separate processes – 
bureaucratization, professionalization, and meritocratization – that support one another and 
facilitates political neutrality within military culture.508  
Bureaucratization is the spread of hierarchical organizations that use division of labor 
between skilled experts to generate administrative effectiveness. As some sociologists have 
highlighted, the military was indeed the first bureaucracy.509 Max Weber argued that bureaucratic 
principles of organization were used by pre-modern states, including ancient China and Egypt.510 Yet 
it was only in the modern nation-state that a single bureaucracy gained a monopoly on 
administrative power. In prior eras, the administrative power had been shared with local nobles, 
who competed with the state for power. This had ensured that command in battle was as much a 
tricky game of coalition management as it was about military efficiency.511 At the battle of Bosworth 
Field in 1485, for instance, the Earl of Northumberland held back his troops when Richard III signaled 
for his assistance. This effectively isolated the king from a third of his force, driving him to make a 
bold attack on his opponent’s center. He lay slain on the ground within hours. Historians discuss 
whether Northumberland’s maneuver may have been a political ruse, designed to give the earl an 
advantageous position in post-Yorkist society.512 The important insight for our purpose is that such 
treachery was not only possible, it was commonplace. In the modern era, by contrast, the nation-
state has a full monopoly of power without being dependent on the aristocracy. A commander 
would never be able to play politics on the battlefield, let alone get away with it. The state recruits 
its men directly, and their allegiance is to the government, not a regional liege. This means that the 
public administration was controlled by only one principal that could serve as a supervisor, and 
judge each member of the administration based on his worth. 
The development of bureaucratic organization was thus driven by large-scale societal 
transformations – the competition between states through warfare, the increased strength of the 
state, and the development of a national political culture – which were highlighted in previous 
chapters. It also depended on the development of a professional officer corps. A professional is a 
person who uses his expertise, which he has learned through specialized training, to accomplish a 
job for pay. Professionalism is the spread of professionals within a given sector. Military 
professionalism is the spread of officers, who are experts in military science through specialized 
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training at military academies and staff colleges, throughout the armed forces. Formal and 
hierarchical bureaucracies needed professional personnel who are capable of managing such 
organizations. The military bureaucracy requires professional personnel who possess an expertise 
that allows them to judge the specifics of various situations and to think out of the box when faced 
with unexpected situations. Professionalism and bureaucratic organization thus developed hand-in-
hand. As these professional bureaucracies showed their worth on the battlefield, the demand for 
further bureaucratization and professionalization grew. Military academies sprang up and became 
essential parts of the officer’s career trajectory.513 
Like bureaucratization, professionalism depended on grand-scale factors. As we saw in 
chapter 5, military expertise could only be professionalized when war required scientific skills. The 
transformation of the character of war – a grand-scale trend related to the development of strong 
nation-states and national consciousness – therefore caused professionalism.514 Professionalism also 
required strong bureaucracies to develop. If the military had not been a bureaucracy, there would 
have been a lesser need for organizational training and fewer resources for organizing military 
academies.  
Meritocracy is an organizational promotion principle that rewards individuals for their 
abilities and achievements. Before the development of the modern nation-state, the career soldier 
owed his fortune not only to his skills, but also to his association with a distinct political faction. 
Promotion depended on political contacts and/or wealth. The soldier did not depend on his abilities, 
but rather on whatever political faction held power at the time. The purchase and patronage system 
was common in most European militaries before the French Revolution. For example, the purchase 
of military offices was standard practice – and even governmentally regulated through a decree by 
George III - in Britain until the system was abolished in 1871. In 1856, for instance, the rank of 
lieutenant-colonel – the highest position attainable through purchase – could be procured for the 
lavish sum of £7,000.515 
In the 19th century, purchase and patronage were replaced by a system based on merit. The 
state was able to summon the loyalty of the officer corps by ensuring that promotion was based on 
fairly unquestionable metrics, rather than political contacts. As long as the soldier owed his career to 
his contacts with political parties, he could never be trusted to be neutral in political affairs. By 
developing a military meritocracy, the state ensured that the individual officer did not need to 
develop political contacts to be promoted. The personal reward system came to depend on non-
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political metrics. Skill had to be measurable – otherwise it would be impossible to facilitate a system 
of promotion around it.516 
Bureaucracy, meritocracy, and professionalism were mutually constitutive. Max Weber 
stressed that bureaucracies reached their final telos when they adopted a meritocratic incentive 
structure that rewards actions, based on their merit rather than on political contacts.517 In simple 
terms, working for merit generally makes bureaucratic organizations more efficient, as the carrot of 
promotion spurs the bureaucrat to maximize his output. Conversely, meritocracy could only come 
into being because all the other features of the bureaucratic organization were in place. Without 
formalized, hierarchical organizational structures, a system based on merit would hardly have been 
possible. The synergy effect between meritocracy and bureaucracy strengthened each dynamic.518 
Secondly, meritocracy required a measurable metric for merit, on which promotions could 
be assessed (B). It is not possible to establish a meritocracy if one cannot measure the skills of a 
bureaucrat in a reasonably standardized way. If merit becomes too dependent on immeasurable or 
intangible metrics, then promotion once again becomes entangled in politics, as it becomes 
impossible to separate personal and political favors from un-biased evaluations. As we saw in 
chapter 5, the military skill is essentially the use of the art and science of warfare. The officer needs a 
sphere of activities, where he can be evaluated by the outcomes of his judgment. If he cannot be 
assessed, using relatively standardized metrics, he will be forced to engage in bureaucratic 
politicking to gain promotion. 
In chapter 5, we also saw that military expertise is never perfect. The military skill is both an 
art and a science, which means that skill necessarily differs from person to person. This places a limit 
on the certainty of the meritocracy. Although the military expertise is largely shared by almost all 
soldiers, it can never be totally universal. Merit is never entirely unquestionable, and the use of 
political contacts can never be eradicated from the promotion process. Though some organizations 
are more meritocratic than others, a military can never become fully meritocratic.  
 The professional-bureaucratic nexus creates two of the three types of military loyalty that 
was (C). Firstly, the meritocratic system produces personal rewards for the military man by paying 
him a wage. To state the seemingly obvious, the military man is loyal to the state because it pays 
him wages, which he can use to sustain himself and to support the communities that matter to him. 
Secondly, the institutions of the modern armed forces create communities within the military. 
Drilling and training create bonds between people who would otherwise be strangers. Soldiers forge 
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friendship with their fellow soldiers when they work together to achieve a purpose. J. Glenn Gray - 
the soldier-philosopher who was inducted into the Army the same day as he received his Columbia 
diploma – describes military comradeship as an experience of becoming part of a community that 
gives individual life meaning.519 Furthermore, military institutions also allowed the state and the 
military to socialize their members. The state could shape military culture, as military life became 
centered around bureaucratic practices and training in the military academy.520 Bureaucracies, 
unlike other forms of organization, can influence the cultural values of the individual. The military 
academy – one of the primary venues for socialization - depended on the development of 
bureaucratic structures of organization. Large-scale socialization only became possible when 
bureaucratic organization had become commonplace.521 
The factors that cause political neutrality, however, also facilitate the development of 
parochialism within the armed forces (D). Firstly, it is an unanticipated consequence of the 
meritocratic system. When the system rewards individual soldiers for their merit in the field, it also 
creates an incentive to ensure that the bureaucratic system has enough resources to create 
additional paths of promotion. An officer’s career not only depends on his performances in the field 
– it also depends on the armed forces’ resource situation. If the military is starved for resources, it 
may cut down on its number of colonels, thus decreasing the likelihood that such a position opens 
up for majors. The officer will therefore have an incentive to ensure that the military has enough 
resources. He will no longer necessarily be politically neutral, though he might stay out of the 
struggle between political parties. Instead, he will work for the interests of the military bureaucracy.  
 Secondly, intra-military bonds – the comradeship that develops between men in the ranks– 
may work against political neutrality because it binds men to one another, rather than to the state. 
The military man also cares about his own security and the safety of his comrades in arms. The 
military is held together by forming bonds between soldiers, yet these ties also mean that the 
military man has an interest in keeping the armed forces out of harm’s way. The military man is 
reluctant to fight, because he knows that fighting may involve the killing or maiming of him, and his 
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military comrades. He simply makes a trade-off between the purpose of the mission and the 
personal losses that he might experience. All soldiers need to feel that their mission has a purpose. 
Without a purpose, war becomes a senseless slaughter - the meaningless loss of comrades without a 
gain in security for society.  
 
Civilian control policy and the professional-bureaucratic nexus 
The professional-bureaucratic nexus largely depends on the existence of an independent military 
expertise, which is largely the result of grand-scale factors, such as the development of the nation-
state, the increased military competition between states, and the increased importance of social 
organization and technology in warfare. However, more easily manipulated factors also affect the 
development of the military expertise. Most importantly, the degree of civilian meddling in military 
policy may erode, or sustain, the objectivity of this expertise (E).  
 Of the three direct policy options facing governments, objective control is most conducive to 
the creation of military expertise. This policy allows military autonomy over tactical and operational 
decisions. Officers thus have a sphere of activities where they can excel without political 
involvement. It becomes possible to distinguish the military expertise from political nous.  
Conversely, subjective control, a fairly rare policy choice in advanced democracies to be 
sure, erodes the meritocratic dimension of the professional-bureaucratic nexus. A government 
pursuing a subjective control policy meddles in military appointments to ensure that the officer 
corps shares the government’s values. Political or factional loyalties, rather than merit, determine an 
officer’s chances of promotion. Meritocracy, one of the constitutive institutions of the professional-
bureaucratic nexus, is thus removed. The purpose of subjective control is to control the military by 
making it loyal to a specific political faction. It is the opposite of political neutrality.  
Finally, assertive control, one of the typical control policies in advanced democracies, also 
diminishes political neutrality. This policy involves civilian meddling in tactical and operational 
decisions, but leaves the military organization, as such, alone. Though the general meritocratic 
principle is largely preserved, it is somewhat diminished by civilian meddling in military expertise. 
There cannot be a purely military expertise, if civilian leaders constantly overrule the military and 
problematize the details of military processes. If that happens, political maneuverability once again 
eclipses military expertise as the most important promotion route. He will be rewarded not for his 
sound advice or military judgment, but for his politicking skills. 
The government’s choice of civilian control policy depends on the nature of the conflict in 
question, and the strategic decisions of the civilian leadership (F and G). As we shall see in chapter 8, 
civilian interference in tactical and operational details may make the military more efficient in some 
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circumstances. Consequently, the civilian leadership cannot always delegate authority over tactical 
and operational details to the military. If the military leadership has proven unable to understand 
the situation in question, such a policy may threaten the security of the state. In that case, the 
civilian leadership has to retain control over decisions, even though it is detrimental to the 
development of norms of neutrality within the military. These requirements depend on the 
functional imperative – that is, the character and intensity of the conflicts facing the state (G). Some 
conflicts are driven mainly by the rules of diplomacy and require extensive political meddling. As we 
shall see in chapter 8, the Cuban Missile Crisis is an instructive example of this type of conflict.  
Furthermore, the effects of the government’s policies also depend on the external 
institutions used to control the military (H). We already highlighted this point in chapter 6. Civilian 
authority is divided between several actors in most modern democracies. As a government agency, 
the military is typically run by the executive, under the supervision of the legislature. Both the 
executive and legislature owe their positions to the authority bestowed by civil society. Therefore, 
the military has additional obligations to civil society, and to the legislature. Many democratic 
systems contain supervision procedures, such as hearings and commissions. Here, the military is 
confronted with a split authority. When the military has several principals, it becomes difficult for it 
to decipher who determines the system of promotions. It risks becoming politicized by being sucked 
into the political struggle between legislature and executive.522 
 
Military trust 
The military man’s decision to remain politically neutral also depends on a causal chain that is largely 
independent of the professional-bureaucratic nexus. The military also becomes politically neutral if it 
can trust the skills, motives, and priorities of the civilian government (I). Trust is the expectation of 
future regular, honest, and cooperative actions of others that affect the trusting actor’s future 
actions.523 It is concerned both with the skills and the motives of the opposite party.524 In other 
words, the officers trust that the civilians have their own interests and the interests of their primary 
communities in mind. They also trust that the civilians can secure those interests effectively. The 
state thus gains the officers’ trust by handling threats and problems effectively (J). The state shores 
up support simply by creating security for the military man’s essential communities. Trust and 
legitimacy are thus closely related.  
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The relationship between military trust and the functional imperative is relatively 
complicated. Firstly, ceteris paribus, the existence of an outside threat makes the military man trust 
the state (K). When one’s significant communities are threatened, one of course turns to the 
institutions that are most likely to handle said threat, in most cases the state. Issues and divisions 
that used to seem important suddenly fade into the background.525 As some scholars have 
highlighted, defining an issue as a security threat is generally an effective rhetorical strategy.526   
Secondly, however, the state risks losing that trust, if its strategies and tactics are not 
militarily effective. Inefficient policies put not only the soldier, but also his comrades in arms and his 
friends, family, and nation, at risk. The military loses trust in the government, if its policies lead to 
unnecessary loss of lives and to a heightened threat to the survival of the state. Effectiveness and 
civilian control are thus intimately intertwined. The threat no longer makes the state more 
trustworthy, if it is unable to handle that threat effectively. All in all, outside threats may be a 
double-edged sword for the state.  
Of course, the military’s trust and the professional-bureaucratic nexus do not exist 
independently of one another. They are each conducive to the other (M). The professional and 
bureaucratic institutions that define the professional-bureaucratic nexus allow the state to socialize 
officers into a military culture that stresses loyalty to the state and the nation. Conversely, a 
government that enjoys the trust of the officer corps faces less resistance and building these 
institutions is therefore for easier.  
Soldiers become politically neutral, when they trust the democratic state (N). Trust is of 
course never easy. There is always a tension between the individual soldier’s loyalty to his family, 
community, nation, and state. If hard-pressed, the soldier may be forced to choose between these 
entities – a choice which may not favor the state. In that sense, the process that leads to political 
neutrality – the creation of communities – may lead to parochialism instead (O). 
For instance, the motives that drove the French military to intervene in domestic politics 
during the Algerian War illustrate the general relationship between trust and political neutrality. 
Algeria was considered to be more than a French colony at the outset of the conflict – it was a part 
of metropolitan France. Algerian insurgents fought for independence against the French state and 
the organizations of the pieds-noirs, the Europeans living in Algeria.527 However, as the conflict 
prolonged and soured, it became clear that keeping Algeria would be too morally and fiscally 
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expensive. The state somehow had to give Algeria its independence and get the pieds-noirs to accept 
their fate.  
The officer corps played a key role in the complex struggle that followed. It was of course 
highly professional.528 The government refrained from affecting the promotional structures of the 
military and the professional-bureaucratic nexus was largely left untouched by the government’s 
policies. The government mostly pursued a policy of objective control, permitting that local theater 
commanders control over tactical and operational (and sometimes even strategic and political) 
details.529 It is remarkable that the officer corps still decided to rise up against its civilian masters. 
This allows us to use this case to tease out the independent importance of trust for the military’s 
motives.  
The legitimacy of the French system of government was relatively low. Its tumultuous 
political history included more than ten constitutional regimes since the Revolution. The officers, 
most of whom had lived through at least the fall of the Third Republic, the shameful Vichy period, 
and the establishment and dysfunctions of the Fourth Republic, could not blindly trust the system of 
government. Contemplating that it could and should be influenced by the military not that far off.530 
The government’s poor results against the insurgents in the early stages of the war meant that its 
legitimacy reached its nadir. 531  
The key question was for whom the officer felt motivated to fight. It was not entirely clear 
who the state was supposed to protect. The officer corps was torn between its loyalty to democracy, 
the government, the state, the French nation, and the pieds-noirs. Many officers were of course 
loyal to the government either out of a genuine devotion to the democratic principles, statist 
nationalism, or, after 1958, out of personal loyalty to de Gaulle. However, other officers saw the 
government’s policies as hurting their primary communities or institutions. They therefore resisted 
these policies with democratically dubious means, even when they were convinced that the 
consequences of failure would be execution. Some saw the Algerian conflict as a battle in a larger 
conflict against the Soviet Union, which could eventually mean the destruction of the French state. 
Others refused to accept the government’s argument that the Algerian population was not part of 
the French nation. Abandoning Algeria would be a blow against the cohesion of France. Finally, some 
were indignated by how the government was willing to abandon the pieds-noirs and were driven by 
a concern for their fate. These motives drove officers to seek the fall of the Fourth Republic and de 
Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 and to several failed coup attempts - the most important of which 
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were the 1960 “week of barricades” and the 1961 “generals’ putsch” – when the new government 
did not live up to their expectations. 532 In that sense, the case illustrates the causal chain explained 
above: an otherwise professional, bureaucratically organized military was driven to interfere in 
politics due to the low legitimacy of the system of government, the incompetence of the 
government, and ambiguities of the constitutive community of the state. The officer corps 
intervened in politics because it could not trust that the government would take of its primary 
communities. 
 
Motivation and political neutrality 
Figure 7.1. gives an overview of the main causal links shaping political neutrality within military 
culture. Here, the coloring of the different boxes reflects the nature of the various factors. The two 
possible outcomes of the causal process – political neutrality or parochialism – are indicated by a 
thick box with white background. Factors that can easily be manipulated by civilian leaders – civilian 
control policy and general strategy and tactics – are marked by a light grey background. Factors that 
are largely shaped by grand-scale factors (but can be influenced by civilian decisions to some extent) 
are marked by a dark grey background.  
The relatively complicated causal map leaves us with some fairly clear predictions for the 
degree of political neutrality within military culture. Firstly, it shows that political neutrality can 
never be complete. The factors that shape political neutrality also cause parochialism. Unlike what 
Huntington predicted, the military will never become completely neutral in politics.  
Secondly, this also shows that professionalism, though a significant factor in shaping military 
culture, is one of several factors in this causal relationship. It only becomes significant when it is 
supported by other factors, such as bureaucratic organization of the military and meritocracy. Other 
factors, notably the military’s trust of the civilians, are also crucial.  
Thirdly, the government’s choice of civilian control policy also influences the degree of 
political neutrality. Generally speaking, civilian meddling in military policy decreases political 
neutrality within military culture. If the government pursues a subjective control policy, the positive 
influence of the professional-bureaucratic nexus is largely destroyed and the officer corps gets an 
incentive to get involved in politics. Even a less intrusive policy, such as assertive control, also affects 
the degree of political neutrality. Assertive control still devalues the military expertise and forces the 
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officers to engage in politicking to ensure that their ideas are followed. Objective control largely 
facilitates political neutrality within the ranks. However, it is important to emphasize that the armed 
forces never become completely neutral, even when an objective control policy is being followed. 
The model shows that political neutrality depends on the strength of an independent military 
expertise and the military effectiveness of the state. None of these factors are necessarily fully 
achieved, even when the government pursues an objective control policy. As we saw in chapter 5, 
the military expertise is not completely given. Debates about military interpretations may politicize 
the officer corps. Furthermore, even officers who do not fear for their promotion may intervene in 
politics, if the state is unable to develop effective strategies and tactics.  
Finally, the functional imperative has a complicated relationship to political neutrality. On 
the one hand, military threats increase the legitimacy of the state. On the other hand, the state may 
experience a significant loss in legitimacy if it is unable to handle these threats effectively. 
Furthermore, some threats may force the government to meddle in operational and tactical details 
and thus make it unable to pursue an objective control policy.  
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Figure 7.1. The main causal links shaping political neutrality 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the role of professionalism and the government’s civilian 
control policy for the development of norms of neutrality within the military. I showed that although 
both of these factors are important, they are only two of several variables that facilitate the 
development of political neutrality. Professionalism supports the development of political neutrality, 
especially when combined with bureaucratic and meritocratic organizational structures. The 
government’s civilian control policy facilitates political neutrality within the armed forces. Generally 
speaking, the degree of political neutrality decreases, the more civilians meddle in tactical and 
operational details. However, the government’s civilian control policy cannot fully guarantee 
political neutrality. Furthermore, military culture will never become completely politically neutral. 
The factors that facilitate political neutrality also create parochialism. Consequently, internal 
mechanisms of control must be supplemented with external mechanisms.  
 The model presented in this chapter diverges from Huntington’s description of military 
identity. The soldier is not necessarily a stoic warrior, born politically neutral and dedicated to 
fighting for the purpose of the state. Instead, though he is largely loyal to the government, state, and 
constitution, he is also driven by other motives that complicate his loyalty. One cannot simply say 
that the civilians decide the mission and that it is the soldier’s obligation to complete the mission. 
The purpose and success of the mission influence the soldier’s perception of the state, and thus the 
likelihood that he will continue to stay politically neutral. Professional officers may act against the 
interests of the government even in highly legitimate and advanced democracies. Consequently, 
civilian control cannot be ensured through internal means only. They must be supplemented by 
external control mechanisms. Civilian control thus depends on a combination of internal and 
external control mechanisms.   
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- 8 - 
Military effectiveness 
 
Civilian control – which was described in chapter 6 and 7 - is only one half of the elite civil-military 
relations package. I explore military effectiveness – the other core topic of elite civil-military 
relations – in this chapter. I analyze how elite civil-military processes influence the military 
effectiveness of the state. I argue that military effectiveness is generated by striking the right 
balance between civilian control on the one hand and a division of labor between soldiers and 
civilians on the other. Soldiers and civilians are experts in military and political affairs respectively. 
Military effectiveness develops when each group focuses on the area they know best. However, the 
system also needs a large degree of strategic coherence – that is, military operations and tactics 
must reflect the overall strategy. Civilians can only secure strategic coherence by meddling in these 
details, thus diminishing the division of labor.  The right balance, I argue, depends on the actual skills 
of civilian and military elites and the character of the threats the state faces.  
The chapter consists of three sections. The first section briefly examines how military 
decision-making functions. The second section explores how civilian control increases military 
effectiveness. The last section looks at how civilian and military expertise functions as a division of 
labor and shows how this division of labor has to be balanced against the need for civilian control.  
 
Strategy and military decision-making 
Military effectiveness is “the capacity to generate military [force] from a state’s basic resources in 
wealth, technology, population size, and human capital.”533 Military effectiveness is created largely 
through planning. However, even an apparently perfect plan may not yield a successful outcome. 
Uncertainty is always a key ingredient of war. One never knows if a truly random occurrence – like 
the heavy rain that some historians argue prevented Suleiman I from attacking Vienna with his full 
force – prevents one from realizing an otherwise sound and achievable war goal.534 Furthermore, the 
strategies and tactics of one’s opponents, which are always opaque to some degree, may make a 
good plan obsolete. Clausewitz likened war with a gamble and asserted that each action only could 
be achieved within a range of probability. “No other human activity”, he wrote in On War, “is so 
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continuously or universally bound up with chance.”535 Good plans do not always lead to good 
outcomes.  
However, strategy, though difficult and often defeated by events, is often the only way of 
managing conflicts. Richard Betts has reviewed the many criticisms of strategy and concludes that 
although they highlight the difficulty of planning, none of them warrants the full disavowal of 
strategy. As he puts it, “there is no alternative but to engage in strategy unless one is willing to give 
up the use of force as an instrument of policy.”536 Strategy does not yield a perfect solution, yet 
planning to control the situation is the state’s best option. It cannot see what may be hidden 
underneath the cloak of events, but it can only try to control events as best it can. 
Strategic policy-making is, simply put, a four-stage process as illustrated in figure 8.1. 
Political discussions and decisions take center stage. Sociologists emphasize that open-minded group 
deliberation has a strong rationalizing potential. Jürgen Habermas claims that what he has termed 
“the peculiar forceless force of the better argument” weeds out bad information and poorly 
structured arguments and creates a better conception of a situation, and what to do about it.537 
Civilian and military actors engage in discussions and thereby confront one another with additional 
information and alternative interpretations. Their discussion will tend to uncover the assumptions 
beneath every argument and test their validity. This allows them to discard erroneous information 
and faulty interpretations in their own analysis. Deliberation thus brings more perspectives and facts 
to the table and produces an answer that is closer to reality. In essence, the actors move back and 
forth between analysis and deliberation and by repeating this exercise in different forums, analysts 
can crystallize a gradually improved perception of reality. 
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Figure 8.1. The four stages of policy-making 
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The forceless force of the better argument is only effective to a certain point. After a while, 
deliberations have to generate a final decision about which policies to pursue. Deliberation does not 
automatically result in a perfect policy, mainly because it would require an unfeasibly long and costly 
time-span to debate every single assumption of every single possible course of action. The material 
and human costs of an erroneous policy – loss of civilian and military lives, physical destruction and 
depletion of resources and legitimacy - may be piling up while decision-makers seek a perfect 
strategy. In practice, the deliberation phase ends when the commander-in-chief stops the discussion 
and makes a policy-decision, based on the views that have been presented through the debate. As 
Clausewitz put it in On War,  
 
“Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast array of 
factors has to be appreciated – mostly in the light of probabilities alone. The man 
responsible for evaluating the whole must bring to his task the quality of intuition that 
perceives the truth at every point. Otherwise a chaos of opinions and considerations 
would arise, and fatally entangle judgment.”538  
 
Deciding requires that the discussion is moved away from the group and developed into a 
coherent judgment. This can only be done by one individual. The authority to be the decider has to 
be vested in just one person. The decision is essentially the decider’s analysis, which he has formed 
through participation in the earlier discussion. 
These political discussions depend on the military bureaucracy for information and 
implementation. Topics can only be discussed if a problem can be detected and if relevant 
information can be brought to the table. Intelligence is therefore an essential component of efficient 
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decision-making. The military bureaucracy survey the situation and gathers intelligence which is then 
used to get an overview of the situation on the ground. Intelligence failures can be crucial. For 
example, during the early stages of the Korean War, various branches of the American bureaucracy 
detected signs of a Chinese intervention in the months before it actually occurred. Military 
intelligence services repeatedly reported that China was concentrating troops north of the Yalu.539 
After the invasion had occurred, UN units – still unaware of the Chinese intervention - began to 
count Chinese-speakers among their prisoners and noticed that enemy bodies wore Chinese 
uniforms.540 These early warning signs of a Chinese invasion of Korea were largely ignored by the 
higher echelons. The possibility of a Chinese intervention was discussed, but brushed aside, in CIA 
briefs only weeks before it happened. The UN forces, which had seemed poised to victory in early 
October, were wholly unprepared for a Chinese intervention and were soon overrun and forced to 
retreat.541 The American failure to detect and react to the invasion prolonged the conflict with 
almost three years.  
Similarly, when a decision has been made, the different wings of the government bureaucracy 
– the military, the diplomatic corps and other parts of the civil service – implement it. Here, the 
question is no longer: “When should we engage with the enemy and allies to maximize our power?” 
The question becomes: “How should these engagements be run to maximize their force?”  
In summary, military strategies are always incomplete attempts to grasp events. Strategies are 
decided by a political leader, based on deliberations between political and military elites. This in turn 
relies on the military bureaucracy’s ability to gather intelligence, and implement decisions once they 
are made. The primary problem of elite civil-military relations is the question of how much civilians 
should meddle in implementation and intelligence gathering.542 Should they interfere in the way the 
military performs these tasks, or should they allow it autonomy to handle these issues 
independently? As the following sections will show, effectiveness is generated by finding the optimal 
balance between two mutually exclusive principles. On the one hand, the civilian leadership has to 
meddle in operational and tactical details within the military’s sphere of expertise to ensure that 
policies are implemented according to the overall strategy. On the other hand, there has to be a 
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division of labor between soldiers and civilians.543 The remainder of this chapter will be spent on 
exploring these principles.  
 
Civilian control and military effectiveness 
As Eliot Cohen has shown, civilian control is crucial for the military effectiveness of the state. Cohen 
explored the practices of the four successful wartime leaders – Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and 
Ben-Gurion – and shows that each of these leaders interfered in tactical and operational details.544 
They were all driven by the need for strategic coherence. It was not enough that they made the key 
overall decisions – they also had to ensure that the operational and tactical implementation 
followed their overall strategy. They did not allow their generals to handle intelligence and 
implementation independently. They had to ensure that their decisions came into fruition. 
 Operations and tactics should be shaped by strategy. A tactical defeat may be a strategic 
victory. The assault on Fort Sumter, which precipitated the American Civil War, is a case in point. 
With tensions rising between the secessionist states and the central government, each party tried to 
gather as many military resources as possible for a possible future confrontation. Among the most 
valuable prizes were the many forts, erected along the coastline as a potent defense barrier against 
a European invasion. One of the Southern forts under Union control was Fort Sumter in South 
Carolina. Hoping to force the Union to give up the fort, rebel troops isolated it, thus making the 
matter of supply a contentious issue.  
Lincoln faced a dilemma. On the one hand, failing to resupplying Fort Sumter would 
eventually cost the Union a precious fort to the enemy. On the other hand, if the government 
decided to supply the fort by force, the North would appear to be the aggressor, thus losing 
legitimacy, which was needed to keep the Union together. The so-called Border States – Delaware, 
Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri – were still sitting on the fence and might have seceded if Lincoln 
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seemed to be the instigator of the conflict. Their secession would weaken his ability to force the 
South back into the Union. Disregarding standard military tactics, Lincoln solved the dilemma by 
attempting to supply the fort without the use of force. He publicly stated that the Union would 
resupply the fort, yet not fire lest under attack. The Confederates decided to prevent the supplies 
from reaching Sumter by force and took the fort after a 33 hour bombardment. In tactical terms, the 
Fort Sumter debacle was a fiasco for the North. The fort was lost and with it the Union’s ability to 
enact force appeared to be diminished. Tactically, the optimal solution would have been to use force 
to rebuff the rebels and resupply the fort. Strategically, however, Lincoln’s course of action was a 
masterstroke. By forcing the South to fire the first shot, Lincoln avoided being characterized as a 
warmonger. He thus kept the Union together. The loss of the Border States, or legitimacy in the 
population at large, would have been a bigger blow to the Union’s cause than the loss of Fort 
Sumter.  A tactical advantage was lost for the sake of strategic gains.545 As Cohen puts it, Lincoln 
“chose an act of military imprudence (…) to achieve a broader political effect.”546 
 Generals may pursue purposes that do not overlap with the overall strategic goals. Firstly, as 
we have already covered in chapters 6 and 7, military leaders may pursue bureaucratic or particular 
interests that do not mesh with the interests of the government. Secondly, their strategic 
understanding of the situation may differ from that of the government. In some cases, they may 
have misunderstood the true purpose envisioned by the commander-in-chief.  
 An example is Lincoln’s constant struggle to ensure that field commanders did not follow 
their own independent strategies. Many Union officers – including the infamous McClellan, the 
North’s erstwhile General-in-Chief – believed that the best strategy was to fight a limited war that 
did not seek to punish the South. This involved minimizing the strain put on the armies of both the 
North and South and focusing on outmaneuvering, rather than crushing, the Confederate forces. By 
taking Richmond, the Confederate capital, the generals believed, a politically symbolic victory could 
be won, followed by a political compromise at the negotiation table. Lincoln came to believe the 
opposite. The South’s armies had to be crushed and its population punished until they surrendered. 
When his strategy was finally implemented, it involved General Grant’s bloody Overland Campaign, 
an attack on General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia through a series of horrendous battles – 
including the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor - where the casualty rates 
anticipated the horrors of the First World War. The Union campaign also included General 
Sherman’s burning of Atlanta, and his destructive March to the Sea, for which he is still loathed in 
the South.  
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The way McClellan and the other wayward officers implemented the government’s policies 
reflected their different strategic approach. They followed a rather defensive strategy and failed to 
pursue a course that would crush the Confederate army and the rebel spirit with it. Lincoln had to 
constantly watch and penalize officers, who did not pursue his strategy.547 For example, as a 
demonstration, he personally sacked Major John Key – a brave, competent, and politically influential 
commander – because he had argued in private that the war was fought as a game, the purpose of 
which was to reach “a compromise and save slavery.”548 
Meddling in tactics and operations require knowledge of the minutiae of military affairs. 
Lincoln, for instance, immersed himself in the study of weaponry and new technology, which 
enabled him to confront and question his officers. For example, he personally ensured that breech-
loading weapons were mass-produced.549 It is simply not enough, as some scholars argue, that the 
civilian leadership makes the decision to go to war and then leaves the details of that endeavor to 
the generals.550 
Civilian control also increases the effectiveness of the state by reducing bargaining costs.551 
It takes time to reach an agreement, during which the bargainers have to be paid and the 
organization may lose focus on implementing the agreed policy. Bargaining always entails the risk of 
reaching a sub-optimal agreement. Simply put, elite civil-military disagreement is costly and reduces 
the effectiveness of the state. Bargaining involves the possibility of military counter-punishment, 
which typically decreases the military effectiveness of the state. As we established in chapter 6, the 
military has significant power resources, which it may employ to influence national security policy. 
Civilian control creates military effectiveness by diminishing the use of these resources. Military 
resistance may cause political commotion, thus weakening the government. An extreme example is 
the 1944 July plot to kill Hitler and overthrow the Nazi regime, staged by officers who were 
disgruntled with the overall strategy. Had the putsch succeeded, it would have been detrimental to 
the established interests of the government. The coup failed owing to a combination of unfortunate 
circumstances. However, irrespective of its outcome, the ensuing officer purges – more than 200 
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officers were executed and many more, including Erwin Rommel and Günther von Kluge, the 
commander of the German forces in the West, were imprisoned or forced to commit suicide– 
severely inhibited the German state’s ability to wage war.552 Similarly, Risa Brooks has compared the 
performance of the Egyptian military in the 1967 Six-Day War (where elite civil-military discord was 
rampant) and the 1973 Yom Kippur War (where elite civil-military relations were harmonious), and 
shown that military effectiveness increased significantly in the latter war. Thus, military resistance 
entails a loss of military effectiveness.553 
 This is where civilian control and military effectiveness overlap. Ceteris paribus, civilian 
control increases strategic coherence and diminishes bargaining costs. Lincoln essentially used an 
assertive control policy, where he constantly meddled directly in the details of military policy. He 
also set up external control institutions, which allowed him to ensure that the generals were 
following his overall strategy.   
 
Expertise and effectiveness 
The degree of civilian control is not the only factor making the state militarily effective. The expertise 
of both soldiers and civilians also play a crucial role. Soldiers and civilians each bring in a distinct type 
of expertise, which ideally makes decisions more attentive to the realities on the ground. Civilian 
decision-makers are experts in politics – the ability to understand the preferences of other actors and 
to use this knowledge to influence their decisions. Officers are experts in military science – how to 
maximize force within a given time and area to achieve a strategic objective.554 The state becomes 
more militarily effective when a division of labor is established, where each group gets to handle the 
problems that their expertise equip them to handle. This division of labor, however, requires that 
civilians refrain from meddling in the details of military policy. In other words, it puts a break on 
civilian control.  
Both political and military expertise concurrently contains scientific and artistic dimensions. 
In chapter 5, we saw that modern fighting involves the scientific analysis of distinct factors, and the 
causal relationship between them. For instance, shelling the enemy involves knowledge of ballistics, 
being able to analyze the battlefield to arrive at an estimate of the requirements in the particular 
engagement, and the ability to operate the equipment effectively. In that sense, military expertise is 
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a type of scientific knowledge. However, there must also be an understanding of how the shelling will 
affect the enemy’s behavior and whether or not the enemy is likely to dig in or regroup elsewhere. 
This judgment involves taking in a lot of factors whose exact value cannot be known precisely. 
Furthermore, it involves anticipating equally imprecise causal mechanisms. Even a tactical operation, 
like shelling, must involve intuition and imagination – artistic skills – that are not uniform from 
person to person. When one moves to the strategic level, this uncertainty factor becomes more 
important.  
Similarly, political expertise is a science in the sense that it depends on knowledge about 
political affairs, and on a causal map of how different factors interact. For instance, a civilian 
decision-maker would most commonly know how a foreign power acts by knowing factual 
knowledge about the constitution and the political factions of that country, and how they affect its 
ability to act. This map of knowledge and causality can never be complete. As we saw was the case 
for military expertise in chapter 5, political expertise is burdened by an overabundance of factors and 
variables. It is impossible to map out all these factors completely, and to fully understand their 
mutual relationship. A brilliant political scientist is not necessary a great politician. To maneuver in 
the political landscape, political leaders have to fill in the gaps. They do this by using their 
imagination to close the holes in their knowledge. Furthermore, devising a political strategy entails 
exploiting expertise strategically to predict how an opponent, or potential ally, might act in the 
future. This necessarily involves a leap of imagination.  
All in all, expertise – be it military as well as political – involves both scientific and artistic 
skills. One can study political science at a university, but one surely cannot become a great politician 
through studies alone.555 In the end, both military and political expertise requires scientific and 
artistic skills, yet the latter are more important for the politician. Scientific knowledge – ballistics, 
mechanics, meteorology, and the like – plays a significant part in the military man’s training. 
Conversely, political science involves less tangible, scientific knowledge. Though both military and 
political expertise contains both scientific and artistic dimensions, military expertise is closer to the 
former and political expertise to the latter. 
War is never entirely separate from politics. War is always fought for political means and 
every military act must therefore be judged by its political purpose.556 As Clausewitz wrote in On 
War,  
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“it is apt to be assumed that war suspends [political] intercourse and replaces it by a 
wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. We maintain, on the contrary, 
that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other 
means. We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means’ because we 
also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or 
change it into something completely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, 
irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events 
progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout 
the war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise? … Is war not just 
another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech and writing? Its grammar, 
indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.”557 
 
In other words, war is a type of politics – it is fought for political purposes and it interacts with 
political considerations. To be sure, though war is a type of politics, it operates in a different way 
compared to other political activities. This is what Clausewitz meant when he stated that war has its 
own grammar. Where politics is the use of cunning and argumentation to convince or compromise, 
war is the use of raw force to coerce other parties. Knowledge about the use of force naturally 
differs from political expertise. 
There are essentially two reasons – one political and one functional - why war and politics 
are intimately interlinked. Firstly, as we saw in chapters 6 and 7, modern society is based on the 
accountability principle. Civilian control of the military helps to secure civil society’s support. The 
citizenry is willing to provide taxes, loyalty and manpower to the state as long it pursues policies for 
their greater good. Military expertise should be wholly subservient to the civilian leadership, if we 
interpret the relationship between war and politics following only this accountability principle. The 
civilian leadership represents the will of the people and the military is the tool by which this will is 
implemented. When militaries take complete control of the state, they often aim to preserve the 
political structure of the country to allow it to borrow its legitimacy. For instance, when the German 
high command seized de facto power during the First World War, it retained the civilian structure of 
the government to harvest the legitimacy of the Kaiser. If we bracket the fact that ousting the 
Emperor would have gone against the royalist and nationalist ideology of the German generals, such 
a move did not make sense even from a pure power perspective. Wilhelm II still served as a potent 
symbol of legitimacy, and keeping him as a figurehead helped the military to shore up the support of 
the population at large. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the real heads of the German government, 
retained civilian chancellors – Georg Michaelis and Georg von Hertling – to uphold the illusion of a 
constitutional, civilian government.558The civilian government, though in many respects, to use 
Arthur Rosenberg’s apt phrase, “no more than a constitutional cloak thrown over Ludendorff’s 
                                                          
557
 von Clausewitz (1976), p. 731.  
558
 Craig (1955), pp. 326-37. 
180 
 
dictatorship”, was still able to place a minor restraint on the military’s political maneuverability.559 
For instance, during the negotiations of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Soviet Union, a rift 
appeared between the Foreign Office and the High Command. The civilians and several lower-
ranking officers worried that overambitious territorial demands would pose a problem for post-war 
Germany. Ludendorff and Hindenburg argued that the Soviets should be forced to give up large 
areas of rich agricultural lands in Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltics. The Kaiser’s overt support of 
the Foreign Office caused much consternation within the High Command. Concurrently, Chancellor 
von Hertling emphasized that the generals were interfering in an area outside of their constitutional 
purview. Only after an extensive campaign against the civilian authorities did the High Command 
prevail.560 Although Ludendorff and von Hindenburg effectively had absolute control of the German 
state, they kept on taking the wishes of Wilhelm II into account.  
Secondly, effective war-fighting requires both military and political insight. The inclusion of 
both types of expertise is thus functionally expedient. The military provides knowledge of how the 
state can deliver the maximal use of force. Political experts provides knowledge of how other 
political actors in the war – the enemy, the state’s allies or civil society - can be influenced in a way 
that is helpful to the state. War is a contest between political entities. Understanding when the 
enemy state would be willing to compromise, or assessing the opportunity to split his alliance on 
political grounds, is a functional requirement for any modern state. Effective decision-making 
therefore requires both types of expertise.561 
The balance between political and military expertise varies at different stages of the 
policymaking process. At the stages of discussion and decision, military actors primarily serve as 
advisors, who bring a military perspective to the debate. However, all decisions cannot be made at 
these stages. Some decisions have to be made at the sharp end, so to speak, during the intelligence 
or implementation phases. Constraints of time and space make it almost impossible for one actor to 
make all the decisions at once. The division of labor allows the military to handle these late-stage 
decisions more or less autonomously. The division of labor between soldiers and civilians follows the 
distinction between grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. Grand strategy is made by 
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civilians with some military involvement; strategy requires both civilian and military expertise; while 
operations and tactics – the implementation of strategic decisions - is primarily a military matter.562 
The command structure of the Soviet Army during the Second World War illustrates the 
need for military autonomy on the tactical and operational level, and the perils of excessive civilian 
control. Stalin had famously purged large swathes of his officer corps to remove any threats to his 
own position. The remaining officers then showed little initiative and followed civilian orders 
slavishly.563 This damaged Soviet effectiveness in the early stages of the war. Erhard Raus, an 
Austrian general famed for his exploits on the Eastern front, noticed that  
 
“Russian elements that broke through our lines could remain for days behind the front 
without recognizing their favorable position and taking advantage of it. The Soviet 
small-unit commander’s fear of doing something wrong and being called to account for 
it was greater than the urge to take advantage of a situation. … [T]here was a 
pronounced spirit of blind obedience that had perhaps been carried over from the 
regimented life into the military field. This lethargy and reluctance to assume 
responsibility was a serious drawback to the Red Army, completely neutralizing a great 
many good points of the Russian soldier at the outset of the campaign.”564 
 
The Soviets had previously experienced similar problems during the Winter War, where the dual 
command system (where military decisions had to be approved by a political officer) diminished 
military effectiveness significantly, causing tactical blunders and eventually contributing to the heavy 
Russian losses in that conflict.565 
The need for a division of labor is not constant. Instead, it depends on two additional 
factors: the skills of the specific civilian and military elites who control the state at the time and the 
character of the threat that the state faces. Firstly, if the government has an inferior understanding 
of the threat and the tactical, operational and strategic policy options, the policies that are pushed 
through may decrease the military effectiveness of the state. This loss of efficiency may even 
outweigh the positive outcome that follows from the increase in strategic coherence. Simply put, if 
the government has a better understanding of strategy, operations and tactics than the military, 
then a policy of assertive control will undoubtedly enhance the military effectiveness of the state. 
However, if that is not the case, objective control may be the correct policy, depending on the 
significance of strategic coherence.  
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The crucial factor is the abilities of individual leaders. Cohen provides a tentative list of 
qualities of a good civilian leader, based on his survey of historical cases. The good military leader 
has a strong intuition – an instinct that allows him to sort good advice from bad advice. He must be 
what Isaiah Berlin called “a fox”. Berlin distinguished between “hedgehogs” and “foxes”. A hedgehog 
is a person who tries to reduce all contradictions to a few overarching principles. A fox, by contrast, 
does not try to systematize everything into a tidy system, but accepts the contradictory nature of 
reality and uses his intuition to guide his way through this complexity.566 Furthermore, the good 
leader knows that thinking outside the box may lead to new strategic options, which may enable him 
to strike the enemy at an unforeseen weak spot. He has good judgment, moderation, and is aware of 
the moral compromises required of a military leader. All of these qualities only become meaningful if 
the leader is immersed in military details; this enables him to unpick and question the advice of his 
military commanders intelligently.567 
However, one cannot assume that the civilian leader has all these qualities. Cohen’s choice 
of cases betrays the limits of his argument. By looking at four successful cases, he essentially uses a 
most-similar framework for analysis, which allows him to distill the core qualities of a good leader. 
Though he does touch upon cases where civilian strategizing led to defeat – for instance, Lyndon 
Johnson’s management of the Vietnam War - he does not analyze those cases systematically. This 
framework does not allow him to say anything about the many cases where political leaders were 
not up to the task. Cohen contrasts Lincoln with Jefferson Davis. In spite of possessing more military 
experience, gained through his years at West Point, as an officer in the Mexican campaign, and as 
Secretary of War, Davis was Lincoln’s inferior as commander-in-chief. Cohen argues that Davis 
lacked the personal qualities – the patience, charisma, decisiveness, and ambition – that Lincoln 
possessed in abundance.568 What might have happened if Davis had been the Union’s president? 
Could he have organized an unequal dialogue or would it have been better had his commanders 
isolated an area – consisting mainly of tactical decisions – where they reigned supreme without 
civilian interference? In other words, if the civilian leader is unable to provide leadership, should the 
strategic process then focus more on the division of labor? If that is the case, then civilian control 
may indeed hamper the development of military effectiveness.  
It is impossible to describe universally valid rules for leadership. In many ways, it depends on 
personality and intangible individual skills that cannot be identified a priori. The comparison of 
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Lincoln and Davis is a case in point. Ex ante, one would think that Davis, the seasoned war veteran 
with decades of political and military practice, would eclipse Lincoln, who had little legislative and 
military experience. However, Lincoln’s personal qualities – his common sense, strength, and 
cunning – outmatched Davis’, making him a superior war leader.569 It would have been impossible to 
determine these facts beforehand. The problem of finding a good leader cannot be solved by setting 
up elaborate screening mechanisms or general requirements for the experience needed to fulfill that 
role. Instead, it has to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Civilian leaders must be judged by 
their actions in a concrete situation. However, this insecurity about the abilities of the political 
leadership means that assertive control would entail some costs in terms of military effectiveness 
under some circumstances.  
Secondly, the importance of each type of expertise differs from conflict to conflict. The 
admixture of expertise depends on the character of the conflict. Some conflicts are highly political, 
while others are grand-scale contests of force. Civilian knowledge is more important in conflicts 
where other parties have to be convinced to cooperate with the state. The Cuban Missile Crisis is an 
example of a conflict, where the state had to try to convince another party – in this case the enemy - 
to cooperate, and where diplomatic procedures superseded the military logic of brute force. Albeit 
still crucial, conventional military expertise was of less importance than an understanding of the 
subtle rules of diplomacy. The American government faced a dilemma between the use of force and 
the use of diplomacy. The military solution would be to bomb the Soviet rockets, thus ensuring that 
they would not be used in a first strike against the American homeland. The disadvantages of this 
course of action were many. A military strike – which would certainly kill USSR personnel and be an 
affront to Moscow – would surely lead to a Soviet reaction elsewhere, most likely in Berlin, and 
possibly ignite a grand-scale war. Furthermore, the Americans could not be sure of destroying all the 
missiles, thus risking a nuclear second-strike from Castro, or local Soviet commanders. In fact, it has 
later been revealed that the Soviets indeed had stationed tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, without 
American knowledge, which could have been used in a retaliatory strike. A diplomatic solution would 
have fewer negative consequences – possibly a deal that entailed some sort of minor military 
weakening of the Western alliance. However, Washington could not be sure that a diplomatic 
solution was possible. If the White House pressed for a diplomatic solution in vain, the Soviets 
missiles might become operational in the meantime, which would have constituted a significant 
military gain for Moscow. Each strategic choice, therefore, came at a cost. The White House decided 
to install a blockade (which was labeled a quarantine for diplomatic reasons) to hinder further 
supplies to Cuba. Despite being on the brink of an all-out nuclear war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
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staunchly recommended a military solution. Air Force Chief Curtis LeMay was adamant in his view 
that only an all-out strike on the Soviet missiles in Cuba would allow the United States to make it 
through the debacle. Instead, the civilian leadership pursued a diplomatic policy that paid off when 
Moscow finally relented and pulled its missiles out of Cuba. The civilians correctly saw that the 
conflict was governed by a political logic of signaling, rather than force. Following that logic, the 
conflict should be handled as a negotiation, where each party should get something out of an 
eventual deal. Movements of military platforms were a way of communicating resolve and openness 
to the Soviets. Ultimately, this resulted in a compromise, which averted a nuclear clash.570 Ironically, 
of course, the civilians also drove home the idea that all future conflicts would be governed by a 
signaling logic. This misperception would cause catastrophe in Vietnam.571 
Conversely, in conflicts that resemble Clausewitz’ concept of absolute war, understanding 
how to exert force effectively is more important than the processes of diplomacy. The First World 
War, for instance, was perhaps the closest we have come to a truly absolute war in the 
Clausewitzian sense.  It was largely a war of technical planning, of railroad timetables, and marching 
schedules. The great armies on the Western front were locked in a competition of brute strength. 
Once the decision to engage in warfare had been made, political matters became of only secondary 
importance. This allowed situations, like the aforementioned Silent Dictatorship, where the war was 
largely run by the generals.572 Of course, neither of these extremes is ever possible and warfare will 
always require an admixture of civilian and military expertise. 
In summary, both civilian and military expertise has functional value for the state. Military 
effectiveness is generated by ensuring that civilian and military expertise is brought into political 
discussions, and by ensuring that tactical and operational decisions can be made by military experts. 
The correct admixture of political and military expertise depends on the character of the conflict in 
question.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore how military effectiveness is created through elite civil-
military interaction. Military effectiveness is one of the two core topics of elite civil-military 
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relations. The state becomes militarily effective by striking the right balance between civilian control, 
and a division of labor between soldiers and civilians. The need for strategic coherence means that 
the civilians have to ensure that tactics and operations support the overall strategy. This can only be 
done through civilian control. However, this need for civilian control has to be balanced against a 
division of labor. Soldiers are experts in the art and science of warfare, while civilians are experts in 
the art and science of politics. Military effectiveness is generated when the military handles tactical 
and operational affairs, while matters of diplomacy and grand strategy are left to the civilians. This 
thus requires that the military is allowed to handle details of military policy autonomously. The 
meddling that ensures strategic coherence thus compromises the division of labor and vice versa. 
The need for a division of labor depends on the skills of civilian and military leaders and the 
character of the conflict in question.  
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- 9 - 
The elite civil-military system 
 
Having explored how civilian control and military effectiveness function in isolation in the past three 
chapters, I can now describe the main processes that define elite civil-military relations in this final 
chapter. To repeat a point that has already been made several times in this dissertation, theoretical 
frameworks require an overview of the main causal relations that shape a specific phenomenon. 
They do not determine which of these links is the most crucial determinant of the phenomenon in 
question. That is the domain of theories, not theoretical frameworks. In the present chapter, I 
provide such an overview for elite civil-military relations. I present a rather complex framework that 
outlines the main causal links driving elite civil-military relations, based on my results from the 
previous chapters. This framework helps me make theoretical predictions of the drivers and 
outcomes of elite civil-military relations. In other words, I map how different exogenous factors 
shape elite civil-military relations.  
The elite civil-military relations are defined by a set of largely interrelated variables. These 
variables constitute a system, by which I mean that changes in one factor affect all other factors. The 
system is meant to make the state legitimate and militarily effective. The key variables are the 
political priorities of the civilian government, the mutual trust between soldiers and civilians, the 
external control mechanisms available to the government, and the actual skills of soldiers and 
civilians. One cannot say that one civilian control policy is superior a priori. Instead, the choice of 
policy depends on the circumstances under which the decision to pursue a policy is being made. The 
stability of the system depends on a host of different exogenous factors. Elite civil-military relations 
in the United States, for instance, are relatively stable. However, this situation may change. A change 
in the relations between the great powers may put American elite civil-military relations under 
pressure.  
The chapter progresses in three steps. The first section presents the main causal links driving 
elite civil-military relations. This rather complex model allows me to analyze how various exogenous 
factors shape elite civil-military relations and how they affect the civilian control policies pursued by 
civilians, the degree of civilian control, and the system’s ability to create legitimacy and military 
effectiveness. This is done in the second section. The final section illustrates how this framework 
works by giving an overview of American elite civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era.  
 
Causality and elite civil-military relations 
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The first step in this analysis is to get an overview of the causality chains that drive elite civil-military 
relations. In this section, I will therefore present a rather complex causal model akin to the one 
developed in chapter 7. The model sketches the main processes that define elite civil-military 
relations, but it does not show which of these causal links is the most important one. Elite civil-
military relations, I argue, function as a system, by which I mean that changes in one variable have 
rippling effects that influence all other elite civil-military variables.573 Most of the system’s processes 
have been described in previous chapters. This allows me to give a rather basic description of each 
variable and instead focus on the overall dynamics of the system. Five of the many components that 
make up the elite civil-military system are especially important for the way in which the system 
works: the civilian priorities, the civilian trust of the military, the military trust of the civilians, the 
strength of external institutions of surveillance and punishment, and the actual skills of soldiers and 
civilians. 574 
 The relationship between civilian and military trust and the external institutions of the state 
is rather complex. The entire framework is presented in figure 9.1. below. It explains how the 
interaction between trust, priorities, and external institutions shape the government’s civilian 
control policy and the degree of civilian control. It also shows that the outcome of the civilian control 
policy - legitimacy and military effectiveness – also depends on the actual skills of the civilian and 
military elites. Reading a piece of text dedicated only to causality is rather difficult. Each step in the 
causal chain is therefore assigned a letter in the text that corresponds to similar link in the model. I 
break the framework into three sub-sections for the sake of style. Firstly, I present the drivers of the 
government’s choice of civilian control policy. I then present the factors that determine if the policy 
leads to civilian control in the second sub-section. In the final sub-section I present how these factors 
lead to legitimacy and military effectiveness.  
  
Civilian control policy 
As we saw in chapter 6, the civilian government has to determine how much it wants to meddle in 
the details of military policy. Bracketing the option of subjective control (which is very rare in 
advanced democracies), the government has to decide if it wants to determine tactical and 
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operational details (assertive control) or if it wants to leave those decisions to the discretion of the 
military (objective control). It also has to decide if it wants to focus primarily on affecting military 
policy directly or if it wants to create additional institutions to control the military. The government’s 
choice of policy depends on its motivation and on the feasibility of each policy option.  
Two variables determine if the government becomes motivated to pursue a certain civilian 
control policy: the government’s overall priorities and its trust in the abilities of the military. Firstly, 
the government’s motives also depend on its overall priorities (A). It has to choose if there are any 
exogenous political considerations that override its concern for elite civil-military relations and if it 
prioritizes military effectiveness or legitimacy. As chapter 5 showed, effectiveness and legitimacy, 
although mutually constitutive, constitute two separate outputs of the elite civil-military system. The 
civilian government’s choice of policy is shaped by whether it wants to increase its legitimacy or its 
military effectiveness. To be sure, in most advanced democracies, effectiveness and legitimacy 
typically are so intertwined that it is well-nigh impossible to determine if the government’s policies 
are meant to increase one or the other. However, occasions where such a choice must be made may 
occur even in stable and advanced democracies.  
Secondly, the civilian choice of policy depends on whether or not the government trusts the 
military’s judgments (B). As we saw in chapter 8, the civilian government needs to ensure that there 
is strategic coherence between its overall strategy and the operations and tactics employed on the 
ground. Civilians trust that the military is capable of giving sound advice and implementing policies 
effectively. They also trust that the military does not pursue their own narrow goals but rather have 
the national interest in mind. The civilian government becomes motivated to pursue an objective 
control policy and stay out of military affairs, if it can trust the judgment and loyalty of the officer 
corps. Vice versa, it interferes in tactical and operational details, when it does not believe that the 
military will implement its policies effectively. If the civilian leadership doubts that the military offers 
expedient advice, it may choose to trust its own judgment and meddle in operational and tactical 
details. This trust is concerned with both the skills and the motives of the officer corps. We have 
already seen that this was the pattern of Union elite civil-military relations during the Civil War. The 
same control policy was used during the early years of the Johnson administration. The Democrats 
who came into power in 1961 had only been in opposition for just eight years and had not yet lost 
the two decades of experience generated before Eisenhower’s tenure. Seasoned administration 
members brought with them the confidence necessary to overrule the generals in crucial matters.575 
The Cuban Missile Crisis further exacerbated the administration’s distrust of the military. The 
military pushed for a military strike on Cuba – a course of action which later evidence suggests 
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would most likely have caused a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. After their 
diplomatic course of action prevailed and yielded a peaceful solution, the civilians had come to see 
the military caught in an archaic, military mindset. The crisis taught them not to trust the advice of 
the armed forces.576 The Joint Chiefs, they believed, did not understand the logic of signaling that 
they believed defined the Cold War. This mistrust came to shape elite civil-military relations. The 
Joint Chiefs became isolated through the Johnson years. The administration took control over 
strategic and even operational and tactical dimensions of the war in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs were 
only included haphazardly to avoid military resistance to the government’s decisions.577 
The civilian choice of policy also depends on the feasibility of each option (C). Simply put, 
does the existing elite civil-military environment allow the government to pursue a policy, which 
may be met with resistance by the armed forces? Is the military sufficiently neutral to accept the 
civilian policy? If not, do the existing external institutions for surveillance and punishment allow it to 
push its policy through in spite of military resistance? The government will typically be able to 
pursue a more meddling civilian control policy, if it already controls the military. Conversely, if 
existing elite civil-military relations are characterized by discord, new meddlesome policies will 
typically increase military resistance.  
 
Degree of civilian control 
The next step is to see how the choice of policy affects the degree of civilian control. As we saw in 
chapter 6, civilian control is determined by the degree of political neutrality in military culture and 
the external institutions for surveillance and punishment. The government controls the military as 
long as it is politically neutral (D). I have already explained how military culture becomes politically 
neutral in chapter 7, where we saw that it depends on the officers’ trust of the goal and 
effectiveness of the government and on the strength of the professional-bureaucratic nexus.  
 To reiterate a point that was already made in chapter 7, the political neutrality of the armed 
forces largely depends on military’s trust in the goals and skills of the government, state, and 
constitutional system (E). The military officer is driven by a dual concern. Firstly, he wants to ensure 
that the civilians pursue goals that benefit the communities about which he cares. The state should 
secure his family, local community and nation. If avoidable, it should not put him and his military 
comrades in harm’s way. To be sure, defining these communities is not always easy. As the example 
of the motives driving the French military during the Algerian War shows, it is not always entirely 
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clear who constitutes the nation and who the state is meant to represent. Secondly, the state should 
pursue these policies effectively. The soldier becomes motivated to interfere in politics if he fears 
that the state is not pursuing policies that will maximize the security of the state. The fate of the 
Fourth Republic shows what may happen with inefficient governments. In chapter 7, we also saw 
that the strength of what I termed the professional-bureaucratic nexus also affect the degree of 
political neutrality within military culture (F). Soldiers become motivated to accept civilian 
supremacy, when their promotion structures are meritocratic and detached from politics. This is of 
course only possible when the military has become professionalized and organized along 
bureaucratic lines.  
Civilian control not only depends on whether or not the military feels motivated to meddle 
in politics. It is also important to determine if military interference in politics is feasible.578 As we saw 
in chapter 6, military shirking stops being a sensible political option, if it can be detected and 
punished by the civilians. It thus depends on whether or not the external institutions of the state 
allow the civilians to survey military behavior and punish shirking (G). Institutions enable civilians to 
control the armed forces, even when the military is motivated to shirk. Furthermore, as we also saw 
in chapter 6 and 7, these external institutions – especially the general outline of the constitution – 
also affect the professional-bureaucratic nexus and they therefore indirectly influence the degree of 
political neutrality within military culture (H). Simply put, the structure of military oversight affects 
the promotion structures, and thus the professional-bureaucratic nexus, of the armed forces. In 
states where oversight is split between the executive and the legislature (for instance the United 
States), the promotion structures will be less meritocratic compared to states where oversight is 
kept within the executive (for instance the United Kingdom).  
 The government’s choice of civilian control policy affects the degree of civilian control 
through three channels. The first, and perhaps most obvious, causal channel is that the degree of 
meddling influences the civilian control of the military directly (I). Simply put, if the government 
determines tactics and operations, it naturally also controls these dimensions of overall policy. 
Assertive control thus increases the direct control of the military, while objective control of 
diminishes the direct control.  
This effect is balanced by a second causal link that has the opposite effect on civilian control. 
As we saw in chapter 7, the civilian control policy also affects the professional-bureaucratic nexus (J). 
Civilian meddling in military policy make it more difficult to separate officer promotions from politics 
and it therefore makes officers more inclined to interfere in political life. Assertive control therefore 
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diminishes the political neutrality of the military, while objective control enhances it. In that sense, 
these two policy options both have positive and negative effects on the degree of civilian control.  
The final causal link is concerned with the institutional dimension of the civilian control 
policy. Instead of meddling directly in military policy, the government may choose to establish new 
external control institutions that allow it to detect and punish military shirking and thus increasing 
civilian control (K). These institutions, which include outside experts, oversight committees, and 
offices for civilian oversight, were presented in chapter 6. However, as we saw in chapter 6, 
establishing institutions typically decreases the military effectiveness of the state. Interservice 
rivalry, for instance, make it easier for the civilians to detect military shirking. Rival services with 
similar insights into the details of military policy will typically alert the civilian government of any 
wrongdoing that occurs within another service. However, interservice rivalry is also a waste of 
resources. It typically involves double or triple administration, because the services do not trust one 
another.  
   
Outcome of elite civil-military relations 
In chapter 5, we saw that the fundamental purpose of the elite civil-military system is to produce 
legitimacy and military effectiveness for the state. A healthy elite civil-military system ensures that 
the state continues to be militarily effective, while securing that its elite civil-military relations do not 
compromise the accountability ideal. Legitimacy and effectiveness are mutually constitutive. All 
other things being equal, increased legitimacy increases the military effectiveness and vice versa (L).  
The choice of civilian policy may both enhance and diminish the military effectiveness of the 
state. These processes were described in more details in chapter 8. Civilian meddling may increase 
the effectiveness of the state, if the civilian have a better grasp of the war than the generals (M). 
Lincoln, for example, understood the true nature of the Civil War and his overall strategic vision, 
which he implemented through an assertive control policy, increased the Union’s chance of success. 
However, this effect depends on the actual distribution of civilian and military skills (N). As we saw in 
chapter 8, the actual skills of soldiers and civilians influence the military effectiveness of the state. 
For instance, the state will most likely become less effective, if the government follows an assertive 
control policy, but its understanding of the situation is far inferior to that of the military.  
Military effectiveness also depends on the degree of civilian control (O). In chapter 8, we 
saw that civilian control increases strategic coherence and minimizes bargaining costs, which in turn 
enhances the military effectiveness of the state. For instance, Lincoln faced a discrepancy between 
strategy, operations and tactics and had to increase the strategic coherence by meddling in the 
details of policy. Civilian control may not only increase effectiveness – it also increases the legitimacy 
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of the state (P). In chapter 4, we saw that the legitimacy of the modern state depends on a principle 
of accountability. In elite civil-military relations, this principle means that the civilian government 
should have unquestionable control over military policy, as we saw in chapter 6. This image is 
shattered by elite civil-military conflicts. Public struggles between officers and politicians diminish 
the legitimacy of the state by showing that the public administration is not necessarily accountable 
to the democratic procedures.  
  
Patterns of elite civil-military relations 
Elite civil-military relations depend on the complex interaction of several factors. The most 
important causal links are summarized in figure 9.1. below.579 The purpose of this analysis of the 
elite civil-military system was to look specifically at the factors shaping the civilian control policy, the 
degree of civilian control, and the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state. These four 
factors are highlighted by a thick box. The main component of the system is civilian trust of the 
military, military trust of the civilians, and the external institutions regulating their interaction. These 
factors are marked by a grey box.  
This model allows us to arrive at a general idea of the factors that drive elite civil-military 
relations. There is no universally superior civilian control policy. Instead, the value of a control policy 
depends on the priorities of the government and the conditions that determine the success of the 
policy. The purpose of the policy is essentially to maximize the legitimacy and military effectiveness 
of the state.  
This framework allows one to develop a theory of elite civil-military relations. Such a theory 
would involve showing how these factors shape the choice of policy exactly and which of them 
carries the most significant causal weight. To some extent, the description of variables presented 
above provides a rough guide to the shape of such a theory. However, it would also require a 
significant empirical analysis based on extensive data material. Developing such a theory is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. Our current purpose is only to arrive at a coherent theoretical 
framework for elite civil-military relations - the conceptual language that allows one to ask the right 
questions.  
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Figure 9.1. The main causal links of the elite civil-military system 
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Elite civil-military change 
Having outlined the internal features of the elite civil-military system, the next step is to provide an 
overview of the factors that may alter the balance of the system. How may exogenous factors 
change elite civil-military relations? The previous chapters have highlighted eight variables that may 
affect the elite civil-military system. I analyze each of these individually in the following. Some of 
these factors are part of the elite civil-military system, but may still be altered because of changes 
that happen outside of the elite civil-military system. They can therefore be said to be exogenous of 
the system. In the following, I start by looking at domestic exogenous factors. I then explore how 
international factors may change the system.  
 
Domestic factors 
A host of exogenous, domestic factors may affect the elite civil-military system. Societal legitimacy, 
the general legitimacy of the state, constitution, and government, is – according to Samuel Finer – 
the most important variable determining patterns of elite civil-military relations.580 As we have 
already seen, societal legitimacy is partly shaped by elite civil-military relations. However, it is also 
affected by exogenous trends that influence the degree to which the citizenry in general and the 
military in particular views the state, constitution, and government. For example, Richard Kohn 
argues that the legitimacy of democracy has been declining in the United States and laments that it 
decreases civilian control.581  
Simply speaking, the higher the degree of legitimacy, the easier it becomes for the 
government to control the military. The legitimacy of the state and government essentially 
strengthens two of the causal links highlighted in figure 9.1. Firstly, it makes the government and 
state more trustworthy in the eyes of the military. When societal legitimacy increases, the military 
becomes less prone to disobedience, because it comes to see the state and government as working 
for the interests of its primary communities. Secondly, societal legitimacy increases the strength of 
the government’s institutions for surveillance and punishment. Institutions rest on a bed of public 
support. An illegitimate government will find that very few citizens are willing to fight to preserve its 
institutions.582 A legitimate government will be able to create strong external control institutions. 
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Both of these effects increase civilian control. This in turn makes the state more militarily 
effective.583  
The strategic culture of the civilian elite also influences the balance of the elite civil-military 
system. Strategic culture is not stable. Instead, it is changed by various exogenous reasons. For 
instance, Christopher Gelpi and Peter Feaver have shown that non-veteran members of Congress are 
more likely to support the use of force. Falling numbers of veterans in Congress, most likely a 
consequence of the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force, is thus affecting the strategic culture in 
Washington.584 Such changes can have consequences for elite civil-military relations. The civilian 
strategic culture influences the priorities of the government. For instance, if the civilians view 
military security as less important, these priorities will affect their choice of civilian control policy. It 
may also shape the civilians’ trust of the armed forces. This was a key part of Samuel Huntington’s 
argument about Cold War elite civil-military relations: post-war civilian strategic culture did not 
prioritize military goals nor did it trust the armed forces.585 Furthermore, a faulty civilian strategic 
culture may indirectly affect the military’s trust of the civilians. Simply put, the elite civil-military 
relations come under pressure, if the civilian elite fails to comprehend the dangers facing the state. 
As we saw in chapter 4, civilian strategic culture can endanger the state if it becomes either too 
driven by moral concerns (excessive liberalism) or if it overestimates the importance of the armed 
forces for the continued survival of the state (militarism). The military loses its trust in the civilian 
elite, if the elite is incapable of grasping the threats facing the state. As figure 9.1. shows, falling 
military trust of the government makes it more likely to become entangled in politics. It thereby 
decreases civilian control of the military.  
Value changes within military culture may also affect elite civil-military relations. Just like 
civilian strategic culture, military culture is affected by various exogenous factors. The military’s 
values and motives are not constant. Intra-organizational changes may affect the composition of the 
military or the values that are being taught at military educational system. For instance, the 
composition of the American military has changed over the last decades. The percentage of self-
identifying Republicans within the ranks has soared, mainly due to political changes in the regions 
from which the bulk of the officer corps is recruited. Simply put, as the South became increasingly 
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Republican, so did the officer corps.586 These changes are not included in the model above or in the 
model of military culture that was presented in chapter 7. They can instead be considered to be 
exogenous. Such changes may affect the elite civil-military system by changing the degree of political 
neutrality within military culture. This will mainly have an effect on the degree of civilian control.  
Administrative changes may also alter elite civil-military relations. External institutions for 
control and surveillance are not permanent. They change due to either deliberate change in their 
design or due to exogenous changes that occur for reasons that on the surface has little to do with 
elite civil-military relations. For instance, the media contribute to the continuous scrutiny of military 
policy. However, the media landscape is constantly changing, due to a plethora of exogenous factors 
- for instance the introduction of new information technology. Richard Kohn, for example, claims 
that the media have “become less substantial, more superficial, less knowledgeable, more focused 
on profit, less professional, and more trivial” and argues that these changes affect elite civil-military 
relations for the worse.587 Most of these exogenously driven changes occur on the margin and do 
not significantly change the relationship between soldiers and civilians. However, they are important 
to keep in mind as a causal mechanism that may affect elite civil-military relations in the long run.  
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act provides an example of a large, deliberately planned 
reform, which significantly changed elite civil-military relations. The reform touched several areas of 
military organization. In an elite civil-military relations perspective, the most important consequence 
of the reform was that it made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the hub of the military’s 
planning and policy formulation. Previously, all the service chiefs had served as advisors to the 
President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Now this function was united 
in the Chairman.588 The purpose of this maneuver was to reduce interservice rivalry. As we saw in 
chapter 6, interservice rivalry serves both positive and negative purposes. On the one hand, it 
provides the civilians with a fire alarm that permits them to detect military shirking. On the other 
hand, it wastes military manpower and resources. This unification of authority made the Chairman 
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an agile political player, who could more easily maneuver vis-à-vis the civilian principals.589 The 
civilian authority over the armed forces was still divided between Congress and the President. This 
gave the military some room to act politically without being called out.  
In chapter 4, we saw that popular militarism may affect elite civil-military relations. 
Increased military popularity within civil society provides the armed forces with stronger tools for 
counter-punishment against the civilians. Consequently, the civilian government finds it more 
difficult to use external institutions to survey and punish the armed forces. For instance, as we saw 
in chapter 4, Hindenburg and Ludendorff used their popularity within the German population to 
diminish the government’s control of the armed forces and, in the end, to establish the Silent 
Dictatorship. To be sure, popular militarism is often caused by other factors. Only when the 
government is considered illegitimate or at least less competent than the leadership of the armed 
forces, will popular militarism influence elite civil-military relations. Other factors, such as the 
general legitimacy of the state, the civilian strategic culture, and the skills of the individuals in charge 
influence the growth of popular militarism. Furthermore, the existence of an outside threat further 
creates a milieu in which popular militarism can grow.  
Finally, elite civil-military relations are affected by the skills and personalities of civilian and 
military leaders. Democracies change both civilian and military leaders every few years, which means 
that this variable is in many ways truly contingent. The skills and personalities of these leaders of 
course influence the skill ratio between civilian and military leaders. They also affect how much the 
civilian government prioritizes elite civil-military relations and the degree of trust that they have in 
the military and that the military have in them. For instance, the inexperience of civilian officials 
largely shaped elite civil-military relations during the Eisenhower years. Leading civilian officials in 
defense and security matters – barring the President of course – felt they lacked military expertise. 
The GOP had been out of office for twenty years and lower officials did not feel they commanded 
the complex details of the subject matter. Consequently, the administration pursued a policy of 
objective control.590  
 
International factors 
Changes in the threats facing the state also affect the patterns of elite civil-military relations. The 
severity of threats is one of the primary causes of elite civil-military change. It is impossible to 
describe a simple causal law between level of threat and elite civil-military relations. Almost the 
entire elite civil-military system is affected, when the state faces an increased level of threat. Flaws 
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and problems that can be papered over in peacetime suddenly come under pressure. Stronger 
threats exacerbate the effect of the domestic factors described above. As Michael Desch has shown, 
a strong, legitimate and well-functioning elite civil-military system experiences fewer tensions when 
faced with an increased level of threat. Conversely, a flawed system will have to handle an increased 
level of tensions, if it suddenly faces an increased threat level.591  
 Of course, the government prioritizes military policy and elite civil-military relations more, 
when the state faces an existential threat. Ceteris paribus, the state and government typically 
become more legitimate when facing a threat. This increased legitimacy enhances the military’s trust 
of the civilian government (as we saw in chapter 7) and strengthens the government’s external 
institutions for control of the military. Taken together, these effects thus strengthen the 
government’s control of the military.592 However, they are balanced by an increased need for 
effectiveness that may decrease the government’s legitimacy and its ability to control the military. 
The government loses legitimacy if it is unable to handle the threat in an effective manner.  This in 
turn destabilizes its institutions for control and diminishes the military’s trust of the civilians.  
The character of threats also influences the elite civil-military system. In chapter 3 and 6, we 
saw that threats mainly require either political or military expertise. Changes in the character of 
threats therefore affect the skill ratio between soldiers and civilians. They also typically influence the 
mutual trust between soldiers and civilians. The civilian perception of the military’s effectiveness of 
course depends on which type of threat is being encountered. Highly political threats - for instance 
threats that are best handled by politically vulnerable alliances - require a high degree of political 
finesse. The military expertise becomes less significant for military effectiveness and civilian trust of 
the military decreases. The civilian leadership will typically see strategic coherence as all-important 
and therefore pursue an assertive control policy. To use the example we used in chapter 8, the 
Cuban Missile Crisis was handled using a political logic of signaling that disregarded standard military 
practices to achieve a higher political goal. The administration used a policy of assertive control to 
make sure that military tactics did not inadvertently start a nuclear war. Conversely, of course, 
conflicts where military expertise is dominant will typically lead to a policy of objective control.  
 
Exogenous factors and elite civil-military change 
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We thus get a full picture of the several exogenous factors that may change elite civil-military 
relations. Each of these factors affects different parts of the system, as summarized in table 9.1. 
However, this effect is never isolated to this primary effect only. Instead, a change in one part has a 
rippling effect throughout the entire system. The factors typically interact with one another. For 
instance, the effect of a change in the international system typically depends on the constellation of 
domestic factors. Analyzing elite civil-military relations thus involves thinking about the complex 
interaction of several factors.  
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Table 9.1. The primary effect of exogenous variables on elite civil-military relations 
 
Variable 
 
Primary effect 
 
 
Societal legitimacy 
 
 
- Military trust of civilians 
- External institutions 
 
 
Civilian strategic culture 
 
- Military trust of civilians 
- Civilian trust of military 
- Civilian priorities 
 
 
Military culture 
 
 
- Military trust of civilians 
 
Administrative reform 
 
- External institutions 
 
 
Popular militarism 
 
- External institutions 
 
 
Individual skills and personalities 
 
- Military trust of civilians 
- Civilian trust of military 
- Civilian priorities 
- Actual civilian and military skills  
 
 
Threat level 
 
- Military trust of civilians 
- Civilian trust of military 
- Civilian priorities 
 
 
Character of threat 
 
- Military trust of civilians 
- Civilian trust of military 
- Actual civilian and military skills  
 
 
 
American elite civil-military relations after the Cold War 
The framework can be used to give an overview of American elite civil-military relations after the 
Cold War. This can only be a sketch of a wider and more extensive analysis and is mainly meant to 
illustrate how the framework presented above works in practice.  
In overall terms, American elite civil-military relations are very stable. Societal legitimacy is 
of course very high. No-one, except the most extreme fringes of the political spectrum, would 
question the legitimacy of the state or the democratic principle underpinning it. Though both 
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Congress and administration have been criticized for being inefficient, their right to keep their 
offices has not been questioned. Almost no-one consider a military putsch a likely or preferable 
option.593  
 Culture is a relatively intangible variable, which is difficult to measure exactly. It is therefore 
difficult to arrive at any final conclusions about the health of American civilian strategic culture. As 
several scholars have shown, American strategic culture spreads wide and encompasses several 
contradictory strains of thought. It is not simply liberal or realist. Instead, both of these trains of 
thought are part of the wider tradition.594 The last decade was defined by a willingness to use force 
to achieve normative goals. In Iraq, this willingness led to elite civil-military problems, when officers 
lost faith in a government that was not capable of bringing victory. Perhaps the biggest problem has 
been a failure to make the goals match the means available.  
In overall terms, American military culture is characterized by a relatively high level of 
political neutrality in the period in question. The legitimacy of the state is high, bolstered by a strong 
national identity and a strong domestic economy. There have been some causes for concern though. 
As we saw above, demographic trends have made the American military more Republican. Some 
scholars have highlighted the existence of a certain disdain for civilian life within military culture.595 
Others have shown that some groups within the armed forces have an incorrect understanding of 
the relationship between top officers and their civilian masters that effectively questions the 
legitimacy of the principle of civilian control.596 However, none of these studies show that the degree 
of political neutrality has changed within military culture.597 Changing ideological patterns within the 
ranks are not necessarily evidence of less political neutrality. A Republican officer corps is not 
necessarily a politically meddlesome officer corps. The studies that look specifically at political 
neutrality do not make a longitudinal comparison. Simply put, they only show that the officer corps 
is not entirely politically neutral – they do not show that those tendencies were already present in 
earlier decades. Though many authors have claimed that political neutrality has been disappearing 
from military culture, no-one has presented any convincing evidence that this is the case.598  
 There have been no major administrative reforms of the channels between civilian and 
military elites since the end of the Cold War. Elite civil-military interaction is still governed by the 
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framework that was put in place with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. In relative terms, the 
civilian principal is divided because of the separation of powers. Congress and the White House 
share oversight over the military. The military agent is united in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Some scholars have complained that this allows a politically adept chairman – the example 
used is typically Colin Powell – to outmaneuver his superiors and shape military policy beyond his 
administrative purview.599 However, there are still several oversight mechanisms that ensure that 
the civilians are capable of detecting and punishing military shirking. Altering these institutions 
involves changes that may not be beneficial. Uniting civilian authority over military policy in the 
White House would improve the civilians’ ability to control the military, but it would also diminish 
Congress’ control with the executive. It would be a blow to the checks and balances that define the 
American constitutional tradition. Similarly, separating the military agent along the lines of the pre-
1986 military would also make it easier to control the armed forces. However, it would decrease the 
effectiveness of the armed forces, as more resources would be wasted in interservice rivalry.  
 It is difficult to pinpoint the degree of popular militarism in contemporary American society. 
Gallup polls have consistently shown that more Americans have confidence in the military than in 
Congress and the Presidency – a trend that has become even more significant in recent years.600 
However, such evidence is not sufficient to determine if the population’s trust in the military is 
strong enough to change the relationship between soldiers and civilians. Though we do have some 
indications that the military is somewhat popular, we do not have a clear picture of how deep this 
popularity runs amongst voters. Neither do we know if it gives the military any leeway vis-à-vis the 
government. 
 Individual leaders have had different backgrounds and expectations to elite civil-military 
relations. For example, the contrast between the two Bush administrations and the Clinton 
administration is stark. The first Bush White House contained several seasoned foreign policy 
veterans and prioritized military policy highly. The President had of course served as Director of 
Central Intelligence in the 1970s and Brent Scowcroft, his National Security Advisor, was a retired air 
force general. 601 The Clinton administration, on the other hand, did not seem to prioritize military 
policy and his administration was generally thought to be thin on military expertise.602 The second 
Bush administration came into office feeling that the military had been left alone to languish and 
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had become institutionally and culturally dormant. Defense reform became a high priority.603 Several 
of its members – which included two former secretaries of defense - had extensive experience with 
defense policy. Changes in civilian leadership lead to different takes on military policy. This affected 
the elite civil-military system.   
 After the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer faced an immediate military 
threat. The Soviet Union had collapsed and left the United States alone as the world’s sole 
superpower. Although the United States still faced some minor threats, its long-term survival is no 
longer in jeopardy. Though global terrorism should be taken seriously, it does not pose an existential 
threat against the United States. Consequently, American policymakers have been given a somewhat 
free hand to pursue the policy goals that they decided to prioritize. Without an international threat, 
the domestic flaws of the American system have never delegitimized the government, the 
constitution, or the state.  
 Post-Cold War conflicts have mainly been fought for political reasons. Their character has 
largely been dictated by political reasoning. For instance, political considerations – concern for 
public support, for support in the international community, and for the health of the Western 
alliance – meant that the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were fought as air wars. Though 
the idea of a land invasion was considered, it was eventually discarded because of the heavy political 
costs it would entail.604 The United States could afford to pursue this type of war because of the lack 
of a clear international threat. This led to some dissatisfaction and a minor loss of trust within the 
ranks.605 The combination of a lack of overall threat and a lack of consensus over the way in which 
military power should be used, did lead to some elite civil-military tensions. 606 However, in spite of a 
few episodes, this dissatisfaction was never strong enough to fuel a large-scale military resistance 
against the government. 607  
All in all, the fundamentals of American elite civil-military relations are healthy. Tensions are 
largely caused by the unavoidable changing of civilian and military leaders and the changes in skill, 
outlook, personality and visions that this entails. There are some factors that could be changed to 
improve elite civil-military relations. The external control institutions split the civilian principal, while 
uniting the military agent in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, altering this 
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fundamental set-up has significant negative side-effects that would most likely make it a suboptimal 
choice of policy. The civilian strategic culture has lacked a consistent understanding of when and 
why force should be used. It seems obvious that a more prudent relationship to the use of force 
would not only improve elite civil-military relations – it would also be beneficial for the overall 
national security of the United States. However, our understanding of American strategic culture is 
not strong enough to predict if the mistakes of the past years can be avoided in the future. Finally, it 
is not entirely clear how deep the popularity of the armed forces runs or if this popular militarism 
allows the military an excessive sanction against the government.  
 Looking forward, the main question is if the elite civil-military system is capable of handling 
the challenges that lie ahead. The international balance of power is changing and the long-term 
security of the United States may soon be at risk. Will its elite civil-military system be up to speed 
with the trials that arise? Answering this question requires a more extensive study of the exact 
nature of the future problems of national security and the strength of the current American elite 
civil-military system. A crude estimate would be that the current system is relatively well-
functioning. One should always hesitate to make ironclad predictions, but it seems likely that though 
elite civil-military tensions will certainly occur, they do not pose a mortal danger to the long-term 
survival of the United States.  
 
Conclusion 
Elite civil-military relations constitute a system of interrelated variables, the purpose of which is to 
maximize the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state. Five key variables make up the 
center of the system: the priorities of the civilian government, civilian trust of the military, military 
trust of the civilians, the external control institutions available to the civilians, and the actual skills of 
the military and civilian elites. The stability of the system can be affected when one or more of eight 
exogenous factors are altered: the legitimacy of the state, constitution, and society; the strategic 
culture of the civilian elite; military culture; administrative reforms; popular militarism; skills and 
personality of individual leaders; level of threat facing the state; the character of conflicts in which 
the state is involved.  
 This model of the elite civil-military system illustrates the complexity of these relations. One 
cannot say that one civilian control policy is superior a priori. Instead, it depends on a host of 
different factors that determine if the government should pursue an assertive or an objective civilian 
control policy. Furthermore, harmony between civilian and military elites is not a goal in itself. 
Discord may be the correct policy if it creates more effectiveness in the long run.  
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- 10 - 
Conclusions 
 
This dissertation is about civil-military relations theory. What do we know about how the interaction 
between soldiers and civilians affects the political governance of the state? What are the limits of 
our knowledge? What is holding us back from knowing even more? How do we develop better 
theories of civil-military relations? This concluding chapter answers these questions based on the 
findings of this dissertation. It begins by outlining why the lack of a theoretical framework is the 
primary stumbling block preventing the development of better theories of civil-military relations. It 
then presents the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation. Having done so, it then 
shows why this theoretical framework is superior to any alternative framework, most importantly 
the one presented by Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State. Finally, it ends by highlighting 
the blind spots within our understanding of civil-military relations, which have been exposed by the 
theoretical framework.  
 
The problem of contemporary theory 
The social scientific study of civil-military relations is hampered by the lack of a coherent theoretical 
framework. The concepts used within the field are simply not properly defined and scholars 
therefore often talk past one another. Many studies focus on highlighting the weaknesses in the 
classical works of the field – weaknesses that were often the result of an imprecise use of terms. The 
solution was to develop a more exact terminology. In other words, the field needs a better 
theoretical framework.  
 I sought out to remedy this problem in this dissertation. In the introduction, I compared this 
venture with the task facing Kenneth Waltz, when he wrote Man, the State, and War: to explore 
how scholars think about civil-military relations and make sure that the concepts used within the 
discipline make sense. Using political and military sociology, I analyzed the meaning of the different 
concepts used to explain the interaction between soldiers and civilians. Unpacking the scholarly 
literature, it became obvious that the dominant theoretical framework was developed by Samuel 
Huntington in The Soldier and the State. Later scholars have attacked Huntington, pointing to the 
empirical faults of his theory, or the theoretical imprecision of one or more of his concepts. 
However, none of them have provided an overarching theory; nor have they tried to significantly 
challenge his theoretical framework.  
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This dissertation might be read as a denigration of Huntington’s work, but is meant to be 
anything but that. Huntington brought much needed consistency to the civil-military relations field, 
but was preoccupied by a need to solve several puzzles within one work. He simply tried to address 
too many things at the same time. The Soldier and the State contained a theoretical framework of 
civil-military relations, a discourse on Western military history, a theory of civil-military relations, a 
theory of civilian control of the military, an overview of the fundamental policy problems facing 
civilian leaders, and a set of policy recommendations for American Cold War policymakers. The 
scope of his project forced him to multitask. While many of his findings were sound, and still stand 
the test of time, his theory of civil-military relations, his policy recommendations for American Cold 
War policymakers, and his theoretical framework were all somewhat off the mark.  
The goal of developing a theoretical framework for civil-military relations – which he 
explicitly identified as his core task - disappeared in the jostling of his purposes. Huntington’s 
nascent theoretical framework was developed by marrying different types of scholarly literature. He 
combined political sociology with military sociology, military history, and military science. I decided 
to replicate this route, but to take more time to explain the nature of each concept. Many advances 
have been made in political and military sociology since Huntington wrote his book in 1957. Using 
these advances helped me to paint a more thorough and coherent picture of the interaction 
between soldiers and civilians.  
 
The theoretical framework of civil-military relations 
Here is the end product of that endeavor. Civil-military relations consist of two subtypes: elite civil-
military relations (the interaction between military and civilian elites within the state) and societal 
civil-military relations (how and why the armed forces contribute to the survival of modern society in 
general). Political science approaches to civil-military relations typically focus on elite civil-military 
relations, but bring in societal civil-military relations to explain the general requirements that are 
asked of civilian and military elites.  
Policymakers in modern democracies have to choose between a palette of different civilian 
control policies. They have the option of controlling the military directly or establishing external 
control institutions. There are basically three types of direct control: objective control entails 
allowing the military to handle policy details autonomously, assertive control involves some 
meddling in the operational and tactical details of military policy, while subjective control involves 
meddling in policy details and replacing the military elite with officers who share the values of the 
civilian government. Subjective control is rarely pursued in advanced democracies and scholars 
typically focus on the choice between assertive and objective control. Furthermore, policymakers 
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may also choose to establish external control institutions. These help them detect and punish 
military shirking. However, they typically entail a loss of military effectiveness. There is no easy 
solution to this aim. Instead, all policy options have advantages and disadvantages. The choice of 
policy depends on the circumstances under which the choice is made.  
The policy options facing political leaders reflect the complex nature of civil-military 
relations. Civil-military relations consist – as mentioned above – of elite civil-military relations and 
societal civil-military relations. Elite civil-military relations constitute a system, based on five core 
variables: the policy priorities of the civilian government, the civilians’ trust of the military, the 
military’s trust of the civilians, the balance between civilian and military skills, and the external 
institutional set-up that define the interaction between soldiers and civilians. The purpose of elite 
civil-military relations is to maximize the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state. The 
strength and health of the system is determined by eight exogenous factors: the general legitimacy 
of the government, state, and constitution; the civilian strategic culture; the values defining military 
culture; administrative reforms; popular militarism; the skills and personalities of individual leaders; 
the general level of threat; and the character of the conflicts in which the state engages. Together, 
these factors make up the fundamentals of the elite civil-military system.  
Essentially, the relationship between soldiers and civilians is essentially a classic information 
asymmetry problem: because they do not know the details of the use of force as well as members of 
the armed forces, civilian leaders have a hard time ensuring that the military is implementing their 
policies completely. This problem is exacerbated by the secrecy required in military affairs. 
Furthermore, the military also has significant and subtle informal power, which it can use to 
destabilize the government. For example, military officers, whether retired or serving, have several 
venues they can use to speak out against the government. Many of these conduits are impossible to 
remove, as they are also used for legitimate purposes. Though clearly illegitimate if used to pursue 
narrow, bureaucratic interests, such practices are hard to distinguish from legitimate usage 
motivated by a genuine concern for the constitution. The military does not necessarily have to use 
these options for them to be politically important because the very possibility of their usage may 
influence the government’s course of action vis-à-vis the armed forces. 
Students of elite civil-military relations focus on one of two analytical perspectives. Civilian 
control refers to the civilian leadership’s ability to control the armed forces. It focuses on how the 
military becomes motivated to accept civilian supremacy. Military effectiveness is the capacity to 
generate military force from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and 
human capital. It focuses on the effect of elite civil-military interaction.  
208 
 
Civilian control is established through a combination of external and internal mechanisms. 
External mechanisms refer to the use of institutions to monitor and punish military actors. This 
approach assumes that actors pursue their own narrow interests. Institutions essentially influence 
the payoffs of behaving in one or another manner. Institutions can delimit the incentive to act 
against the will of the government by making it easier for the government to detect and punish such 
behavior. Internal mechanisms are defined as the creation of a military culture of loyalty. The soldier 
is more easily controlled if he feels loyal to the democratic institutions of the state. But neither 
external nor internal mechanisms are a panacea that solves the problem of civilian control. Instead, 
these mechanisms are typically combined to ensure that the military implements the will of the 
government.  
Military effectiveness depends on the balance between need for a division of labor between 
soldiers and civilians and the need for strategic coherence. The division of labor between soldiers 
and civilians originate in the specific expertise that each group possesses. Soldiers are professional 
experts in the art and science of warfare, while civilian politicians are experts in the art and science 
of politics. None of these spheres of expertise are purely scientific, though the element of science is 
more pronounced for the soldier than it is for the politician. This division of expertise informs the 
division of labor between soldiers and civilians. Ideally, decisions should be made by the latter in 
after an open and frank discussion, where both groups contribute. These deliberations are based on 
information gathered by the military bureaucracy, which also has the task of implementing decisions 
once they have been made.  
This division of labor principle is balanced by a need for strategic coherence. The civilian 
leadership has to ensure that the military bureaucracy gathers information and implements decision 
in a way that reflects the overall strategy. This can only be done by interfering in tactics and 
operations. Civilian control ensures strategic coherence. In other words, strategic coherence is 
ensured by meddling in decisions within the armed forces’ purview. It necessitates compromising 
the division of labor.  
 The two imperatives that define elite civil-military relations can only be understood by 
taking a broader perspective and looking at how they originate in the processes that define society. 
In other words, elite civil-military relations are shaped by societal civil-military relations. These 
relations are characterized by a tension between a societal and a functional imperative. The societal 
imperative is the degree to which domestic features of society obstruct the state from pursuing an 
optimal political course. The functional imperative is the material requirements that a society has to 
fulfill in order to survive: the state needs to accumulate power to ensure that enemy states do not 
cut off its access to material resources.  
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 The need for military effectiveness grows out of the functional imperative. All states require 
power to fend off enemies, and to keep order within their borders. Military force is one of the tools 
through which the state generates power. Compared to earlier state forms, the modern state has 
access to a wider range of power generation tools. Whereas earlier states depended largely on 
continuous military campaigns, the modern state has the option of generating power through its 
domestic economy. Thus, whereas pre-modern states relied on constant warfare, the modern state 
can generate power through peace.  
The need for civilian control originates in the legitimacy structures of the modern state. 
Modern society is defined by a need for accountability. Members of civil society offer taxes, 
manpower, and loyalty in exchange for protection and services. This need for accountability was less 
pronounced in previous societies. In modern society, it is absolutely central. Since the military 
revolution during the early modern era, the military competition between states has forced the state 
to include a steadily wider group in the social contract. Consequently, the government needs to 
control the armed forces, because it is part of the larger idea of accountability to which it owes its 
legitimacy.  
 The societal imperative depends on whether or not the ideas and cultural categories that 
determine the state’s course of action are compatible with the threats it faces. In other words, the 
state’s ability to respond to foreign threats is influenced by the ideas within the government and civil 
society and the degree to which the political system allows ideas to transfer from civil society to the 
state. Because of the accountability principle that defines modern society, ideas fermented in civil 
society may influence the state’s ability to respond to foreign threats. The societal imperative may 
become problematic due to either excessive individualism or excessive elite militarism. In other 
words, the elite may either under- or overestimate the importance of military force. Furthermore, 
the armed forces may gather additional clandestine power if it becomes too popular in the 
population at large (popular militarism). This can skew the relationship between civilian and military 
elites.  
 
Moving beyond ‘The Soldier and the State’ 
This dissertation is the first comprehensive meta-theoretical study of civil-military relations and the 
first complete description of the theoretical framework of civil-military relations. Contemporary 
theorists have been pre-occupied with exploring sub-dimensions of civil-military relations. The 
present study collects all these insights into a coherent theoretical framework. The theoretical 
framework that Samuel Huntington developed in The Soldier and the State did not fully define the 
concepts, or describe the causal logic within the field. These limitations influenced his theory of civil-
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military relations. The result was a set of empirical predictions that did not pan out. I have 
highlighted the most important conceptual inconsistencies throughout this dissertation.  
Huntington did not explore the policy-dilemma facing policy-makers. When mapping out the 
policy options facing civilian leaders, he only explored subjective and objective control, the two 
extreme positions. He did not investigate the consequences of an assertive control policy, the middle 
position between these extremes. Modern, advanced democracies rarely, if ever, pursue a policy of 
subjective control. Instead, most policy-makers choose between assertive or objective control. This 
study added this option to the framework of civil-military relations. Furthermore, Huntington did not 
explore how civilian policymakers could control the military by establishing external control 
institutions.  
Huntington regarded professionalism as the pivotal factor in his theoretical framework. In 
his view, the choice between different civilian control policies should be evaluated based on 
whether or not they enhanced professionalism. Professionalism ensured both civilian control and 
military effectiveness. But he did not distinguish between civilian control and the creation of military 
effectiveness.  
By contrast, the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation draws an important 
analytical distinction between civilian control and military effectiveness. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to explore how the military comes to accept civilian supremacy and the consequences of 
interaction between civilian and military elites concurrently. Studies typically look at just one of 
these dimensions. Huntington did not explicitly distinguish between civilian control and military 
effectiveness, and his description of each of these categories was incomplete. His implicit conception 
of military effectiveness focused on the division of labor between civilian and military experts. He 
did not emphasize the need for strategic coherence; nor did he describe how this entailed 
compromising the aforementioned division of labor by allowing civilians to meddle in operational 
and tactical details.  
Similarly, his conception of civilian control focused excessively on internal mechanisms of 
control, while largely ignoring the equally important external mechanisms. He did not see civilian 
control as a combination of external and internal mechanisms. Instead, he offered a purely 
internalist position. This argument was based on an imperfect conception of military 
professionalism. Huntington believed that professional soldiers will automatically be loyal to a 
democratically elected government. However, this is not necessarily the case. Even professional 
soldiers are loyal to many different groups and communities and one cannot argue a priori that they 
will remain loyal to the government in a time of crisis. Furthermore, many of the mechanisms that 
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create modern military culture also lead to parochialism. Officers may just as well pursue the narrow 
interests of the military bureaucracy as they may pursue the interests of the government.  
Huntington did not provide a comprehensive definition of professionalism – the most 
important variable in his scheme. He offered three empirical characteristics of the professional 
soldier, yet he did not pinpoint the essential nature of professionalism. The framework presented in 
this dissertation offers such a definition. Military professionalism is the spread of officers, who have 
become experts in military science through specialized training in military academies, throughout 
the armed forces. When looking at the development of the modern military, one finds that it is only 
one of several factors that facilitate political neutrality within military culture. Other factors, such as 
the development of bureaucratic modes of organization characterized by meritocratic promotion 
structures and a strong and legitimate state, play an equally important role.  
This limitation within Huntington’s framework was, to some extent, caused by an 
incomplete conception of military expertise. He implicitly understood it as a scientific and universal 
knowledge type, which can be taught at the military academy and which will not differ from officer 
to officer. The framework presented in this dissertation offers a more nuanced portrayal of military 
expertise. Clausewitz understood military expertise as both an art and a science. While it certainly 
contains scientific elements, such as the calculation of troop movements and the performance of 
weaponry, it cannot be reduced to a purely scientific type of knowledge. It also contains some 
elements of intuitive and artistic thinking, which cannot be taught at the academy. Thus, different 
officers come to different recommendations about the same issue. For that reason, military 
expertise is not of a universal standard, and the military officer, though an expert in the eyes of the 
public, cannot claim the authority of infallible skill. Instead, his judgments may be questioned by 
other experts, and become the subject of debate.  
Huntington’s framework also failed to paint an accurate portrait of societal civil-military 
relations. The twin imperatives shaping these relations were not defined adequately. When 
analyzing the societal imperative, he grasped how the state could be endangered if dominated by 
anti-military ideology. However, he did not describe how militarism – the flip-side of the ideological 
coin – could also cause significant problems. His analysis of the functional imperative overestimated 
the importance of military force and failed to grasp how many states have other tools for power 
generation at their disposal. Analyzing the American Cold War societal civil-military relations, he did 
not understand that the United States occupied a privileged position in the international system, 
which - combined with its strong domestic economy - allowed it to dominate even though it did not 
direct all its available resources to the military. This latter mistake was transposed into his theory of 
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civil-military relations and caused him to make inaccurate predictions of American Cold War civil-
military relations.  
Based on the many problems with his theory and theoretical framework, the status of 
Samuel Huntington’s work within the field should be reconsidered. Huntington’s writings – especially 
The Soldier and the State –have hitherto been the starting point for exploring civil-military relations. 
Huntington is certainly one of the field’s great masters. However, he can no longer be the starting 
point for all scholarship. He should instead become a figure of primarily historical importance, whom 
it is crucial to study to understand the historical background of the field, but who does not define 
the field in the 21st century. His role should be akin to that which figures like August Comte or 
Ferdinand Tönnies have within sociology. Comte was the father of modern social science and 
introduced several of the categories that eventually turned into our modern social science 
vocabulary. Tönnies introduced the distinction between traditional communal life and the 
rationalized existence of modernity – Gemeinshaft and Gesellschaft – which has become central to 
most sociological theory from Weber to Foucault. Reading Comte and Tönnies is crucial if one wants 
to understand the intellectual history of the social sciences. It gives us a chance to understand from 
where our frames of mind come. Anyone who would want to scrutinize our present concepts might 
go back to Comte and Tönnies to understand their historical origins. However, no one would argue 
that one could analyze today’s society in any satisfactory way using their categories alone. Instead, 
contemporary sociologists have taken their notions and refined them through a long process of 
theoretical discussion. In the same way, the civil-military relations field has to move beyond 
Huntington. Challenging Huntington has been an important task – this dissertation has been doing 
just that – but the field simply has to move on. This dissertation has shown that Huntington’s theory 
and theoretical framework were both flawed. It has provided the field with a new and coherent 
theoretical framework. The study of civil-military relations is moving into a post-Huntingtonian era.  
 
The future of civil-military relations research 
Theoretical frameworks help us to ask better questions about a field of study. For instance, Kenneth 
Waltz’ theoretical framework of international relations - presented in Man, the State and War - 
allowed scholars to pinpoint the gaps in their existing knowledge of international politics. Thus, the 
theoretical framework of civil-military relations permits us to understand what we do not know 
about how soldiers and civilians interact. I would therefore like to conclude this dissertation by 
listing what I consider to be the five most promising avenues for future research. Firstly, and perhaps 
foremost, the literature still lacks a comprehensive theory of elite civil-military relations. The 
framework presented in this dissertation highlights the crucial factors that determine patterns of 
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elite civil-military relations. However, it has not explored the relative importance of these factors. 
Which of them determine how soldiers and civilians interact? Had it done so, it would have 
presented a theory of elite civil-military relations. Such a theory, however, requires careful empirical 
analysis, which was well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Analyzing empirical cases to develop 
a theory of elite civil-military relations is perhaps the most important task facing students of civil-
military relations.   
Secondly, we still need a greater understanding how civilian control is the result of internal 
and external mechanisms for control. Civilian control is – as mentioned - one of the two major 
subtopics within civil-military relations. By distinguishing between these two types of control 
mechanisms, this dissertation showed that neither of these mechanisms can explain civilian control 
of the military. Instead, civilian control is always instituted through a combination of external and 
internal mechanisms for control. The literature has hitherto focused on either internal or external 
mechanisms. Future research should explore how these mechanisms are combined.  
Thirdly, we need a much better conception of how internal control mechanisms work. The 
civil-military relations literature cannot explain why members of the military become politically 
neutral. Political neutrality, the dominant literature argues, follows from the fact that modern 
officers are professionals. This dissertation explored this idea and found it wanting. Professionalism 
most often means a politically neutrality military. It covers a variety of different causal mechanisms, 
which are rarely mentioned. The relationship between these causal factors – which constitutes the 
underlying cause of political neutrality – is generally not explored. Understanding how and why 
militaries become politically neutral should be a goal for future civil-military relations research. The 
model presented in chapter 7 could be a starting point for that endeavor.  
Fourth, we must gain get a better understanding of how military effectiveness – the second 
area of study within elite civil-military relations - is generated. The literature on elite civil-military 
relations and military effectiveness has focused on the empirical study of historical examples. It 
yields several important insights about which patterns of civil-military relations are optimal for 
military effectiveness. It generally argues that civilian meddling generates military effectiveness. 
However, to be useful for the civil-military relations field, these historical insights need to be 
captured in more general terms. The existing literature focuses on a few successful cases. Very little 
research looks at cases where the civil-military interaction results in defeat. One could hypothesize 
that there would be cases where civilian meddling had a detrimental effect.  
 Finally, this dissertation kept two variables – the character of war and the polity of the state 
– more or less constant. It was shown that the relative importance of political and military expertise 
is crucial for elite civil-military relations. However, I did not explore how different types of war entail 
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more or less political and military expertise. Future research can broaden the conclusions of this 
dissertation by looking at that question. Furthermore, I only looked at elite civil-military relations in 
advanced, Western democracies. In principle, one would expect that the processes uncovered in this 
dissertation can be found in other types of societies as well. Merging this research with the vast 
coup studies field that looks primarily on developing states is another avenue for future research.  
With that outline of the future avenues for civil-military relations research, this dissertation 
has gone full circle. We set out to understand how better theories of civil-military relations could be 
developed, and if there were any stumbling blocks preventing this from happening. It was shown 
that the lack of a coherent theoretical framework was the main problem. Such a framework was 
then developed and the avenues for future research were highlighted. This framework will hopefully 
serve as the foundation for more accurate analyses of civil-military relations.  
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